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This study examines the history of marital rape and related topics in the United 
States within the broader context of women’s legal and political rights. The project 
demonstrates the interplay between women’s activists, legislators, the criminal justice 
system, and an involved public necessary to change both societal and legal views on 
spousal rape, and eventually its criminalization in all fifty states.  
Chief Justice Matthew Hale first announced the legal impossibility of rape in 
marriage in a seventeenth-century treatise in which he established the irrevocable consent 
theory, which argued that men had an absolute right to sexual relations within the bonds of 
marriage, and provided the foundation for a marital rape exemption. While modern case 
law and legal commentary questioned the veracity of Hale’s presumption, it remained the 
basis for successful arguments against spousal rape laws for centuries in both Great Britain 
and the United States.  
Concentrating on approaches to criminalizing marital rape in three of the fifty 
states, this dissertation provides a reasonable representation of the existence of the 
marital rape exemption in America, arguments used to maintain the exemption, and 
various methods used to end this form of gendered violence and gender discrimination 
accepted in this country until the 1970s. It explores key issues relevant to the social and 
  
legal history of spousal rape in the United States: the rise of domestic violence and sexual 
assault movements that began in the late 1970s and the promulgation of rape shield laws, 
which provided evidentiary protections for rape victims during trial.  
Ultimately, this project demonstrates several of the important victories that women 
made in areas of personal autonomy over their bodies, which led to the criminalization of 
rape in marriage. Over the course of nearly one hundred and fifty years, social and legal 
attitudes toward spousal rape – actually, sexual assault in general – resulted in greater legal 
protection for the rights of married women. The elimination of the marital rape exemption, 
better trained law enforcement, increased services provided by advocates, and a more 
informed public all contributed to increased visibility about the existence of marital rape 
and active responses to that crime. 
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A NOTE ABOUT LEGAL TERMS 
 Because state law governs crimes related to sexual assault, each state has the 
authority to select the phraseology it will use to describe those criminal offenses. 
Throughout this dissertation, seemingly different terms may appear to describe similar 
offenses. For instance, California uses the term “spousal rape,” while South Carolina uses 
“spousal sexual battery.” While there might be a slight variation in the elements of those 
crimes, they refer to virtually the same offense.  Three times, the phrase “forcible rape” 
appears. In those instances, I follow the definition provided by the FBI’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting (UCR) Program: “the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her 
will.”  Attempts or assaults to commit rape by force or threat of force are also included 
within this definition; however, statutory rape (without force) and other sex offenses are 
not. Finally, some states use the term marital rape, while other states use spousal rape to 
describe criminalized sexual actions between married partners. I use the terms 
interchangeably.   
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INTRODUCTION 
“LEGITIMIZING” MARITAL RAPE: CHANGING SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
ATTITUDES ABOUT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MARRIAGE 
 
On October 10, 1978, Greta Rideout called the Salem Women’s Crisis Service of 
Salem, Oregon, to report that her husband, John, had raped her. The crisis worker advised 
Greta to call the police. When the police arrived, Greta reiterated her claim that her 
husband had raped her. On October 18, the State charged John with violating Oregon’s 
recently revised rape law, which did not provide an exemption for men accused of raping 
their wives. In 1978, Oregon was one of only three states whose rape laws did not include 
the common law exemption for husbands accused of raping their wives. The resulting 
trial was the first in the United States in which a husband faced charges of raping his wife 
while the couple was still living together. Held in December 1978, the trial lasted only six 
days; deliberations by the jury took only two-and-a-half hours. The jury of eight women 
and four men acquitted John Rideout because they did not feel that there was adequate 
evidence to support a verdict of “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”1 
Despite the verdict, the Rideout case holds a unique position in the history of 
marital rape in America. Irene Frieze explained that prior to Rideout, “there was little 
discussion of marital rape by the general public or by researchers and counselors skilled 
in dealing with other types of rape cases.”2 The Rideout trial changed that. The media 
paid significant attention to the Rideout case because of the novel issue it presented: was 
rape in marriage a legitimate crime? The case received national news coverage in print 
and on television. Walter Cronkite, the avuncular news anchor hailed as “the most trusted 
                                                 
1 Melissa Anne Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse? Media Coverage of Marital Rape in the 1978 Rideout 
Trial,” Master’s thesis, Georgia State University (2008), 2-3. 
2 Irene Hanson Frieze, “Investigating the Causes and Consequences of Marital Rape,” Signs 8, no. 3 (1983), 
532. 
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man in America,” discussed the trial on The CBS Evening News. National newspaper 
coverage included the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, and 
the Los Angeles Times.3  
While many articles mentioned Oregon’s revised rape law, very few addressed the 
legal reasoning undergirding it. For example, Rideout revolved around such legal issues 
as equal protection, and yet media coverage rarely explained that equal protection for 
wives required the elimination of the marital rape exemption.4 One article, purportedly 
offering to explain the “background” to the trial, made only brief reference to the 
underlying statute, noting that the original bill included a spousal exemption, but that 
legislators amended it to allow prosecution of husbands. The article, however, did quote 
State Senator Vern Cook, who had voted against the bill.5 According to Cook, his main 
objection to the bill was that it absolved women of “their responsibility to avoid a 
situation . . . by moving out of the house” and that resulting trials would amount to 
nothing more than “a swearing contest between husband and wife” that would be difficult 
for a court to resolve.6 Such arguments engaged in victim blaming and suggested that 
rape in marriage was nothing more than a squabble between husband and wife that did 
not require intervention by the criminal justice system. 
Media coverage generally focused on witness testimony regarding Greta’s 
character, rather than offering legal commentary. Even before the trial began, headlines 
referenced her sexual history, her motivations for bringing the charge, and her 
                                                 
3 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 3, 50. 
4 Lisa M. Cuklanz, Rape on Trial: How the Mass Media Construct Legal Reform and Social Change 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 53, 56. 
5 Robert Vernon “Vern” Cook served in the Oregon House of Representatives from 1956 until 1960 when 
voters elected him to the Oregon Senate. He remained in the Senate until he was defeated in the 1980 
election. 
6 Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 56. 
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“propensity” for lying. The trial followed a similar path. District Attorney Gary 
Gortmaker described the harsh reality of many rape cases: despite the perception that the 
defendant is on trial, “we’re going to try the victim first, the law second, and the 
defendant third.”7 Demonstrating the attitude of many prosecutors at the time, Gortmaker 
openly expressed his lack of sympathy with victims of spousal rape. At the beginning of 
the trial, Gortmaker stated: “if it had happened in the bedroom and he didn’t beat her up, 
I’d agree with the other side.”8 The transparency of Gortmaker’s statement illustrated the 
ongoing argument of domestic violence and sexual assault advocates: simply passing a 
law against marital rape did not instantaneously change public opinion about the 
wrongfulness of forced sex in marriage. Additionally, it reflected a widespread belief that 
to constitute rape, the victim must suffer physical injury that is observable.  
As Franklin E. Zimring noted: “More than novelty made the Rideout trial . . . one 
of the premier media events of its time. Public reaction was heightened by the prospect of 
forcible sex in marriage being treated as forcible rape because the majority of the 
population [did] not accept the moral equivalence of the two behaviors.”9 The jury’s 
verdict underscored the incongruity between public perception of rape and spousal rape. 
Editorials following the verdict attempted to explain the jury’s decision. One author 
stated: “The idea that marriage implies or requires perpetual consent, under all 
circumstances, to sex is grotesque. And a partner in a marriage must have resource [sic] 
to the law when the other partner resorts to violence.” 10 At the same time, he and others 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 53.  
8 Susan Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” American Bar Association Journal 66, no. 9 (1980), 
1091. 
9 Franklin E. Zimring, “Legal Perspectives on Family Violence,” California Law Review 75, no. 1 (1987), 
537. 
10 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 63-64; G. F. Will, “When Custom Doesn’t Work Anymore,” 
Washington Post (December 28, 1978). 
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recognized that John Rideout faced up to 20 years behind bars if the jury found him 
guilty and questioned the appropriateness of such a sentence. The conflict was evident: 
recognizing the immorality of spousal rape, how does one determine what punishment is 
appropriate? Evidently, the jurors believed that a twenty-year sentence was too severe for 
the crime of spousal rape.11 Another journalist took a varied, but related, approach, 
suggesting that a charge of assault and battery would have netted a very different result. 
She reasoned that a jury would be more likely to convict if they knew the defendant was 
facing six months rather than twenty years.12 By focusing on relative sentencing for rape 
and assault and battery, both articles allude to a perception that spousal rape was not as 
damaging as stranger rape. Further analysis by scholar Lisa Kivett concluded: “The 
reluctance to punish spousal rape with penalties commensurate with other types of rape 
showed the continuing uncertainty that rape was, in law, even possible between husband 
and wife.”13 Thus, members of the jury, and by extension the community at large, 
acknowledged the possibility of forced intimacy in marriage, but were uncertain whether 
it was an appropriate matter to bring before the court. 
During the trial, journalists rarely approached feminist reformers for their 
opinions on violence in marriage. While publications on domestic violence and rape in 
marriage were available in the years leading up to Rideout, the mainstream had not 
accepted the arguments raised by those texts as a way to understand the dynamics of 
                                                 
11 The jury was not in a position to consider a sentence less than twenty years. All that they knew was that 
the “judge called for an acquittal or a minimum conviction of first-degree rape, with a 20-year sentence, 
without instructing the jury how much of the sentence the defendant would actually serve.” Barry, “Spousal 
Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1091. 
12 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 64; Judy Mann, “Jury in Oregon Ducked Constitutional Questions,” 
Washington Post (December 29, 1978).  
13 Lisa Kivett, “Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law,” Baylor 
Law Review 38 (1986), 1047. 
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family violence. However, when given the opportunity, feminists expressed views on 
violence, within marriage, including rape. One woman presented an equal protection 
argument, explain that prior to the 1977 adoption of Oregon’s revised rape statute, the 
law presented a problem for married women since only women separated from their 
husbands could bring a charge of [marital] rape. Another noted the importance of the 
Rideout trial: “We women have been taught that we have no choice, that [sexual 
submission] is our role in life, what we’re supposed to do. . . . This trial is so important to 
make women aware they’re not property, that they have choices” – the choice to say no 
to unwanted intimacy with their husbands, and the choice to seek legal recourse if their 
refusal is overcome.14  
The Rideout story did not end with John’s acquittal. The couple briefly 
reconciled, but divorced in 1979. As is common in cases of domestic violence, John’s 
attention to Greta did not cease when their marriage legally ended. Later that year, he 
pled guilty to criminal trespass for breaking into Greta’s home and the court sentenced 
John to probation. The court eventually revoked his probation, finding that John had 
repeatedly violated the terms that strictly prohibited further threatening communications 
with his ex-wife.15 
  Despite John Rideout’s acquittal, his trial raised several issues that persisted in 
subsequent marital rape trials. As states passed laws that eliminated the spousal 
exemption to rape, legislators had to overcome the argument that current assault and 
battery statutes were sufficient to address cases of marital rape. When Oregon revised its 
                                                 
14 Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 63. See, Diana Russell, The Politics of Rape: The Victim’s Perspective (New 
York: Stein and Day, 1975); Del Martin, Battered Wives (San Francisco: Glide Publications, 1976). 
15 Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1091. 
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rape law in 1977, it faced opposition within and outside of the legislature. The original 
bill would have allowed prosecution when married couples lived apart or when unmarried 
couples lived together; however, “the Senate Judiciary Committee amended the proposed 
bill to allow prosecutions regardless of marital or residential status.”16 This change 
caused a few of the bill’s original supporters to vote against it. One state senator 
explained his opposition: “We don’t need another law to make assault and battery a 
crime. They’re confusing assault and battery with rape.”17 Charles Burt, defense attorney 
for John Rideout, was one of the most outspoken opponents to Oregon’s rape statute. 
Burt addressed the issue of marital privacy when he argued that it was “a waste of the 
criminal court’s time to get into [the] area of [marital intimacy].” In an inflammatory 
remark, Burt insisted: “a woman who’s still in a marriage is presumably consenting to 
sex. . . . Maybe this is the risk of being married, you know?”18 The Oregon legal 
community was quite familiar with Burt’s opposition to marital rape laws. At a dinner for 
the State Bar Board of Governors, attendees presented Burt with a T-shirt that read 
“Rapists Need Love Too.”19  
As noted above, Greta’s sexual history was a primary concern throughout the 
trial. At the time of the Rideout trial, it was common for defense attorneys to use the 
victim’s sexual history to attack her credibility and the truthfulness of her claim. As a 
result, many victims were reluctant to report the crime or to take the case to trial. Rideout 
was no exception. The judge ruled that the defense could introduce evidence of Greta’s 
                                                 
16 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 52. 
17 Ibid., 52-53. 
18 Barry, “Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law,” 1090. 
19 Ibid. 
 7 
 
dishonesty and sexual history during the trial.20 Thus, the jury heard that Greta Rideout 
had “sexual problems,” a topic of great interest reported by the media. The defense 
focused on Greta’s past abortions and a previous accusation of rape that she later 
recanted. The jury also heard that Greta told John that she was sexually interested in other 
women, although she later explained that talk of a lesbian fantasy was just to get a rise 
out of her husband. Burt used Greta’s recanting of the prior rape claim and the lesbian 
fantasy incident to challenge Greta’s truthfulness, suggesting that she was dishonest and 
was lying about her husband raping her.21 
Because rape by a husband did not fit the cultural image of a stranger in a dark 
alley assaulting and raping a woman, Rideout also emphasized the question of whether 
forced sex in marriage constituted “real rape.” Perceptions of marital rape have been the 
subject of many studies, which gauge participant attitudes about the severity of marital 
rape. Many have shown that the doubts about appropriate sentencing as seen in the 
Rideout trial were common. A study conducted in 1999 found that eighty percent of the 
general population believed that husbands used force often or somewhat often to have sex 
with their wives, yet significantly fewer categorized such action as rape. Researchers 
attributed this cultural invalidation to the participants being less likely to categorize 
behavior as rape when there was greater evidence of prior sexual intimacy between the 
victim and the accused. One of the first studies used to evaluate the perceived seriousness 
of marital rape asked participants to evaluate the severity of a variety of crimes. Overall, 
participants ranked forcible rape by a former spouse as nearly equivalent to blackmail 
                                                 
20 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 39. 
21 Bazhaw, “For Better or for Worse,” 38. 
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and the use of LSD, once again suggesting the perception that rape by a current or former 
intimate partner was not as traumatizing as stranger rape.22  
Lisa Cuklanz, professor of Communication Studies at Boston College, has closely 
evaluated the Rideout trial and has provided commentary on why the acquittal was the 
only verdict that the public could have reasonably expected. To reach another verdict 
would have required the court, jury, and mainstream culture to move beyond traditional 
beliefs about rape and marriage. According to Cuklanz: “they would have had to believe 
that wife battering syndrome existed, that there was no significant motivation for a wife 
to concoct a false story of rape, that juries were no less able to decide who was telling the 
truth in a rape case than any other case, and that rapists were not only violent strangers 
but also ‘loving’ husbands.”23 Evidently, the media, jury, and public at large were not 
willing to accept these assertions in 1978 when the Rideout case went to trial in an 
Oregon courtroom and, via the media, in the court of public opinion.  
In 2015, debates still exist about what actions constitute “legitimate” rape and 
whether circumstances exist which should insulate a man from charges of raping his wife. 
In recent years, two politicians in Missouri found themselves in the national spotlight for 
comments made about “legitimate rape.” In 2012, then United States Representative 
Todd Akin sabotaged his bid for a seat in the Senate when he used the term “legitimate 
rape” in a discussion about abortion laws, specifically whether he believed that abortion 
was justified in the case of a rape resulting in pregnancy. Akin demonstrated his 
                                                 
22 The early study ranking the severity of crimes occurred in 1974, prior to the criminalization of marital 
rape. Therefore, participants ranked rape by a former rather than a current spouse. Jennifer A. Bennice and 
Patricia A. Resick, “Marital Rape: History, Research, and Practice,” Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 4, no. 3 
(2003), 323. 
23 Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 55. 
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ignorance of the female reproductive system when he suggested that a woman cannot get 
pregnant after being raped because “women’s bodies can tell when rape has occurred and 
‘shut the whole thing down,’” thereby preventing conception. Akin’s comments raised 
alarms for those who interpreted his statement as victim-blaming.24 Two years later, the 
concept of legitimate rape was still alive and well in the Show-Me State. State 
Representative Rick Brattin introduced a bill that would require a woman seeking an 
abortion to first get written permission from the father unless the pregnancy was the 
result of “legitimate rape.” While Brattin argued that he was not using the term in the 
same vein as Akin, his statement illustrated his limited understanding of rape victim 
behavior. Mother Jones was the first to quote Brattin as saying: “If there was a legitimate 
rape, you’re going to make a police report, just as if you were robbed. . . That’s just 
common sense.” Brattin’s view of “common sense” fails to acknowledge the various 
reasons that women fail to report rape, which include a fear of not being believed, 
concern about retribution from an abuser, and public notoriety if the case proceeds to 
trial.25 The examples above demonstrate a continuing lack of consensus within the United 
States about what acts constitute “legitimate rape” and whether that view of “legitimacy” 
is broad enough to include sexual assault within the union of matrimony.  
This dissertation examines the history of marital rape and related topics in the 
United States, placing it in the broader context of women’s legal and political rights. 
With origins in the 1960s, there is today a growing body of literature that focuses on the 
                                                 
24 Lori Moore, “The Statement and the Reaction,” New York Times, August 21, 2012; Charlotte Alter, 
“Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong With Saying ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Time, July 17, 2014. 
25 Molly Redden, “This GOP Lawmaker Wants a Woman to Get Permission From the Father Before 
Having an Abortion Unless it was ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Mother Jones, December 17, 2014, accessed June 
21, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/republican-wants-women-get-permission-father-
having-abortion.  
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legal and political rights of women in America. Similarly, since the 1970s, there has been 
an increase in scholarship that addresses women’s rights to bodily autonomy, dealing 
with domestic abuse and rape. By the late 1980s and 1990s, academics began to focus on 
the confluence of these issues: rape in marriage. As states began to address marital rape, 
legislators, jurists, law enforcement, prosecutors and defense attorneys, special interest 
groups, and individual parties of interest engaged in sometimes-tempestuous dialogues 
about the meaning of marriage, power and authority within such unions, equal protection 
of the law, bodily integrity, and human rights. Using three states as case studies, this 
project will evaluate the interaction of community actors, legislators, and the judiciary to 
explore three different paths by which states have addressed the marital rape exemption 
amid shifting social attitudes about women’s right to bodily autonomy.  
There is a significant and growing body of literature available today on marriage, 
domestic violence, and rape. Less common, but no less important, is a hybrid of these 
issues: scholarship that addresses the history of rape within the bonds of marriage. Much 
of this literature has come from the disciplines of sociology, social work, and psychology. 
Additionally, the marital rape exemption has been the topic of narrowly focused law 
review articles that highlight a particular state law or court decision. What is absent from 
this scholarship, however, is a manuscript-length work that moves from the historical 
underpinnings of the marital rape exemption to a modern, multi-state review of 
legislative history, campaigns by women’s groups, judicial activism, and public reaction.  
Recent publications addressing rape have not discussed marital rape with any 
detail. Danielle McGuire’s award winning At the Dark End of the Street (2011) interprets 
anew underpinnings of the civil rights movement. McGuire masterfully argues that the 
 11 
 
sexual assault of African American women by white men, often not prosecuted in a court 
of law, motivated the activism of Rosa Parks long before the iconic day in which she 
refused to give up her seat on a Montgomery bus. As an investigator for the NAACP, 
Parks was responsible for looking into cases involving the rape of African American 
women. Given the focus of At the Dark End of the Street, marital rape did not have a 
place in McGuire’s argument. 26 In 2013, Estelle Freedman’s Redefining Rape addressed 
the fluidity of the term rape in America. Her narrative focused on the period from the 
1870s until the 1930s, a time in which racial segregation, lynching, and the women’s 
suffrage movement coexisted. Freedman demonstrated how white and African American 
activists challenged the traditional view of rape: “a brutal attack on a chaste white woman 
by a male stranger, usually an African American.” 27 They sought a broader and more 
realistic definition of the term. Ultimately, Freedman concluded that contemporary 
definitions of rape are reliant upon political power and social privilege. In the closing 
pages of Redefining Rape, Freedman draws her arguments about rape to the present. In 
that discussion, she devotes two paragraphs to the criminalization of marital rape that 
began in the 1970s. The upcoming release of Sarah Deer’s The Beginning and End of 
Rape: Confronting Sexual Violence in Native America will provide scholars another lens 
through which to evaluate the gendered and political nature of rape in American society. 
According to advance material, Deer’s critique of federal law argues that the destruction 
of tribal legal systems has drastically limited the possibility of legal redress for Native 
                                                 
26 Danielle L. McGuire, At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance – a New 
History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2010).  
27 Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in The Era of Suffrage and Segregation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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American rape victims. Her solutions call for the intersectionality of tribal law and 
feminist advocacy to address this inequality in policies regarding sexual assault.28 
Although concentrating on only three of the fifty states – Nebraska, California, 
and South Carolina – this dissertation will provide a reasonable representation of the 
existence of the marital rape exemption in America, the arguments used to maintain the 
exemption, and the various methods used to end this form of gender discrimination 
accepted in this country for over two centuries. Additionally, it will explore key issues to 
understanding the social, political, and legal history of rape in marriage in the United 
States.  
In order to understand the evolution of Western and American law on the matter 
of marital rape, it is necessary to reflect on global historical patterns of gendered 
sexuality, specifically male interests in female bodies. In her discussion of women’s 
bodies, Rose Weitz, Professor of Women and Gender Studies at Arizona State 
University, proposed that since the time of Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1754 
B.C.) and nearly to the present, “western law typically has defined women’s bodies as 
men’s property. In ancient societies, women who were not slaves belonged to their 
fathers before marriage and to their husbands thereafter. For this reason, Babylonian law, 
for example, treated rape as a form of property damage, requiring a rapist to pay a fine to 
the husband or father of the raped woman, but nothing to the woman herself.”29 
 In discussing men as being sexually proprietary, Margo Wilson and Martin Daly 
have noted, “Men exhibit a tendency to think of women as sexual and reproductive 
                                                 
28 Sara Deer, The Beginning and End of Rape: Confronting Sexual Violence in Native America 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
29 Rose Weitz, “A History of Women’s Bodies,” in Rose Weitz, ed. The Politics of Women’s Bodies: 
Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. 
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‘property’ that they can own and exchange. . . . [In this context], proprietariness implies a 
more encompassing mind-set [than sexual jealousy], referring not just to the emotional 
force of one’s own feelings of entitlement but to a more pervasive attitude toward social 
relationships.” As such, Wilson and Daly explained: “Proprietary entitlements in people 
have been conceived and institutionalized as identical to proprietary entitlements to land, 
chattels, and other economic resources. Historically and cross-culturally, the owners of 
slaves, servants, wives, and children have been entitled to enjoy the benefits of ownership 
without interference, to modify their property, and to buy and sell, while the property had 
little or no legal or political status in ‘its’ own right.”30 This absolute privilege of (white) 
men to control their “property” with virtually no oversight from outside authority 
promoted a culture in which men had unrestricted sexual access to their wives and slaves 
without the fear of legal intervention. In Anglo-American countries, the implications of 
this culture would be felt for centuries to come until marital rape was politicized in the 
1970s. 
Evidence of men’s proprietary view of female sexuality is pervasive in Western 
cultural practices. For instance: 
 
Anglo-American law is replete with examples of men’s proprietary entitlement 
over the sexuality and reproductive capacity of wives and daughters. Since before 
the time of William the Conqueror there has been a continual elaboration of legal 
devices enabling men to seek monetary redress for the theft or damage of their 
women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity. These torts, all of which have been 
sexually asymmetrical until very recently, include “loss of consortium,” 
“enticement,” “criminal conversation,” “alienation of affection,” “seduction,” and 
                                                 
30 Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, “Till Death Us Do Part,” in Rose Weitz, ed. The Politics of Women’s 
Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 2010), 331-332. See 
also, Rebecca E. Dobash and Russell P. Dobash, Violence against Wives: The Case against Patriarchy 
(New York: Free Press, 1979); Diana E. H. Russell, Rape in Marriage (New York: MacMillan, 1982); and 
A. Sachs and J. H. Wilson, Sexism and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978). 
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“abduction.” In all of these tort actions the person entitled to seek redress was the 
owner of the woman, whose virtue or chastity was fundamental.31 
 
This gender-based entitlement to redress persisted in medieval English criminal courts, 
tempered only moderately in cases of rape.  
Courts accorded a woman a strong legal voice in only two types of cases: a case 
involving the murder of her husband and a lawsuit involving her own rape. In both cases, 
she was able to narrate the events of the case and name the alleged perpetrator. Yet, 
history bears out the fact that rape cases were not evenly balanced in the search for 
justice. Not all women stood equally before the law. The men responsible for making the 
law believed that true felony rape, punishable by “life and member,” was an appropriate 
charge only when a virgin had been the victim.32 A man convicted of raping a married 
woman or a widow was only subject to corporal punishment. Further complicating this 
system was the inaccurate medical belief, still apparently held by Todd Akin in 2012, that 
a woman could not conceive if she did not consent to intercourse. Thus, if a child resulted 
from the union, the law would not view the rape as a felonious action.33 A further 
                                                 
31 Wilson and Daly, “Till Death Us Do Part,” 332. For more on the cultural and legal structures supporting 
male proprietary entitlement over women’s bodies in Western tradition, see F. L. Attenborough, The Laws 
of the Earliest English Kings (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963); C. Backhouse, “The Tort of 
Seduction: Fathers and Daughters in Nineteenth-Century Canada,” Dalhousie Law Journal 10 (1986), 45-
80; P. Brett, “Consortium and Servitium: A History and Some Proposals,” Australian Law Journal 29 
(1955), 321-28, 389-397, 428-434; M. B. W. Sinclair, “Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman,” Law 
and Inequality 3 (1987), 33-102; Margo Wilson, “Impacts of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law,” 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 45 (1987), 216-242; and Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 
“The Man Who Mistook His Wife for Chattel,” in J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, ed. The Adapted 
Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
289-321.  
32 As noted in the Oxford English Dictionary, as early as 1275, “life and member,” or the more commonly 
known “life and limb,” described actions that would put one’s life in mortal danger. In the case of felony 
rape, as used here, the term referred to a possible sentence of death for a conviction.  
33 The belief that a woman could not become pregnant unless she consented to an act of sexual intimacy 
spanned beyond medieval England, as demonstrated by Else L. Hambleton in her discussion of rape in 
seventeenth-century Massachusetts. Else L. Hambleton, “‘Playing the Rogue’: Rape and the Issue of 
Consent in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts,” in Merril D. Smith, Sex without Consent: Rape and 
Sexual Coercion in America (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 28. The twenty-first century 
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inequity was the fact that trials generally followed formal procedures strictly rather than 
adapting to the substance of each case. In this sense, a woman who failed to use 
appropriate language in petitions and testimony risked having the case dismissed and she 
herself held liable for bringing a false claim.34 
Another quagmire for women was rape in marriage. Upon marriage, a man 
acquired the right to exercise control over his wife’s sexuality, which generally meant 
that he retained sexual access for himself. As noted by Wilson and Daly, “Not only have 
husbands been entitled to exclusive sexual access to their wives, but they have been 
entitled to use force to get it. The criminalization of rape within marriage, and hence the 
wife’s legal entitlement to refuse sex, has been established only recently.”35 Lord Chief 
Justice Matthew Hale (1609-1676) gave legal precedence to this idea in a seventeenth-
century treatise. Published posthumously in 1736, History of the Pleas of the Crown 
argued the impossibility of spousal rape.36 The marital rape exemption that he presented 
stated that a “husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
                                                 
examples presented in the introduction demonstrate that distorted views of women’s sexuality, consent, and 
rape continue to permeate social consciousness.  
34 For further information regarding the law of rape in medieval England, see Barbara Hanawalt, Of Good 
and Ill Repute: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 124-141. 
35 Wilson and Daly, “Till Death Us Do Part,” 332. See also, S. S. M. Edwards, Female Sexuality and the 
Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981). 
36 Matthew Hale was one of the greatest scholars on the history of the English common law, having read 
and written extensively on the subject. As a jurist, Hale had a reputation characterized by the highest 
integrity and impartiality. The year 1660 saw Hale knighted and appointed Chief Baron of the Exchequer. 
Then in 1671, Hale was elevated to the position of Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. Perhaps the two 
slight blemishes on his reputation, as observed by twentieth-century scholars, surround his positions on 
witchcraft and rape, both of which earned him the label of misogynist. No doubt influenced by his Puritan 
background, Hale once allowed the execution of two women accused of witchcraft. It was his suspicion of 
the veracity of rape accusation, however, that has left the most enduring stain on his reputation. Referring 
to rape, Hale expressed that “it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be 
defended by the party accused, though never so innocent,” which modern scholars have variously 
interpreted as a reflection of the criminal justice’s distrust of women or simply a concern for according 
defendants a presumption of innocence. See, Laurie Edelstein, “An Accusation Easily to be Made? Rape 
and Malicious Prosecution in Eighteenth-Century England,” The American Journal of Legal History 42, no. 
4 (1998), 351-390.  
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wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself in 
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”37 While modern case law and legal 
commentary question the veracity of this statement, it would remain the basis for 
successful arguments against spousal rape laws for centuries to come in both Great 
Britain and the United States. For example, in the United States, Massachusetts was the 
first state to invoke Hale’s view, doing so in the 1857 case Commonwealth v. Fogerty; 
Massachusetts, joined by the other forty-nine states, adhered to the irrevocable consent 
theory until the 1970s.38 
 Notably, Hale was writing at a time when marriage irrevocably bound a wife to 
her husband as his property. Over a period of centuries, English jurists established the 
legal fiction of marital unity, which asserted that at marriage, husband and wife became 
one legal entity in the eyes of the law, and that entity took the form of the husband. The 
common law tradition, as transferred to the American colonies in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, perpetuated this legal fiction as a convenient term by which to 
understand the relationship of the couple to the outside world, their families, and each 
other. As a direct result, a woman came to be legally under the protection of her husband 
in a legal status known as coverture.39 Coverture was the system of law that transferred a 
woman’s legal and “civic identity to her husband, giving him use and direction of her 
                                                 
37 Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 72. 
38 Estrich, Real Rape, 72-73; Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 77 Mass. 489 (1857), was the first case in the 
United States to recognize the existence of a spousal rape exemption. In that case, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court recognized that marriage to the victim would be a defense to rape. Morgan Lee 
Woolley, “Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues,” Hastings 
Women’s Law Journal 18 (2007), 278-79; Amber Bailey, “Redefining Marriage: How the Institution of 
Marriage has Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples,” Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & 
Society 27 (2012), 320.  
39 Norma Basch, “Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America,” 
Feminist Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 347. See, Shammas, Carole, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property 
Acts,” Journal of Women’s History 6, no. 1 (1994), 9-30.  
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property throughout the marriage.”40 In this condition of dependency, she could neither 
sue or be sued in her own right, nor could she enter into contracts or make a will.41 Such 
legal invisibility was, of course, incompatible with the ideology of the revolutionary 
period and the early republic. There were exceptions to the rule of marital unity; 
however, they were limited and applied capriciously, resulting in a class-based and race-
based system that favored the wealthy and legally sophisticated.42 
Contemporary law often wrote of the unity of marriage, in which the husband was 
supreme and the wife invisible. At that time, married women could not own property or 
enter into contracts in their own right. If this legal incapacity was the justification for the 
marital rape exemption, it should not have survived outside the nineteenth century when 
legislation in both England and America established Married Women’s Property Acts. 
Gradually, these statutes gave married women, like single women, control over their 
individual real and personal property. Such property in time would be considered 
separate, immune from their husbands’ debts. Married women also eventually gained 
control of all their wages earned outside of the home, were able to enter into legally 
binding contracts, and could sue and be sued in courts of law.43 Nevertheless, rape – 
specifically the debate surrounding rape in marriage – prevailed into the late twentieth 
century as an issue that was both within and influenced by the larger elements of the 
women’s rights movement in Anglo-American culture. 
                                                 
40 Linda Kerber, Toward an Intellectual History of Women (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997), 264-265. 
41 Ellen Dannin, “Marriage and Law Reform: Lessons from the Nineteenth-Century Michigan Married 
Women’s Property Acts,” Texas Journal of Women and the Law 20, no. 1 (2010), 3. See also Nancy Cott, 
“Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934,” American Historical Review 130 
(1998), 1440-1474; Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-
Century New York (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).  
42 Basch, “Invisible Women,” 348-349. 
43 Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 16. 
 18 
 
As the following chapters will demonstrate, women’s activism led to changes in 
both societal and legal views on spousal rape. Chapter One, “‘All Men and Women are 
Created Equal’: The Long Journey toward Personal Autonomy for Married Women in 
America,” chronicles women’s activism from the nineteenth-century women’s rights 
movement to the feminist efforts at the end of the twentieth century. Particular attention 
is given to women’s activism surrounding marital property laws; bodily integrity, 
including voluntary motherhood; and changing awareness about rape and domestic 
violence.  
Chapters two through four will illustrate the independence that each state 
maintains when deciding issues relating to marital relations and criminal laws and 
sanctions. Each study will critically analyze the interplay between lawmakers, jurists, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, women’s interest groups, and the public at large 
during the period in which the states reevaluated and rescinded the marital rape 
exemption. Due to the discretion that each state possesses, change did not happen at the 
same rate or even in the same manner in these three states. These examples present a 
representative picture of the arguments made by supporters and opponents of the 
exemption across the United States, the use of legislation and common law to bring about 
change, the importance of interest groups in calling for change, and the value of having 
support from both law enforcement and the judicial system in ensuring that new laws are 
enforced. 
Collectively, these chapters present three distinct approaches that states across the 
country employed to address the marital rape exemption. They provide especially rich 
examples of case law and legislative history that illustrate the intricacies of changing 
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social and legal attitudes toward spousal rape. They also provide critical insight about 
social issues related to sexual assault: the rise of domestic violence and sexual assault 
movements and the promulgation of rape shield laws. While the states are geographically 
removed from one another, their stories provide a representation not of regional 
differences, but rather differences in methods utilized to address rape in marriage.  
Chapter Two, “‘Invading the Domestic Forum and Going behind the Curtain’: 
Nebraska’s Elimination of the Marital Rape Exemption and the Development of 
Coordinated Victim’s Services,” serves two purposes. Initially, it assesses the decision by 
Nebraska’s unicameral legislature to lead the nation by eliminating spousal immunity for 
the crime of rape. A 1975 bill revised Nebraska’s rape statute, providing a more inclusive 
definition of sexual assault and eliminating legal protection for husbands accused of 
raping their wives. A single legal challenge in 1986 solidified the constitutionality of 
Nebraska’s elimination of the spousal rape exemption. Building on this approach, the 
latter half of the chapter discusses the rise of the domestic violence and sexual assault 
movements and how those movements responded to changing legal attitudes about rape 
in marriage. Activism in Nebraska serves as an illustration of coordinated response 
efforts to sexual assault beginning in the late 1970s.  
The ease by which Nebraska addressed marital rape stands in stark contrast to the 
complexity legislators faced in California. Chapter Three, “The Burden of Married 
Women in the Golden State: California’s Struggle with Spousal Rape Laws, 1979-2006” 
analyzes legislative efforts in the twenty-seven years between California’s promulgation 
of its first spousal rape law in 1979 and the 2006 amendment which brought that law into 
alignment with the state’s general rape statute. The discussion recounts periods when 
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amendments were unopposed, as well as those plagued by dissension both within the 
state assembly and from interest groups within the state. 
Despite early efforts by some states to follow the examples set by Nebraska or 
California, others were reluctant to disregard the common law exemption. The final 
chapter, “Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Getting Away with Rape in Marriage in South 
Carolina,” provides such an example. When South Carolina passed its spousal sexual 
battery law in 1991, the statute established a crime with elements quite distinct from the 
general sexual battery law. The latter provided marital rape victims less legal protection 
than non-spousal rape victims. Chapter Four traces the passage of South Carolina’s 
spousal sexual battery law and highlights the first case brought under the new statute. The 
chapter further discusses revisions to South Carolina’s rape shield laws, evaluating such 
evidentiary protections for rape victims in relation to those promulgated in other states 
and those provided under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
Together, the chapters offer a historical analysis of the marital rape exemption 
and related topics within the United States as they represent changing social and legal 
attitudes about women’s autonomy. As a result of those changing attitudes, if prosecutors 
tried John Rideout today instead of 1978, the jury may have reached a different 
conclusion – and so, too, may have the public.
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CHAPTER 1 
“ALL MEN AND WOMEN ARE CREATED EQUAL”: THE LONG JOURNEY 
TOWARD PERSONAL AUTONOMY FOR MARRIED WOMEN IN AMERICA 
 
On April 26, 1857, several men raped Agnes O’Connor in Chicopee, 
Massachusetts, and subsequently faced criminal charges for that crime. The indictment 
alleged that the defendants acted “violently and against her will [to] feloniously . . . 
ravish and carnally know” the victim.44 Following their conviction, the defendants 
appealed the judgment on the grounds that: “it is not alleged in the indictment, that said 
Agnes O’Connor was ravished, &c. by force, as required by law,” and “because it is not 
alleged but that said Agnes O’Connor was the wife of one of the defendants, or which 
defendant, if any.”45 The court upheld the convictions, dismissing both arguments raised 
by the defendants. Writing for the court, Justice Bigelow explained that the indictment set 
forth all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense of rape despite the omission 
of the words “by force” because the word ravish “of itself imports the use of force.”46 
Similarly, Bigelow reasoned, no precedent in the United States or England had ever 
required an indictment for rape to include an averment that the victim was not the wife of 
one of the defendants.  
The significance of Commonwealth v. Fogerty is threefold. The elements of the 
crime used to convict the defendants of rape – the use of force, carnal knowledge of the 
victim, and the act accomplished against the will of the victim – would define rape 
statutes across the United States without successful challenge for the next one hundred 
twenty years. Fogerty was the first documented case in the United States in which a court 
                                                 
44 Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489 (1857). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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recognized the legal impossibility of a man raping his wife, acknowledging that marriage 
to the victim was a defense to a charge of rape. This marital rape exemption would 
remain in all fifty states until the mid-1970s. The legal protection for a husband was not 
absolute, however, as Fogerty made clear. While the state could not convict a man for the 
rape of his wife if he acted alone, in many states, the law allowed the prosecution of a 
man who acted in concert with another to commit rape upon his wife.47  
The controversy about a husband’s license to rape was not new when laws began 
to change in the 1970s and 1980s. The women of first-wave feminism, who championed 
for women’s rights in the second half of the nineteenth century, decried marital rape. To 
understand the underpinning of this activism, however, one must start by looking at 
women’s rights activists in the late eighteenth century.  
 The infant stage of the American women’s rights movement began to take form 
among elite women by the eighteenth century, as noted by the March 31, 1776 letter from 
Abigail Adams to her husband John Adams, asking that he “Remember the Ladies,” act 
more favorably than his ancestors, and arrest the traditional (one might say natural) 
tyranny of men in society.48 The French woman who came to be known as Olympe de 
Gouges, took up a similar struggle, publishing pamphlets and giving public speeches in 
favor of rights for women – the right to divorce, control of property, and maternal 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 491. 
48 The descriptor “American,” selected purposefully, signifies the overall focus of this dissertation is the 
change in societal attitudes and laws within the United States regarding rape inside of marriage. It in no 
way ignores the significant influence of British common law on the laws governing the British colonies in 
North America or the subsequent states that emerged following the independence of the United States. 
Rather, it signifies the distinct timing and methods used to bring about changes in American society, a 
society that found influence from Britain and to a lesser extent France, but that developed apart from those 
nations. The quotation from Abigail Adams comes from a letter that she penned to her husband between 
March 31 and April 5, 1776. Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive. Massachusetts Historical 
Society. http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/ 
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welfare. In 1791, she issued Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen, 
her most celebrated work and the first official document in support of women’s rights 
written by a woman in Western Europe. While not well-received by social critics at the 
time, de Gouges’ work advocated for a system of gender-neutral meritocracy, in which 
one’s advancement in society would be based, not on gender or familial connections, but 
on one’s abilities and talents. The next year, in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
(1792), British writer Mary Wollstonecraft blamed contemporary political, educational, 
and religious institutions for the systematic subjugation of women, demanding equal 
education, civil, and political rights for all human beings.  
 Well-read American women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, best 
known as leaders of the American suffrage movement, would have been familiar with the 
work of de Gouges and Wollstonecraft, perhaps finding inspiration from those and other 
women who demanded an end to the second-class status imposed on women.49 As one of 
their first priorities, Stanton, Mott, and others in the early women’s rights movement 
addressed property rights for married women, an issue causing contention across the 
nation. The passage of married women’s property acts was anything but straightforward; 
however, it was a step toward the advancement of equality for women in marriage. By 
recognizing married women’s property rights, the resulting legislation challenged marital 
unity, the system of coverture, and a husband’s property interest in his wife.  
                                                 
49 Stanton and Mott had met in London in 1840. Both had traveled to England with their husbands for the 
World Anti-Slavery Convention, only to learn that convention organizers refused to seat female delegates. 
In this way, the male leaders of the convention spurred to fruition the development of the women’s rights 
movement in England and America. Alana Jeydel, Political Women: The Women’s Movement, Political 
Institutions, the Battle for Women’s Suffrage and the ERA (London: Routledge, 2004), 28; Pamela Slotte 
and Mila Halme-Tuomisaari, ed. Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 172. 
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Resentment to this two-tiered system came to a head in the Jacksonian era, 
challenging the legal understanding of man and wife. Arguments utilized economic 
reasoning as well. Coverture had arisen when the economy relied upon land ownership 
and agricultural production; yet, this system no longer seemed as viable when the 
economy shifted in favor of an urban commercial market. The rise of a female labor 
force, the advent of life insurance, and the growth of savings banks all called for a 
reassessment of the role of the wife in society. Between 1820 and 1860, such arguments 
justified the passing of legislation to protect married women’s property. The first wave of 
Married Women’s Property Acts, passed in the 1830s, arose in part because of the 
decade’s banking crisis, which culminated in the Panic of 1837.50 Enacted first in 
southern states, these laws found support from male legislators out of a desire to 
empower their daughters against spendthrift sons-in-law, specifically to protect their 
daughters’ property from their husbands’ creditors.51 Beginning in 1848 New York, the 
second wave of marital property legislation resulted from similar motivation: wealthy 
fathers wanted to ensure that their sons-in-law would be unable to gain access to their 
daughters’ inheritances. Yet, as these laws passed, they did not provide universal 
                                                 
50 Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 11; Richard H. Chused, “Late 
Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property 
Acts by Courts and Legislatures,” The American Journal of Legal History 29, no. 1 (1985), 4. As Woody 
Holton has noted: “Each of the financial panics that struck the United States in the decades after the 
ratification of the Constitution set off a scramble for mechanisms by which to safeguard debtors’ property.” 
Thus, the laws to insulate a married woman’s property from her husband’s creditors were but one reaction 
to the vicissitudes of the nation’s economy in the nineteenth century. Woody Holton, “Equality as 
Unintended Consequence: The Contracts Clause and the Married Women’s Property Acts,” The Journal of 
Southern History 81, no. 2 (2015), 319.  
51 Joseph A. Custer, “The Three Waves of Married Women’s Property Acts in the Nineteenth Century with 
a Focus on Mississippi, New York, and Oregon,” Ohio Northern University Law Review 40 (2014), 39-440; 
Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 9-30. 
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protection for women, as state legislators fumbled with piecemeal affirmative rights for 
women, and jurists limited the application of these new laws.52  
Mississippi, the first state to adopt a Married Women’s Property Act in 1839, is 
illustrative of the limited benefits granted to married women by such legislation.53 
Mississippi Senator Thomas B. J. Hadley introduced the marital property legislation. In 
its original form, the bill was visionary, yet well beyond the comfort level of most 
lawmakers. Had it passed, Hadley’s bill would have given married women nearly the 
same property rights as men and single women:  
[E]very free woman who got married in Mississippi would be allowed to retain 
whatever possessions she owned on her wedding day, along with all the money 
she earned and all the gifts she received afterward. And the income generated by 
these assets would be hers to dispose of as she pleased.54 
 
Additionally, the bill would have given Mississippi the distinction as the first common 
law state to provide married women the right to draft a last will and testament. Less than 
one month after Hadley introduced his bill, Governor Alexander G. McNutt signed it into 
law, albeit in an almost unrecognizable incarnation. The new law provided that brides 
would retain ownership over only one type of property brought into a marriage – slaves.55 
Even then, married women had only limited possessory rights over their slave property in 
the same way the law allowed them rights over their own land. Management of the slaves 
                                                 
52 Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 13-16; Kathleen Sullivan, 
Constitutional Context: Women and Rights Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007). 
53 Arkansas passed a Married Women’s Property Act in 1835, several years prior to Mississippi; however, 
at the time Arkansas had not yet gained statehood.  
54 Holton, “Equality as Unintended Consequence,” 331-32. 
55 Like Mississippi, many other southern states focused on the possession of slaves to the near exclusion of 
every other sort of property when passing initial married women’s property acts. Holton has argued that 
much of the motivation behind the southern states allowing married women to own personal property was a 
result of “the boom-bust cotton economy – and by the fact that enslaved workers, being both valuable and 
mobile, were uniquely vulnerable to seizure by creditors.” Holton, “Equality as Unintended Consequence,” 
314-15. 
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would rest with their husbands, who would also receive any income the slaves generated. 
Amendments to the bill also removed clauses that guaranteed married women the right to 
wages earned outside the home and the right to write wills. Such changes undermined 
what would have been a significant stride toward marital equality.56 
In the four decades beginning in 1840, legislators expanded early laws providing 
only debt protection to include “the right of married women to manage, enjoy the profits, 
sell, and will personal and real property that they had owned prior to marriage or had 
been given or inherited from a third party during marriage.”57 Even so, married women 
could not count on automatic or absolute protection from these expanded laws. In the 
decades when married women’s property legislation faced revisions, courts were asked to 
rule on disputes concerning the appropriate definition of a married woman’s estate 
separate from that of her husband. The language of many state statutes was vague enough 
to leave room for argument and therefore litigation.58  
Whenever possible, judges tended to resolve conflict in a way that would uphold 
economic patriarchy within the family unit, often imposing additional burdens on married 
women who chose to maintain property separate from their husbands. Courts refused to 
apply the laws retroactively; thus, women married prior to the law’s enactment would not 
gain protection granted under the legislation. Some courts applied the law only to 
property women acquired after the law went into effect, regardless of their marriage date. 
Regarding the right to contract, some jurisdictions required married women to specify 
that their separate estate would be responsible for any debts that arose because of the 
                                                 
56 Holton, “Equality as Unintended Consequence,” 134. 
57 Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts,” 11. 
58 Chused, “Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law,” 4. 
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business relationship created under the contract, in order for the contract to be 
enforceable. Married women who chose to claim earnings as part of a separate estate 
often faced court-imposed obstacles. In New York, for instance, “the earnings had to be 
paid by a third party, the services had to be unconnected to household activities (e.g., 
boarding, sale of eggs and butter), and the woman had to specify that she was operating 
under a separate account.”59 Despite early limitations, contemporary feminists viewed 
married women’s property acts as a great victory, perhaps even the most significant 
change in the legal status of women in Anglo-American society in seven hundred years of 
common law.60 Nineteenth-century feminists, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Lucretia Mott, attacked the legal fiction of marital unity, arguing that it was an antiquated 
example of patriarchal values that no longer seemed appropriate in modern society.61 
Many in the nineteenth-century women’s rights movement believed a woman’s loss of 
legal personhood at marriage was a more pressing problem than the absence of suffrage. 
Feminists attacked laws that allowed a man to control his “wife’s property, collect and 
use her wages, [and] select the food and clothing for herself and children.”62 This initial 
step toward property ownership was a catalyst for women gaining the right of personal 
autonomy.  
As white activists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott concerned 
themselves with the legal fiction of marital unity and married women’s property acts, 
activist African Americans turned their attention to discourses of rape and lynching, two 
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issues that “have historically influenced understandings of race, gender, and sexuality 
within American society.”63 Both forms of violence address the power dynamic of 
control over the body of another. As Sociology Professor Patricia Hill Collins has 
described, sexual violence has served as a method by which to control marginalized or 
non-dominant groups – African Americans, women, the poor, as well as gays and 
lesbians.  
Prior to the Civil War, slave owners had unlimited sexual access to their slaves. 
As Missouri v. Celia (1855) demonstrated, legally sanctioned white male privilege 
granted sexual access to slave women. Robert Newsom purchased Celia when she was 
fourteen years old. For the next five years as Celia worked on Newsom’s farm, he raped 
her regularly and fathered two children by her. In 1855, when she was again pregnant, 
Celia requested that Newsom refrain from future instances of sexual force. When he 
refused, she killed him and disposed of his body. She was subsequently charged with his 
murder. A Missouri rape law enacted in 1845 made it a crime “to take any woman 
unlawfully against her will and by force, menace or duress, compel her to be defiled.”64 
At trial, the defense attorney argued that Celia had acted in self-defense, fearing 
imminent sexual assault. After the prosecution and defense had presented their respective 
arguments, the judge, relying on the Missouri Slave Code of 1804 that made no 
distinction between slaves and other personal property, explained to the jury that Celia, 
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being a slave, was her master’s property. As property, the judge reasoned, the rape law 
did not apply to Celia, despite the fact that the statute referred to “any woman.” Further, 
because Celia was “property” and not a “woman,” the judge held that she could not raise 
the argument of self-defense with respect to rape.65 He instructed the jury to consider 
only whether Celia had murdered Newsom. Found guilty by a jury of twelve white men, 
and after the exhaustion of appeals to stay her execution, Celia hanged for the crime of 
murder.66  
In the post-emancipation South, Collins asserted, the institutionalization of 
“lynching and rape served as gender-specific mechanisms of sexual violence whereby 
men were victimized by lynching and women by rape. Wide-scale lynching occurred in 
tandem with the rise of the myth of the Black man as rapist who set his eyes upon White 
women. Quite often, lynching was a public affair, sanctioned, and ritualized to “install a 
hegemonic White masculinity over a subordinated Black masculinity.”67 As such, the 
lynching of African American men connotes the emasculation of both the victim and 
other Black men within the community. In contrast to public lynching, the rape of Black 
women occurred in private and their suffering personal an invisible within society. Just as 
the myth of the Black rapist justified violence against men, the myth of the 
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hypersexualized Black woman served to blame victims for their own rapes. Collins 
recognized the incongruity of the solution raised by Black male leaders: “their political 
solution of installing a Black male patriarchy in which Black men would protect ‘their’ 
women from sexual assault inadvertently supported ideas about women’s bodies and 
sexuality as men’s property. . . . Black women’s suffering under racism would be 
eliminated by encouraging versions of Black masculinity whereby Black men had the 
same powers that White men had long enjoyed.”68 While such actions would elevate the 
position of Black men, African American women continued to find themselves at the 
mercy of men. 
The activism of many African American women parallels their personal 
experiences. For instance, Ida B. Wells, journalist, women’s rights advocate, and anti-
lynching crusader, rejected the myths of the Black male rapist and the immoral, licentious 
Black woman. The lynching of several of her friends influenced Wells’ worldview; 
thereafter, she devoted much of her life to the anti-lynching crusade. Similarly, Anna 
Julia Cooper, one of the first four African American women to earn a doctorate degree, 
promoted the cause of Black women’s education. Her book, A Voice from the South, 
represented not only her political activism, but also an early example of Black 
feminism.69 
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Despite a divergence of guiding issues, both white and African American women 
activists promoted greater gender equality in American society. Legislation passed in 
New York certainly served as encouragement for the emergence of the modern American 
women’s rights movement. In April 1848, after more than ten years of debate, New York 
enacted a married women’s property act, granting married women control over property 
they brought into a marriage or received after they wed.70 Three months later, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the now legendary meeting at Seneca Falls, 
New York. The convention attracted three hundred men and women, some skilled 
activists, many Quakers, and nearly all abolitionist.71 It was there that they issued the 
Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, which called for complete 
equality and treatment in all areas of women’s lives. Patterned on the Declaration of 
Independence, the language of and emotion elicited by the Declaration of Sentiments was 
instantly recognizable: “all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.”72 The purposeful imitation also advanced the belief that the rights 
asked for were justified by the American traditions of equality and rebellion. While the 
founding fathers set blame at the foot of King George III, the authors of the Declaration 
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of Sentiments asserted that the subjugation of women resulted from the historical and 
absolute tyranny of men over women.73 The bold, radical demand for full citizenship 
made an argument for women “in a way that claimed republicanism for women not as 
mothers responsible for rearing good little citizens but as autonomous individuals 
deserving of that right.”74 In doing so, the signatories challenged the Victorian ideal of 
gender-based separate spheres by asserting a public role for women.75 While almost 
unanimously denounced by the male establishment – publishers, politicians, and 
clergymen alike – the Declaration of Sentiments prompted more meetings in other cities 
and states, and the U.S. women’s movement was born, paving the way for the first steps 
in addressing marital rape.76  
Another key issue in the legal address of marital rape was divorce, or the lack 
thereof, which prevented women from leaving abusive marriages. The liberalization of 
divorce laws did serve as a leveling force in American society. The right to attain a 
divorce was also a legal disability of women for many years in the United States. In 
England, divorce was relatively nonexistent until 1857; marriage was a divine institution 
and a sacrament that fell under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts.77 English law did 
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recognize an action called divorce a mensa et thoro, in which the parties might live apart 
if one was guilty of adultery or extreme cruelty. Most American colonies, however, did 
not transport this strict prohibition on divorce. In fact, the earliest reported divorce in the 
colonies was in Massachusetts in 1661. That is not to say that the colonies – or later states 
– provided liberally for divorce.78 Notably, South Carolina did not provide for divorce 
until 1942, and in New York State, adultery was the only grounds for divorce until 1966.  
 The states saw marriage in contractual terms, where each party had fixed rights 
and obligations; it was up to the state to promote and preserve marriage. To succeed in a 
divorce proceeding, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had irrevocably broken 
the terms of the marriage contract. The most common form of evidence supported claims 
of adultery, desertion, or sexual incapacity.79 Between 1820 and 1860, states revised their 
divorce statutes, making the termination of marriage easier: as expected, as grounds for 
divorce expanded, divorce rates increased.80 By the 1960s, fault-based divorce became 
legally routine, as couples seeking to dissolve their marriages claimed wrongs that 
closely followed the letter of the law, demonstrating “the exact minimum requirements 
and even the precise legal phrases needed for a fault-based divorce.”81 In time, divorce 
laws shortened residency requirements for filing, reacting to “migratory divorces,” in 
which one party to the marriage would take up residence in a state that had a shorter 
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residency requirement or more liberal grounds for filing.82 Similarly, by 1985 all fifty 
states offered no-fault divorce for couples claiming irreconcilable differences.83 Each of 
these changes to divorce laws provided women greater opportunity to leave abusive 
marriages. 
 Scholars in a variety of fields have studied the implications of more liberal 
divorce laws, specifically those that allow one spouse to decide unilaterally to end the 
marriage. Such laws provide an important escape route in a troubled marriage, but the 
benefits may be more significant. Studies have shown that access to unilateral divorce has 
led to a significant reduction in domestic violence and a drop in the number of married 
women who attempt suicide. Higher separation and divorce rates also result in lower 
homicide rates among intimate partners.84 At the same time, however, no-fault divorce 
laws could prove detrimental to a partner who did not want to end the marriage by 
reducing his or her bargaining power. This was particularly true for full-time 
homemakers who were economically vulnerable. A new cohort of women emerged who 
found themselves among the ranks of the poor as divorce rates doubled between 1965 and 
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1978. Diana Pearce coined the phrase “the feminization of poverty” to describe this 
gendered, economic shift.85  
 While divorce was more accessible in the era of no-fault, the government 
maintained its interest in the family unit: how to define “family” or “marriage”; the 
division of obligations when divorce divided a family; and the financial implications 
divorce had for women and children. By more liberally reforming divorce laws, state 
legislatures and courts contributed to and reflected changing moral and legal definitions 
of marriage. As no-fault replaced fault-based divorce, petitioners no longer had to 
demonstrate that the other spouse had broken the state-defined terms of the marriage 
contract. Rather, no-fault statutes suggested that the state should refrain from deciding if 
one party to the marriage had failed to live up to the marriage agreement. If the couple 
determined the marriage was not meeting their expectations for the union, one or the 
other could seek legal dissolution.86 Divorce reforms in the no-fault era moved toward 
gender-neutrality regarding child custody, child support and alimony, viewing both men 
and women as income earners and caregivers.  
Then in the 1976 case Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court 
acknowledged the “substantial increase in the number of couples living together without 
marrying,” resulting in the first cohabitating non-married partner receiving “palimony” 
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when the couple separated.87 Recognizing the prevalence of nonmarital relationships as 
indicative of changing mores of society, the Court explained its decision: 
The judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the 
fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital 
relationship should be removed. The courts now hold that express agreements will 
be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration. We add 
that in the absence of an express agreement, the court may look to a variety of 
other remedies in order to protect the parties’ lawful expectations.88 
 
This landmark decision influenced the economic aspect of cohabitating relationships 
across the nation as courts in one state after another addressed the validity of palimony 
and contracts for cohabitation. While some states were reluctant to adopt the Marvin 
standard, the legal principle that emerged was that “sex outside marriage could no longer 
be labeled illicit in any simple sense.”89 Reflective of this change in legal and social 
mores, the number of unmarried-cohabitant households increased almost ten-fold 
between 1970 and 2000, reaching nearly five million by the dawn of the twenty-first 
century.90 Ultimately, the effect of divorce reforms and the creation of economic rights 
for cohabitating partners was to expand individual rights outside of the traditional marital 
state that favored male interests.91  
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 While legal access to divorce increased for women over the course of the 
twentieth century, these changes did not automatically eliminate the exemptions in the 
law that protected husbands who raped their wives. Activists who challenged the marital 
rape exemption in the mid- to late-twentieth century faced the difficulty of overcoming 
both historical and modern justifications for the legal protection granted to husbands. As 
noted in the Introduction, spousal immunity sprang from the opinion forwarded by 
Matthew Hale’s seventeenth-century treatise, History of the Pleas of the Crown. Notably, 
Hale did not base his assertion on any supporting authority; despite this legal deficiency, 
his contention came to be the legal standard in England and the United States. Justice 
William Ventris Field, in a 1889 dissenting opinion, brought this deficiency to light and 
proposed that there were circumstances under which a wife could refuse intercourse (and 
thereby a husband could be guilty of rape). His commentary went virtually unnoticed and 
the marital exemption remained.92  
Temperance workers, abolitionists, social purity crusaders, and other advocates 
for women’s rights addressed sexual coercion publicly during the early nineteenth 
century. However, barring evidence of significant violence, rape in marriage was nearly 
invisible in Victorian America “since it seldom found its way into public discourse, 
private correspondence, the dockets of criminal courts, or the transcripts of divorce 
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trials.”93 By the mid-nineteenth century, some advocates began to extend their concern 
with sexual coercion to include actions that occurred between husband and wife. Most 
vocal and direct in their outcry against rape in marriage were individuals who society 
held to be more radical or anarchist – members of groups like the Free Lovers. Victoria 
Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin, sisters who published the newspaper Woodhull and 
Claflin’s Weekly, boldly blamed married women’s inability to refuse the sexual advances 
of their husbands for collective maladies women faced. According to one 1871 editorial 
in that newspaper: “Women, in short, were beginning to feel that access to their bodies 
should be ‘theirs to grant or refuse.’ The conflict between women’s desire for self-
ownership and their subjection to ‘undesired sexual relations’ was generating internal 
‘antagonism’ that was ultimately responsible for the destruction of their physical well-
being.”94 Additional issues of Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly mirrored this sentiment, as 
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contributing writers relayed the testimony of women who complained of sexual abuse 
within marriage.  
In newspapers, pamphlets, and novels, Free Lovers spoke of different forms of 
sexual coercion within marriage: physical, economic, and psychological. Their writing 
and speeches spoke of the resulting consequences women suffered because of this abuse, 
which included physical and emotional injury, and even death.95 While limited in scope, 
such efforts drew on “the sexual ideology of the radical Enlightenment and the 
abolitionist movement,” using terms such as “‘prostitution’ and ‘slavery’ to describe the 
emotional condition and legal position of the married woman,” highlighting the 
importance of consenting to sexual relations.96  
In contrast, most suffragists and moral reformers, highly concerned about 
maintaining social respectability and garnering mass support, generally did not “advance 
very far beyond prevalent standards of propriety in discussing sexual matters 
publically.”97 Furthermore, reformers addressing the politics of marriage focused on 
alcoholism and unrestrained male sexuality as the root cause of sexual violence within 
marriage, thereby avoiding any direct attack on the institution of marriage itself. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other writers of the era made a case against many oppressive 
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conditions within the state of marriage; they singled out obligatory sex for particular 
condemnation. Such women identified the law as complicit in such atrocities, holding the 
legal system responsible for women’s oppression. Stanton once wrote: “What father 
could rest at home by night, knowing that his lovely daughter was at the mercy of a 
strong man drunk with wine and passion and that, do what he might, he was backed up by 
law and public sentiment?”98 Pauline Wright Davis, in an address to the National Woman 
Suffrage Association in 1871, spoke out against the laws that made “obligatory the 
rendering of marital rights and compulsory maternity.”99 While nineteenth-century 
feminists did make strides related to the legal foundation of marriage, laws protecting a 
woman from sexual coercion by her spouse was not one of them.100  
Closely related to sexual coercion within marriage were the ideas of involuntary 
motherhood and childrearing, as they contributed to the oppression of women. The late 
nineteenth century saw the rise of the voluntary motherhood movement, which advocated 
reproductive self-determination that would allow women to “make pregnancy, childbirth, 
and motherhood matters of conscious choice.”101 According to Linda Gordon, those who 
advocated for voluntary motherhood were either suffragists, part of the moral reform 
movement, or members of Free Love groups. Both suffragists and Free Lovers viewed 
reproduction in the context of social changes, which they hoped included “a decline in 
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patriarchal power within the family.”102 At the same time, neither group – nor the 
women’s rights movement as a whole in the nineteenth century – supported contraception 
as a way to limit family size, as birth control advocates in the early 20th century would. 
Despite the reluctance of the feminist movement to embrace the use of abortion or 
contraception as methods of limiting family size: “Abortionist and sellers of 
abortifacients and contraceptive methods had been advertising extensively, if subtly, for 
decades, their main clients being married women. . . . Both abortion and the market for 
contraceptive aids such as condoms, pessaries, and douches gave unmistakable signs that 
men and women, married and not, wanted to limit pregnancies.”103  
Despite their widespread use, many women’s rights activists in American society 
viewed contraceptive devices as unnatural and their use raised the fear of sexual 
promiscuity, which in turn threatened the very fabric of society by undermining the 
family unit.104 Nevertheless, nineteenth-century reformers wanted women to be able to 
limit pregnancy if it was physically or psychologically in their best interest. Toward this 
end, they advocated abstinence, either by mutual consent of the married couple or as a 
unilateral decision by the wife to refuse her husband. While law and custom promoted 
sexual intimacy as a wife’s responsibility, voluntary motherhood promoted a woman’s 
right to refuse as representing “her independence and personal integrity.”105 
In the years following the Civil War, many women publicly advocated for a 
woman’s inherent right to control the number of children she bore, while also demanding 
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recognition of female sexuality. Notable examples include Pauline Davis Wright, Isabella 
Beecher Hooker, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton.106 Perhaps the most extreme supporter of a 
woman’s right to her own body at that time was Eliza B. Duffey, who promoted the idea 
that women had no obligation to bear children, but rather had the right to avoid 
motherhood entirely if they so desired. Duffey went further, criticizing women who did 
not limit their family size and concluding that unlimited reproduction would result in 
premature aging and senility.107 
Voluntary motherhood emphasized the physical dangers intercourse and resulting 
pregnancy posed to women in the nineteenth century. Pregnancy, childbirth, and even 
abortions were dangerous and could lead to permanent injury or death for a woman. Yet 
only a few in the voluntary motherhood movement favored the use of contraceptive 
devices to limit conception. Dr. J. Soule argued: 
No woman shall hereafter be compelled to bear children against her wishes. God 
knows it is bad enough [emphasis in the original] for a woman to bear children 
when she consents to it, without being compelled, time after time, to bear them 
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when she does not want them . . . [Birth control places women] in a freer, a 
happier, and more independent position.108 
 
At the same time, Frederick Hollick, author of several medical advice books, promoted 
the benefits of birth control for women’s health as preferable to abortion. Dr. George 
Napheys argued that a woman’s independence required control over her own fertility. 
Napheys reasoned:  
Religion might tell woman . . . that “it is her duty to bear all the children she can. . 
. . if a woman has a right to decide on any question . . . it certainly is how many 
children she shall bear. . . . Certainly . . . wives have a right to demand of their 
husbands at least the same consideration which a breeder extends to his stock.”109 
 
Despite these efforts to promote voluntary motherhood, at the end of the nineteenth 
century the majority within the women’s rights community had not embraced the use of 
contraceptive devices to prevent conception.  
In the early twentieth century, some radical women’s rights activists embraced 
contraception. As women became convinced that relief from enforced childbearing could 
come through birth control, they subordinated the issue of forced sex within marriage to 
the struggle for contraception and abortion rights.110 The primary focus of the birth 
control movement was to promote a woman’s right to decide when and if she wanted to 
become pregnant.111 At the center of the movement, Margaret Sanger “viewed birth 
control as a means to women’s autonomy,” voicing her belief: “It is none of society’s 
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business what a woman shall do with her body.”112 In 1912, Sanger began to advocate for 
the use of contraceptives, both in writing and at speaking engagements. She saw birth 
control as a way for women to enjoy sexual intimacy free from the fear of unwanted 
pregnancies. Two objectives guided Sanger’s actions: “sexual freedom for middle-class 
women” and eradicating “the misery of working-class women who had virtually no 
control over their own fertility, and bore child after child despite grinding poverty.”113 
Initially intent on providing poor women with contraceptives to control their fertility, 
Sanger changed her focus when stymied by conservative opposition to birth control 
clinics. Thereafter, “she began to target elite and middle-class audiences and to 
emphasize the erotic potential for women by separating sex from reproduction.”114 The 
Comstock law thwarted her efforts, as the federal obscenity laws included prohibitions 
against information about contraception.115 Facing forty-five years in prison if convicted 
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of violating the law, Sanger fled to Europe where she gained access to contraceptive 
devices, which she would later sneak into the country, more information about birth 
control, and an international following. When she returned to the United States, she 
demanded a trial, but the federal prosecutor decided to drop the pending charges against 
Sanger. Thereafter, she embarked on a national speaking tour before settling in Brooklyn, 
New York, and opening the first birth control clinic in the United States. Sanger once 
again faced arrest, a trial, and possible conviction, this time for disseminating information 
on birth control without a physician present. The government’s actions against Sanger 
provided the birth control cause with significant publicity and drew attention to a shift in 
the sexual norms that had governed the middle class for more than fifty years. Further: 
To advocate fertility control among women through access to contraceptive 
devices rather than through abstinence implied an unequivocal acceptance of 
female sexual expression. It weakened the link between sexual activity and 
procreation, altered the meaning of the marriage bond, and opened the way for 
more extensive premarital sexual behavior among women.116 
 
This was certainly a consequence never anticipated or intended by the government as it 
enforced the laws governing the distribution of information about contraceptives. 
 The birth control movement was above all things fluid and adaptive. Across time 
and regional boundaries, tactics adapted to the political, economic, and social interests of 
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the population.117 In the 1920s, for instance, two very different impulses motivated the 
birth control movement: the move toward sexual liberalism and eugenics. Sexual 
liberalism, represented by sexual freedom in Hollywood films, promoted companionate 
marriage characterized by mutual sexual satisfaction and even sexual expression outside 
the confines of marriage. The use of contraceptives would reduce the possibility of 
pregnancy and increase personal satisfaction during intimacy. Eugenics rhetoric 
promoted restricted reproduction by “undesirables” for whom birth control was a 
necessity. According to D’Emilio and Freedman, because of her single-minded goal of 
making birth control a major political issue, Sanger “was willing to play to nativist and 
middle-class fears of immigrants, blacks, and the poor.”118 Sanger promoted the eugenics 
agenda and played on the rhetoric of nativists, when she “defined the purpose of birth 
control as ‘more children from the fit, less from the unfit.’ It was ‘nothing more or less 
than the facilitation of the process of weeding out the unfit, or preventing the birth of 
defectives.’”119 
Sanger and her followers adjusted their tactics to address the economic crisis of 
the 1930s. Increased poverty caused by the depression meant that couples had difficulty 
supporting large families. Activists “trumpeted fertility limitations for the poor as an 
‘important relief measure,’” thereby reducing the size of families receiving government 
aid.120 As the decade progressed, the number of family planning clinics increased 
nationwide: there were twenty-eight clinics in 1929, one hundred fifty-eight by 1935, and 
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five hundred forty-nine by the beginning of 1940.121 As Norman Hines noted there was 
an uneven distribution of these clinics across the country. Clinics were more likely to 
appear in areas of higher population, particularly in the North. In contrast, facilities were 
more limited in “the South and in the sparsely settled areas of the West.”122  
For the birth control movement to succeed, it was necessary to separate birth 
control from obscenity laws. Advocates were able to accomplish this by reframing birth 
control as a scientific, medical issue rather than a form of pornography. Promoting this 
new definition, the American Birth Control League “emphasized how birth control 
prevented the cycle of poverty, untimely deaths, and unwanted children.”123 A significant 
first step toward the legalization of birth control came in 1936 with United States v. One 
Package of Japanese Pessaries.124 The case challenged the provision of the Tariff Act of 
1930 that had incorporated the anti-contraception element of the Comstock Law. The 
federal appellate court that heard the case held that the Tariff Act did not apply to 
physicians who were importing contraceptive devices in order to use them to protect the 
health of their patients. 
By the end of the 1930s, the climate toward birth control had changed enough 
among politicians, physicians, and the public, that contraception was more acceptable.125 
The birth control movement gained further legitimacy with the formation of Planned 
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Parenthood of America in 1942.126 Once again in the late 1940s and 1950s, the message 
of advocates changed to suit the realities of American life. During the postwar baby 
boom, when women were marrying earlier and having children sooner and more often, 
Planned Parenthood emphasized the right of couples “to continue their sexual 
relationship without doubling the size of their families,” and spacing children.127 Fertility 
studies demonstrated that despite the baby boom, eighty-one percent of married women 
utilized some form of contraception in the years 1955 to 1960.128  
The birth control pill, commercially available in 1960, further challenged 
historical views of contraception. Premarital sex had been increasing steadily, albeit 
gradually, since the 1920s, but the introduction of the birth control pill weakened the link 
between sex and marriage as “growing numbers of . . . women began to stake out their 
right to enjoy sex for pleasure rather than for procreation.”129 The decade “witnessed a 
profound shift in attitudes toward female premarital sex.”130 Women in the post-pill era 
could enjoy physical intimacy while avoiding pregnancy, a shotgun wedding, a prolonged 
stay at a home for unwed mothers, an illegal or dangerous abortion, or a damaged 
reputation. Realistically, each of these consequences was still a possibility, but with 
greater access to reliable birth control, the probability of any of them coming to fruition 
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dropped dramatically. Thus, changing social attitudes in the 1960s, accompanied by 
pharmaceutical advancements, gave way to greater sexual autonomy, which would lay 
the groundwork for the anti-rape movement and discussions about marital rape. 
It would be the second-wave feminists, beginning in the late 1960s, who would 
revive the issue of forced sex in marriage and make it a subject of public debate. The 
feminist movement that emerged in the 1960s found inspiration from many sources, 
including Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan, and Kate Millett, as well as the 
experiences women gained from their participation in the civil rights movement, the 
antiwar movement, and other movements of the New Left.  
First published in 1949 as Le Deuxième Sexe, Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex elicited a discussion about the historical status of women that scholars still debate 
today. Some have referred to the text as a “feminist bible,” despite the underlying 
religious connotation and de Beauvoir self-identifying as an atheist. One writer boldly 
called The Second Sex “an act of Promethean audacity – a theft of Olympian fire – from 
which there is no turning back. It is not the last word on ‘the problem of women,’ . . . but 
it marks the place in history where an enlightenment begins.”131 Beauvoir posited a self-
other relationship between man and woman, where man was the self/subject and woman 
the other/object, understood only in relation to man.132 Women, like minority groups such 
as Blacks and Jews, de Beauvoir concluded, were “objectified as the Other in ways that 
were both overtly despotic and insidious,” subjugated merely for belonging to the 
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particular group into which they were born.133 Beauvoir illustrated this self-other 
relationship with repeated discussions of sex between males and females, where men 
were generally the actors and women those acted upon.134  
While The Second Sex was not primarily a book that admonished men for 
sexually assaulting women, de Beauvoir did make recurring reference to rape. She used 
rape imagery to describe women’s first experiences with sex. Whether within or outside 
of marriage, de Beauvoir explained that such experiences could be traumatizing for 
women. For instance, de Beauvoir asserted:  
The woman is penetrated and impregnated through the vagina; it becomes an 
erotic center uniquely through the intervention of the male, and this always 
constitutes a kind of rape. In the past, a woman was snatched from her childhood 
universe and thrown into her life as a wife by a real or simulated rape; this was an 
act of violence that changed the girl into a woman: it is also referred to as 
“ravishing” a girl’s virginity or “taking” her flower. This deflowering is not the 
harmonious outcome of a continuous development; it is an abrupt rupture with the 
past.135  
 
The language of this passage delineates male from female, actor from subject. The man 
penetrates, impregnates, and snatches the woman, throwing her into her new life. The 
woman on the other hand is ravished, taken, and deflowered by the man, and as such, her 
passive involvement is subordinated to his. Through this example and the many others 
provided in The Second Sex, de Beauvoir created the framework of “women as other,” 
marginalized and subjected to the dominance of males in society. Later feminists would 
utilize this structure to discuss how that gender disparity created situations that promoted 
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– or at least condoned – violence against women. Ultimately, it is de Beauvoir’s views on 
sex as rape that foreshadow future arguments women’s disempowerment in 
heteronormative relationships, especially marriage. 
Beauvoir’s most notable, some might say subversive, challenge to the status quo 
asserted: “One is not born, but rather one becomes a woman: no biological, psychological 
or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society.”136 
These twenty-six powerful words challenged the social construct that defined “woman” 
in contemporary society, and they disparaged the myth of blissful domesticity and 
sentimental motherhood. In addressing women’s subordination, de Beauvoir emphasized 
the dilemma of modern women: they had basic political rights, yet still “suffered from 
extreme cultural, social, and economic marginality.”137 While promoting equality for 
women, she also acknowledged that equality could coexist with difference. Women, 
particularly with access to contraceptives and paid employment, could emerge with new, 
individual personal identities independent of men. For de Beauvoir, equality between 
men and women would result from the eradication of women’s oppression. While largely 
ignored in the United States and England until the 1970s, thereafter, The Second Sex was 
a foundational work underscoring second-wave feminist activism.138  
                                                 
136 Rosen, The World Split Open, 56. 
137 Ibid., 57. 
138 Vintges, “Simone de Beauvoir,” 140. For a brief overview of some of the controversy that surrounded 
the principles de Beauvoir espoused, see Dorothy Kaufmann, “Simone de Beauvoir: Questions of 
Difference and Generation,” Yale French Studies 72 (1986), 121-131. For more on de Beauvoir’s influence 
on second-wave feminism, see Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, “Seeing ‘The Second Sex’ through the Second 
Wave,” Feminist Studies 6 (1986), 247-276. Jo-Ann Pilardi has evaluated the critical reception that The 
Second Sex received in France, the United States, and England, depicting the cyclic nature of the scholarly 
responses. Jo-Ann Pilardi, “The Changing Critical Fortunes of the Second Sex,” History and Theory 23, no. 
1 (1993), 51-73. 
 52 
 
In her best-selling book, The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan argued that the 
strict gender division promoted in post-World War II America stunted the lives of many 
women, resulting in extremely high levels of female dissatisfaction, boredom, and even 
psychosomatic complaints. The problem, Friedan postulated, arose from the societal 
expectation that women would find contentment in the home, raising children and taking 
care of their husbands, tasks made easier with the modern, timesaving appliances that 
were more widely available in 1950s America. To move beyond the resulting malaise that 
suburban domesticity caused, Friedan encouraged women to pursue their passions outside 
the home, whether in education or employment.139 While The Feminine Mystique often 
receives credit for jumpstarting second-wave feminism, the text is not without its 
detractors.140 Critics have argued that the “problem” Friedan identified and her solutions 
were applicable only to upper and middle-class, white women. Contrary to Freidan’s 
assertions, not all housewives were unhappy. Many women embraced their new roles as 
homemakers; unlike their mothers and unmarried sisters, they were not compelled to take 
low-paid employment outside the home. Additionally, not all Americans could or did live 
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by the norms of suburban domesticity, ideals that were out of reach for many racial 
minorities, inner city residents, recent immigrants, and rural Americans. In fact, at the 
height of the postwar period, more than one-third of American women held jobs outside 
the home. By the 1960s, one worker in three were women, and three of five working 
women were married. Nevertheless, Friedan and her “problem without a name” did 
breathe life into the nascent women’s movement of the 1960s, setting the stage for 
substantive progress in criminalizing marital rape.141  
Particularly interesting is the influence that Friedan had on public perception 
regarding topics she only lightly covered or did not show up in her book. When Stephanie 
Coontz agreed to write a book on the influence of the Feminine Mystique on American 
society, she interviewed a wide variety of women, some of whom had read the book and 
some who merely thought they had. One notable commonality that emerged was the 
conflation of Friedan’s message with a wide swath of issues related to the women’s 
movement. Coontz notes that one respondent insisted that “The Feminine Mystique 
documented how women in the 1950s were excluded from many legal rights and paid 
much less than men – although in fact the book spends very little time discussing legal 
and economic discrimination against women.”142 Another woman interviewed swore that 
Feminine Mystique encouraged women to burn their bras, while others assured Coontz 
                                                 
141 Following the release of The Feminine Mystique, Friedan’s influence was so great among women’s 
rights advocates that she became the first president of the newly formed National Organization for Women 
in 1966. As Friedan explained in the first speech of her presidency, the objective of NOW was “to take 
action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, exercising all 
privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men.” Betty Friedan, “The National 
Organization for Women’s 1966 Statement of Purpose,” http://now.org/about/history/statement-of-purpose/  
142 Coontz, A Strange Stirring, xvi. 
 54 
 
“that Friedan had called for the end to marital rape and sexual harassment – ideas that do 
not appear anywhere” within the book.143  
Kate Millett took up the feminist cause with Sexual Politics, published in 1970.144 
Like the rhetoric of Friedan, Anne Koedt, and Shulamith Firestone, Millett’s writing 
interrogated the intersection between identity and sexuality for women.145 Millett 
acknowledged the legal success of first-wave feminists in achieving suffrage, while 
simultaneously addressing what she saw as the noxious, yet subtle, lingering influence of 
patriarchy in sexual relations. In Sexual Politics, Millett unabashedly analyzed the 
misogyny she found in American and British literature. D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, 
and William Burroughs were particular targets. As Ruth Rosen has observed: “Through a 
close reading of their texts, Millett demonstrated how much cruelty and hatred these 
misogynist authors had directed at women.”146 Women within the pages of the novels 
Millett analyzed “never seemed to mind male acts of rape, violence, or mutilation. The 
moment a man penetrated a woman, she invariably experienced sublime heights of 
orgasmic bliss. In fact, the crueler the male character was, the greater her sexual 
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satisfaction seemed to be.”147 Sexual Politics, in its early days as a dissertation and later 
as a published text, broke ground in its departure from traditional thesis writing, opening 
the field of feminist literary criticism and giving a new voice to feminist theory.148 
Millett’s assertions, as well as the arguments presented by other feminist scholars 
and novelists, led many women to evaluate just how liberating the Sexual Revolution had 
been for them. While the birth control pill, and later the intrauterine device, separated 
sexual intimacy from conception, emancipation from earlier sexual norms diminished 
perceptions of intercourse outside of marriage as deviant. Still, this sexual liberation did 
not free all women from the guilt of intimacy separate from marriage, nor did such 
encounters result in fulfilling experiences for all involved. 
Throughout the 1970s, feminist activism addressed the gender inequalities that 
remained in society – those areas where political, economic, and social distinctions still 
separated women from men. One significant area of concern was women’s ability to 
exercise control over their bodies. “Although the American women’s movement began by 
emphasizing women’s ‘sameness,’ the focus on women’s autonomy over their bodies 
“refocused attention on those female experiences that made women unique.”149 
Consciousness-raising sessions led to discussions about dismissive and condescending 
treatment from the male-dominated medical community, sexual harassment that stemmed 
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from the sexual objectification of women, the illegality of abortion and its consequences, 
and the legal difficulties women faced with regard to rape and domestic violence.150  
Facing a medical establishment that continued to treat women “as ignorant or 
hysterical patients,” in a manner that was humiliating, dismissive, and woefully ignorant 
of the “female biological experience,” feminists “sparked a campaign to train more 
women doctors, to reeducate male physicians, and to create a women-oriented health 
movement.”151 At the forefront of this movement was a group of activists from Boston 
that emerged from Bread and Roses, a women’s liberation organization in existence from 
1969 through 1971, which later identified itself as the Boston Women’s Health 
Collective. Members, none of whom were physicians, became experts on the topic of 
women’s bodies, studying female “anatomy, physiology, sexuality, venereal disease, 
birth control, abortion, pregnancy, and childbirth,” before publishing their findings in 
pamphlet form and then in the greatly expanded book Our Bodies, Ourselves in 1973.152 
Illustrating the self-help theme of second-wave feminism, Our Bodies, Ourselves, written 
in language accessible to the layperson, discussed medical information as well as 
previously taboo topics like lesbianism and sexual violence.153 Health activists addressed 
a wide range of issues facing women and their reproductive health, questioning why 
                                                 
150 Chapter 2 discusses Nebraska’s domestic violence and sexual assault movement that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s.  
151 Rosen, The World Split Open, 175-176. As Estelle Freedman has noted, the women’s health movement 
attempted to restore medical authority over reproduction that male gynecologists had usurped from 
midwives. While a few women entered the medical profession in the nineteenth century, it was not until the 
1960s that a significant number of women integrated into the profession. In 2000, more than forty percent 
of medical students in the United States were female. Estelle B. Freedman, No Turning Back: The History 
of Feminism and the Future of Women (New York: NY, Ballantine Books, 2003), 215.  
152 Boston Women’s Health Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973); 
Evans, Tidal Wave, 48; Rosen, The World Split Open, 176; DuBois and Dumenil, Through Women’s Eyes, 
699. 
153 Freedman, No Turning Back, 216. 
 57 
 
physicians – not patients – had power over health decisions. Encouraging women to be 
active medical consumers rather than passive patients at the mercy of patriarchal medical 
structures, health activists challenged everything from decisions about contraception and 
abortion to radical mastectomies and coercive sterilization. 
While feminists were encouraging women to seize control of their reproductive 
health, activists were also spearheading the domestic violence movement. The 
development of the domestic violence movement was not the result of a singular event, 
but rather the culmination of a series of continuous events evolving around the nation 
beginning in the 1970s. Victims of domestic violence found themselves isolated from 
friends, family, and community resources. Early calls for change were hardly outrageous. 
Advocates asked only that the legal system treat battered women fairly and equitably, 
questioning “why a woman beaten in her own home by her husband was denied . . . 
justice, while someone assaulted in the street was recognized as a legitimate victim of a 
crime.”154 Those within the domestic violence movement believed that treating domestic 
violence as seriously as other forms of violent crime would convey to the public that such 
behavior was no longer socially or legally acceptable.155 Yet this change in opinion 
would not come easily.  
At the forefront of the movement, feminist scholars both chronicled and advanced 
the agenda of domestic violence activism. Del Martin’s 1976 publication of Battered 
Wives was the first general text to introduce the problem of domestic abuse.156 An 
informative source on domestic violence in the United States, it critically analyzed the 
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legal and political status of women abused by their husbands. Battered Wives also served 
to validate the view held by many feminist members of the movement: domestic violence 
was the result of institutional misogyny. Martin described society as a patriarchal one in 
which males defined and then confined women to inferior roles by means of intimidation, 
threats, and the use of force. Two years later while she chaired a meeting sponsored by 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Martin contended that the condition of 
battered women was a matter of national concern.157  
Susan Schechter published Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles 
of the Battered Women’s Movement in 1982. Reflecting on her motivation for writing the 
text, Schechter explained: “I hoped to tell a story about feminist, grassroots organizing 
and about the hard work required to build organizations, change law and social policy, 
and at the same time sustain a social movement. I wanted to brag about and document the 
accomplishments but also describe the hard, complicated work almost invisible 
underneath our new buildings and laws.”158 In doing so, Schechter acted as both historian 
of and visionary for the battered women’s movement. Through her writing and public 
speaking, she promoted the fundamental assertion of the feminist movement that “women 
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had a right to control their own bodies and lives.”159 Women and Male Violence, credited 
with framing “the issues of intimate violence in a way that helped shape every subsequent 
analysis of domestic violence, its causes and solutions,” extolled activists to do more.160 
In 1979, psychologist Lenore Walker released The Battered Woman, the book that 
introduced the theory of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). Walker’s controversial 
theory suggested that women who endure repeated physical or psychological acts at the 
hands of their husbands might suffer from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder, which 
would impair their ability to think rationally and make reasonable decisions.161 Cyclical 
behavior between the woman and her abusive partner, characterized by three distinct 
phases – tension-building, acute battering, and calm respite – might result in a pattern of 
psychological and behavioral symptoms. An individual suffering from BWS usually 
presents four common ideations: she believes that the violence was somehow her fault; 
she does not have the ability to place responsibility for the violence elsewhere; she fears 
for her life or the lives of her children; and she holds an irrational belief that her abuser is 
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omniscient. Physical symptoms might include headaches, chest pains, anxiety, insomnia, 
panic attacks, and agitation.162  
Since the release of The Battered Woman, female defendants have raised BWS as 
a defense in criminal cases to justify violent acts committed against their abusive 
husbands. While not all jurisdictions will allow a defendant to raise the defense of BWS, 
the majority of states have allowed expert testimony on BWS. The watershed case 
involving BWS was State v. Kelly, involving a 1984 appeal before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. In Kelly, the defendant faced the charge of stabbing her husband to death 
with a pair of scissors. She claimed to have acted in self-defense, fearing for her life after 
seven years in an abusive marriage. The trial court had prevented the testimony of an 
expert on BWS and the defendant appealed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: “the 
battered-woman’s syndrome is an appropriate subject for expert testimony; . . . the 
expert’s conclusions, despite the relative newness of the field, are sufficiently reliable 
under New Jerseys standards for scientific testimony; and that defendant’s expert was 
sufficiently qualified” to testify at trial.163 
One commonality addressed by Martin, Schechter, Walker, and other scholars, 
was that there was a ubiquitous sentiment across America that what happened in the 
home was private and personal, and therefore not to be shared in public or addressed by 
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governmental entities.164 This code of silence also hid the fact that domestic violence 
often included sexual assault.165 In the 1970s and 1980s, women organized politically 
against the all-too-common violence that influenced their lives, transforming the way that 
society viewed violence against women. For instance, “battering and rape, once seen as 
private (family matters) and aberrational (errant sexual aggression), are now largely 
recognized as part of a broad-scale system of domination that affects women as a 
class.”166  
 The feminists of the 1970s, largely white and middle-class, characterized 
women’s oppression as universal, overlooking ways in which other forms of oppression 
and hierarchy intersected with gender.  The recognition of gendered violence as social 
and systemic, however, gave way to the development of identity politics, a construct that 
helps to explain the oppression experienced by members of a particular group, whether 
defined by race, class, sexual orientation, or some other characteristic, and “serves as a 
source of strength, community, and intellectual development.”167 However, as Kimberlé 
Crenshaw cautioned, “The problem with identity politics is that it frequently conflates or 
ignores intragroup differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of 
difference is problematic because the violence that many women experience is often 
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shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race, class, and sexual orientation. 
Moreover, ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups, 
another problem of identity politics that bears on efforts to politicize violence against 
women.”168 For example, both feminist efforts to address gender discrimination and anti-
racist activism that highlights the experience of people of color may operate as though the 
issues are mutually exclusive. While sexism and racism often intersect in the lives of 
women of color, the exclusivity issue may result in an either/or situation in which the 
individual has to choose which characteristic of her identity she will elevate – i.e. gender, 
race, or sexual orientation.169 
Nevertheless, identity politics and intersectionality provided cohesion for women 
of color who organized activist efforts that often operated independently of those led by 
white activists. At the same time, women of color engaged in the development of 
additional theoretical paradigms that addressed concerns unique to minority women. 
Notable within this group are two scholars noted earlier in this chapter: Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, one of the founders of critical race theory, and Patricia Hill Collins, whose 
work addresses the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and nation. Other African 
American scholars have added to the growing body of literature on the intersection of 
race and gender in American society. In Women, Race, & Class, Angela Davis evaluated 
women’s struggles, both Black and white, to remove economic, social, and sexual 
barriers that prevented gender equality. Davis addressed racism in the woman’s suffrage 
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movement and analyzed the myth of the Black rapist. In a chapter on the birth control 
movement, Davis was critical of contraception and sterilization as applied to women of 
color, linking it to the eugenics movement and identifying it as a form of racial/ethnic 
genocide.170 Johnnetta Betsch Cole and Beverly Guy-Sheftall addressed the role of 
gender and sexuality in racism in Gender Talk: The Struggle for Women’s Equality in 
African American Communities. Cole and Guy-Sheftall spoke equally to the racist 
exploitation of Black bodies and the sexist oppression of Black women. They called upon 
Black men to “acknowledge their gender privileges and [to] . . . publicly disavow sexist 
attitudes and behaviors . . . [and replace] patriarchy with partnerships.”171 
Such activism took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, as white and African American 
women began meeting in small groups, engaging in quiet, intimate conversations that 
broke the silence of domestic abuse and provided evidence that these women were not 
alone in their experiences.172 They spoke of a lack of assistance for women who lived in 
abusive households. When responding to reports of domestic violence, police officers 
generally acted with grave caution. Even when there was evidence of physical assault or 
a court issued protective order, rarely did the police make an arrest.173 In fact, most police 
forces across the United States followed a no-arrest policy, in which police officers 
would not arrest the physical aggressor in a domestic dispute. During the 1970s, for 
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example, Michigan police officers were under orders to “avoid arrest if possible” in 
domestic violence situations. In Oakland, California, police officers learned to respond to 
domestic disputes as peacemakers rather than enforcers of the law.174  
 In the mid-1970s, women working domestic violence hotlines realized that the 
battered women calling were in need of a place of refuge if they were ever going to leave 
their abusers. To meet the initial need, some advocates opened their homes to those in 
need. Similarly, as explained by Barbara J. Hart of the Pennsylvania Coalition against 
Domestic Violence, selected churches offered asylum to women escaping domestic 
violence in much the same way they offered sanctuary to draft evaders during the era of 
the Vietnam War.175 For those women who did escape, there was a need greater than 
simply a safe location. The emergence of shelters as safe havens also made available 
clothing, food, and other personal items that the women had left behind.176 From their 
inception, shelters relied on donations to assist with operating costs and services offered 
to clients. 
 The tireless work of activists began to pay off. Across the country, support and 
understanding was more prevalent. Still, it was not an easy transition. Police officers still 
hesitated to arrest men during domestic violence call outs. Doctors who treated patients 
with recurring injuries were generally ineffective allies. Many ignored signs of domestic 
violence, embraced the belief that it was a private, family matter, or believed that social 
workers were best poised to handle these conflicts.177 Even potential allies within the 
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criminal justice system were ineffectual, primarily because there was a lack of 
communication between the different components of that system. Candace Mosley, a 
professional in the areas of domestic violence and crimes against women, explained that a 
variety of individuals from law enforcement and criminal, civil, and juvenile courts may 
have interacted with a particular family, but rarely did they make the connections that 
would have brought their disparate interests together.178  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, many laws changed to reflect the 
criminalization of battering. Legal changes in New York between 1970 and 1983 provide 
a great example of the gradual criminalization of domestic violence. In 1970, New York 
police officers received the authority to make warrantless arrests when there was a 
reasonable belief that a crime had been committed. This discretion allowed an arrest in 
the case of domestic violence, even if the crime had occurred outside the observation of 
the police officer. In 1977, New York granted married women the right to have abusive 
husbands prosecuted. Jurisdiction over first-degree assaults became the purview of the 
criminal court rather than family court in 1980, another step by the legal system in 
acknowledging the seriousness of the offense. Then a significant policy shift occurred 
within the family court: the original purpose of keeping the family together was amended 
to reflect the goal of ending family violence. Finally, in 1983, an amendment to the state 
law “made abuse victims eligible for compensation to the same extent as other crime 
victims.”179 
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The momentum behind these changes stemmed largely from the efforts of 
domestic violence advocates; however, there were other noteworthy influences as well. 
Civil lawsuits filed against police departments increased significantly, focusing on the 
constitutional issues of due process and equal protection under the law. The 1984 case, 
Thurman v. City of Torrington, was a turning point for department no-arrest policies and 
attitudes toward domestic violence in general. The Thurman court held that “official 
behavior that reflects an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference to victims of domestic 
assault violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”180   
Tracey Thurman’s marriage to her husband, Charles “Buck” Thurman, was a 
tempestuous one. Three times, she attempted to leave him, but she always returned after 
he promised to change his abusive ways. In October 1982, she escaped a fourth time, 
returning to her hometown of Torrington, Connecticut. Tracking her down, Buck arrived 
in the small New England town and settled into a pattern of tormenting Tracey, 
sometimes calling her as many as twenty-five times a day, demanding to see her and their 
son, C.J.181 Tracey obtained a restraining order, but without enforcement by the 
Torrington Police Department, the restraining order did no good. Buck’s harassment 
continued. He repeatedly showed up at Tracey’s house; in the presence of police officers, 
Buck smashed in the window of Tracey’s car while she was in it; and he threatened to kill 
Tracey and C.J. She called the Torrington Police many times, but received little or no 
relief.  
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Police charged Buck with breach of the peace for breaking the car window, but 
when convicted he received a suspended sentence. In another instance, the police told 
Tracey that they would need to see Buck violate the restraining order for them to act. On 
yet another occasion, police officers told Tracey that the only officer able to assist her 
was on vacation, so there was nothing they could do. Still, Tracey continued to report 
violations of the restraining order to the police and asked for assistance when Buck 
continued to threaten her. However, as Mahlon Sabo, the Torrington Police Chief, told 
Tracey, the situation would be easier if Buck was not her husband since the city police 
officers followed department policy of not making arrests when husbands and wives were 
involved, a practice that was quiet common among law enforcement at the time.182  
On June 10, 1983, Buck tracked Tracey to the home of a girlfriend she was 
visiting. Tracey once again called the police to ask for assistance. By the time an officer 
arrived on the scene twenty-five minutes later, Buck had stabbed Tracey thirteen times in 
the face, neck, and shoulders. While Buck stood over Tracey’s body holding a bloody 
knife, the police officer failed to arrest Buck for another twenty minutes, allowing time 
for Buck to kick Tracey in the head, breaking her neck. The attack left Tracey paralyzed 
on her right side and without feeling on her left. After seven months in the hospital, 
Tracey testified at her husband’s trial and filed a lawsuit against the Torrington Police 
Department and twenty-four of its police officers who failed to act on her behalf, 
claiming that their reluctance to intervene violated her constitutional right to equal 
protection.183  
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In Thurman v. City of Torrington, the district court explained that the police 
policy of not arresting men who battered their wives reflected an impermissible 
stereotypic view that husbands may physically abuse their wives. The court held:  
A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he 
is her husband. Concommitantly [sic], a police officer may not knowingly refrain 
from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an 
arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. Such 
inaction on the part of the officer is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.184 
 
The court found the Torrington police negligent and awarded Tracey nearly two million 
dollars in damages.185 The State of Connecticut thereafter instituted a mandatory arrest 
policy in cases of domestic violence.186 Following Connecticut’s example, other police 
departments changed their policies to include mandatory intervention in domestic 
violence cases. 
 As the domestic violence movement moved into the 1980s and 1990s, societal 
awareness was evident throughout the nation. Expanded media exposure helped bring an 
increase to public attention regarding the plight of victims. 60 Minutes, one of the 
nation’s most notable prime time, televised newsmagazines, aired a segment in 1982 
titled “A Place to Go,” which promoted sensitivity and support for domestic violence 
victims. The segment, which focused on domestic violence shelters in Austin, Texas, was 
part of the most watched episode of the season.187  
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The domestic violence movement gained more public attention in June 1990, 
when then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced the bill that would become the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA). Biden explained that the bill had three broad goals: “to 
make streets safer for women; to make homes safer for women; and to protect women’s 
civil rights.”188 The provisions of the bill were expansive, covering all types of gender-
based violence, whether domestic violence, stalking, rape, or homicide. Initially, Biden’s 
bill seemed to face more opposition than support from women’s groups and civil rights 
groups: “One group claimed the bill would violate the First Amendment, another that its 
rape penalties were too high, and still another that it would detract from efforts to pass 
legislation addressing other more important women’s issues.”189 
Undeterred by the opposition, Biden brought together women leaders who, under 
the leadership of the NOW Legal Defense Fund, would create a coalition of “grassroots 
providers, shelters, religious organizations, survivors, mental health providers, 
prosecutors, and victims’ rights advocates” to combat objections to VAWA legislation.190 
Notable opposition arose in the Department of Justice under President George Herbert 
Walker Bush, and within the federal judiciary. Particularly caustic was the opposition by 
then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist who publicly denounced VAWA for its open-ended 
criminal provisions and civil rights provision that Rehnquist predicted would force federal 
courts into resolving ordinary family disputes. Biden and the grassroots coalition were up to 
the challenge and pushed forward, finally gaining the support necessary for the bill to pass in 
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1994. When VAWA went into effect, it authorized “$1.8 billion to aid police, prosecutors, 
and victim advocates in combatting crime against women.”191 
That same year, the Ad Council and the Family Violence Prevention Fund 
(FVPF) launched a domestic violence prevention campaign using the tagline “There’s no 
excuse for domestic violence.” Public service advertisements highlighted “an effort to 
reduce domestic violence by making it socially unacceptable.”192 According to the 
American Medical Association, at that time, domestic violence was the number one 
health threat for women.193 The campaign, which encouraged people to get involved in 
prevention efforts, spread like wildfire, as anti-domestic violence literature and publicity 
materials adorned walls in city hall buildings, doctors’ offices, shelters, hospitals, and 
courthouses. Two and a half months after the campaign launch, FVPF workers had 
responded to requests for over ten thousand domestic violence prevention action kits.194 
Despite the forward momentum brought on by VAWA, advocates realized that as 
long as domestic violence was still occurring, there was room to do more. Advocates 
promoted a two-pronged strategy: reactive measures to assist victims and proactive 
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tactics to prevent future violence.195 Achieving this goal would require a collaborated 
effort among community-based groups, where each contributor understood and respected 
the knowledge and skills that the others brought to the association. Law enforcement, 
lawyers, physicians, and other professionals would need to listen to and learn from 
survivors and advocates who had become the experts on domestic violence.196 
Educational programs promoted the training for those encountering victims and their 
families; simply going through the mechanics of taking a victim statement, providing 
emergency room treatment, or helping a victim acquire an order of protection was not 
enough. These professionals needed to learn to act with compassion, to understand the 
interpersonal dynamics within the violent family, to provide services for the children of 
female victims, and to provide structural support that would allow victims to become 
survivors. 
Closely related to the domestic violence movement was the call for women’s 
sexual autonomy. Recognizing a threat to that sexual self-sovereignty, consciousness-
raising discussions delineated a path from the sexual objectification of women to their 
vulnerability in public to sexual assault.197 Beginning in the radical arm of the women’s 
rights movement, “organizers reframed sexual violence not merely as a private trauma 
but also as a nexus of power relations and a public policy concern,” clearly associating 
the problem of sexual violence with male privilege.198 At the time, victims rarely reported 
sexual assault, victim blaming was common, and society perpetuated the belief that rape 
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was a rare event. Armed with the motto “the personal is political,” activists sought to 
change laws and public opinion.199  
One strategy used to change public opinion and influence legal revision was to 
provide “open public forums in which victims and survivors of crimes against women 
could speak out.”200 Issues debated in the forums included weak rape laws and enduring 
myths about rape, both of which brought wife abuse and rape into public discourse. 
Advocates also used marches and conventions to bring woman/wife abuse to the attention 
of the public, often garnering state and national exposure for their cause. As Susan 
Schechter explained: “lawyers, therapists, women’s crisis and anti-rape workers were 
reporting numerous calls and visits from abused women desperately in need of housing 
and legal assistance,” thereby demonstrating the pervasiveness of the problem.201 
In her 1971 essay, “Rape: The All-American Crime,” Susan Griffin challenged 
the notion that rape was an act of sexual desire, instead referring to it as an act of 
violence in which “a man attempted to gain complete control over a woman.”202 Estelle 
Freedman described the significance of Griffin’s work: “She exploded each of the myths 
about rape in American culture, addressed the legal obstacles to prosecuting sexual 
violence, named white male privilege as the heart of the problem, and recognized the 
particular vulnerability of women of color and the costs of the myth of the black 
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rapist.”203 Journalist Susan Brownmiller advanced the ideas introduced by Griffin in 
Against Our Will, a groundbreaking text that discussed the universality of rape.204 
According to Brownmiller, rape had occurred throughout time in parts of the world under 
a variety of circumstances, including the act of conquest when sexual assault is an 
acceptable part of the spoils of war. Echoing Griffin’s assertion that rape was about 
power, Brownmiller pronounced in the book’s introduction: 
Man’s discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must 
rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric times, along with the 
use of fire and the first crude stone axe. From prehistoric times to the present, I 
believe, rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a 
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of 
fear.205  
 
It was this fear, Brownmiller noted, that sustained female subordination. Throughout the 
nearly four hundred pages of the text, Brownmiller explored the power dynamics 
represented by rape, proposed changes to the laws governing sexual assault, and 
introduced her reader to the emerging feminist anti-rape movement.206 
 Emboldened by the works of Griffin and Brownmiller, feminists identified rape as 
a problem that law enforcement and women’s groups needed to address. Advocates 
established rape crisis hot lines and rape crisis centers to provide victims with 
counselling, legal aid, help in dealing with the police and hospital personnel, and 
assistance in the form of support groups. By the mid-1970s, more than four hundred 
centers were operating in towns and cities across the United States.207 Concurrently, 
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activists advocated for changes in the way that police officers and the court system 
treated sexual assault victims, maintaining that this treatment was tantamount to being 
victimized a second time. “Feminists called for training police, emergency room staff, 
and court personnel to make them more sympathetic to women reporting rape. . . [and] 
have insisted on the reform of legal procedures as well.”208 Since the 1970s, states have 
changed their sexual assault statutes and court procedures in alignment with many of the 
concerns raised by second-wave advocates. The testimony of a corroborating witness is 
no longer required for a conviction, and in the majority of states, the law no longer 
requires that a victim establish that she resisted to prove that an assault occurred. Gone, 
too, in the majority of jurisdictions are questions about what the victim was wearing, 
whether she knew her attacker, and testimony about the victim’s prior sexual experiences, 
all vestiges of myths about rape.209 
Susan Brinson, Professor of Mass Communication at Auburn University, posited 
that in “societies in which justice and the right to physical integrity are championed, a 
fundamental conflict occurs among cultural values” when confronting issues of rape. 
Such conflict may be resolved through the development of rape myths by allowing 
society to rationalize the prevalence of the crime by offering explanations [or excuses] 
for its occurrence.210 In fact, myths associated with rape long influenced social and legal 
attitudes about sexual assault. Overcoming these myths was necessary if anti-rape 
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advocates hoped to educate the public and convince legislators to change sexual assault 
laws.  
Martha Burt, researcher at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., identified four 
recurring rape myths: the victim asked for it, the victim wanted it, the victim lied about it, 
and the victim was not really hurt.211 Each of these explanations turn the focus from the 
rapist to the victim, suggesting victim culpability. The first myth suggested that the 
victim provoked the sexual attention because of her behavior, the clothing she was 
wearing, or her choice to be in the “wrong” place. This, of course, presupposes that there 
is a “right” way for a woman to dress or behave, that there is a “right” place for them to 
be, and that a woman who transgresses from this model has asked to be sexually violated.  
Closely related is the “victim wanted it” myth, which proposed that the victim 
enjoyed rough/forced sex. Once again, her clothing, behavior, and location served as 
evidence of her desire. Evidence of promiscuity on the victim’s part further supported the 
contention that “she wanted it,” and negated the possibility that a rape actually 
occurred.212 The supposition that women want forced sex opens the door to two other, 
equally pervasive myths: a woman cannot be raped against her will, and women never 
really mean no. As Brinson explained:  
The former suggest that any healthy woman can get away from her attacker if she 
really wants to, thus insinuating that many rape victims wanted to be attacked. 
The later asserts women may say no, but they really do want to be raped. . . . 
[These myths] return us to patriarchal notions of women desiring male 
domination, as well as the belief that rape is an act of sex rather than violence.213 
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Each argument turns the focus back on the desires of the victim, making her responsible 
for the attack and denying any injury. 
A third myth noted by Burt, the “rape lie,” argued that a victim, who had 
consented to sex, later changed her mind or regretted the action. To alleviate guilt the 
victim claimed rape, implying that she did not want the sex in the first place. This myth, 
like the others, shifts responsibility from the rapist to the victim. Additionally, it focuses 
on the untruthful woman who vindictively blames an innocent man.214 
 During their efforts to revise public opinion about rape, feminists became more 
outspoken about dispelling the myth that sexual violence occurs only between strangers, 
while in fact, some husbands raped their wives. Yet the laws of every state in the country 
spoke to the legal impossibility of spousal rape. Sociologist Diana Russell laid the 
foundation for the activism that followed in her books The Politics of Rape and Rape in 
Marriage.215 Russell conducted the largest and most thorough empirical study of marital 
rape, interviewing a random sample of over nine hundred women in San Francisco, 
California, in 1978. For the purpose of her study, Russell defined rape as “rape by force, 
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rape by threat of force, and rape when the wife is in no position to consent because she is 
unconscious, drugged, asleep, or in some other way helpless.”216 About fourteen percent 
of all married respondents revealed that their husbands had raped them or attempted to 
rape them. Russell proposed that the actual number might have been higher since many 
wives she encountered did not view themselves as rape victims and believed they had a 
duty to submit to their husband’s desires for sex, even when they were not interested.217 
Armed with these statistics, Russell posited that spousal rape might be the most 
prevalent form of rape. She further proposed that despite public opinion to the contrary, 
rape in marriage might be more traumatic than stranger rape. She explained: 
Wife rape can be as terrifying and life-threatening to the victim as stranger rape. 
In addition, it often evokes a powerful sense of betrayal, deep disillusionment, 
and total isolation. . . . Much more is at stake for a victim of wife rape than for a 
woman who is raped by a stranger. When a woman has been raped by her 
husband she cannot seek comfort and safety at home. She can decide to leave the 
marriage or to live with what happened. Either choice can be devastating. Leaving 
involves all the trauma and readjustment of divorce, economically, social, and 
psychologically, including feeling responsible for the suffering of the children, if 
there are any. But staying with someone who has raped you . . . usually means 
being raped again, often repeatedly.218  
 
Russell went on to say that the general public, feminists, and even workers in the 
domestic violence movement, had failed to make rape in marriage a pressing concern, 
instead largely ignoring the realities surrounding the crime. Her goal in writing Rape in 
Marriage was, in part, to provide empirical data on wife rape to facilitate legal and social 
change. Ultimately, Russell’s research on marital rape dispelled the societal myths that 
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rape in marriage is rare, that marital rape is less traumatic than other kinds of rape, and 
that by simply avoiding strangers and dark alleys women can avoid rape.219 
Thereafter, women’s rights advocates began calling for social recognition of rape 
in marriage and legal prohibitions against that act. Such action would require society to 
overcome not only the traditional justifications for spousal immunity, but also the modern 
justifications for the retention of the marital rape exemption. By the middle of the 
twentieth century, support for the marital rape exemption was based on several rationales: 
marital privacy, marital reconciliation, fear of false allegations, the difficulty of proving 
rape, and the belief that rape within marriage was less severe than rape outside of 
marriage.220  
 Proponents of the concept of marital privacy advocated that the right was so 
fundamental that the outside world – i.e. the government – should be prevented from 
defining or interfering with the activities therein.221 Since the mid-1960s, courts have 
countered the argument of marital privacy as it relates to spousal rape by suggesting that 
the protection of privacy within marriage only applied to consensual acts, not to violent 
unilateral ones. Thus, states must balance the right to privacy with their obligation to 
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protect the right of an individual’s bodily integrity. Other courts have argued that to 
sustain the justification of marital privacy, the court would be endorsing a husband’s 
legal control over his wife’s body.222  
 The rationale of marital reconciliation was really an extension of the marital 
privacy argument, in which a figurative closed curtain keeps out the public. By keeping 
the public out, the couple within the home would resolve their differences independent of 
external forces. Some theorized that this resolution process would foster greater mutual 
respect between the parties, leading to a greater likelihood of reconciliation. In contrast, if 
a woman brought the law into the marriage by bringing criminal charges against her 
husband, such action would exacerbate the marital discord, making reconciliation 
unlikely. Opponents of this rationale, including most jurists, refuted the argument 
suggesting that if the marriage had deteriorated to the level of rape there was little in the 
marriage left to reconcile.223 
 The third arena of justification for spousal immunity is the “fear-based argument.” 
There was the fear that fabricated claims by vindictive women would result in the 
conviction of innocent men. Closely related to this was the floodgate argument, which 
proposed that permitting women to come forward and seek the prosecution of their 
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husbands for rape would open the floodgates for spousal rape prosecutions, thus 
overloading the court system. Opponents of this reason claimed that fabricated rape 
allegations would be unlikely, not only because they are traditionally difficult to prove, 
but also as Susan Brownmiller rightfully noted, because prosecution for those crimes is 
often more shameful for the female victim than the male defendant.224  
 The final modern justification argued that marital rape was less serious than other 
rapes. One rationale behind this position is that a married person maintains a reduced 
expectation of personal autonomy than a single person, and therefore, the violation to a 
marital rape victim is less harmful than that to non-marital rape victims. Opponents of 
this argument claimed just the opposite, arguing that marital rape carried with it a 
stronger sense of betrayal, disillusionment, and even self-blame.225  
The efforts of second-wave feminists brought about legislative changes to protect 
women. However, these changes were not always immediate, nor were they absolute. 
Activists argued for women’s rights to bodily autonomy, which they believed should 
include the power to refuse sexual intimacy with one’s husband. Gradually, courts began 
to support the unilateral right of women to decide to use birth control, to procure an 
abortion, to undergo a hysterectomy, and to select sterilization procedures.226 Using this 
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success as a foundation, women’s rights advocates pushed for further court-recognized 
liberties, such as freedom from forced intercourse with their husbands. 
 Changes to the marital rape exemption have been as varied as the states in the 
nation. State statutes, not federal law, generally regulate domestic relations and most 
crimes against the body. Therefore, each state has the authority to pass, alter, or abolish 
regulations in these areas independently of the other forty-nine. The laws relating to 
spousal immunity from rape charges are no exception. There are a few general trends 
visible when evaluating the history of state governance of rape in marriage. The absolute 
exemption, evident in all fifty states before the mid-1970s, was addressed in a variety of 
ways. Court-made law and legislative changes are the basic way that any legal change 
occurs; however, in the latter category, those changes completely eliminated the 
exemption, denied the exemption if certain statutory conditions existed, expanded the 
exemption to include cohabitating boyfriends, or expanded the realm of immunity to 
apply to voluntary social (sexual) companions.  
 State courts used their power of judicial review to find marital exemptions 
unconstitutional. Generally in doing so, they explained their decisions using Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection analysis, although in a few cases jurists based their opinions 
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parent or one serving in loco parentis for a female under the age of eighteen; and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000), in which the Court held a Nebraska law prohibiting “partial birth abortions” unless the 
mother’s life was in danger violated the liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Cases in which courts have addressed a woman’s unilateral decision separate from her 
husband to undergo a hysterectomy or other sterilization procedures include Murray v. Vandevander, 522 
P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App, 1974) and Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (1975), both of 
which referred to the abortion cases decided on privacy and personal autonomy grounds. 
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on First Amendment grounds relating to freedom of association and privacy. In one case, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that there was no “rational basis to distinguish 
between marital and non-marital rape, noting the ‘various rationales which have been 
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the 
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even 
the slightest scrutiny.’”227 The Supreme Court of New Jersey made direct reference to 
changes in legal and social conditions since Matthew Hale first issued his opinion on 
spousal immunity. The court noted, “The rule, formulated under vastly different 
conditions, need not prevail when those conditions have changed.”228 Noting several 
changes since Hale’s pronouncement, the New Jersey court held that the state’s rape laws 
aimed at protecting the safety of the women involved, not the property rights of fathers 
and husbands. Furthermore, with the demise of the legal fiction of marital unity and the 
advent of married women’s property laws, the court concluded in 1981 that the marital 
rape exemption had no place in contemporary New Jersey law.229 
 The year 1985 falls nearly at the halfway point between the first state addressing 
the marital rape exemption and the year in which the final state did so. As such, exploring 
the status of changes to the exemption at that time is particularly illuminative. In January 
1985, twenty-seven states exempted husbands from prosecution for the rape of a wife if 
the couple were living together; at the same time, twenty states that could, by virtue of 
legislation, prosecute a cohabitating husband for raping his wife.230 In other states, 
however, legislators placed obstacles in the way of the absolute elimination of the 
                                                 
227 People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152 (1984). 
228 State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193 (1981). 
229 Ibid.  
230 Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 140. 
 83 
 
exemption. Other states required the occurrence of certain circumstances before 
immunity was broken. The most absolute or severe conditions occasionally required the 
exemption to remain in place until a divorce decree legally ended the marriage. In such a 
situation, even if the couple had separated for a significant period and the wife had made 
it perfectly clear by her actions that she no longer wished to be married, the man was 
immune from prosecution for rape until the day the divorce was final. This situation 
appeared to present the injustice of unequal protection for women who would have no 
real protection until the slow-moving divorce process was final.231  
 Some states enacted partial exemption statutes that put limitations on the spousal 
exemption, which went into effect once the marriage had reached a point of no return. 
Thus, a wife could terminate her consent prior to divorce if she indicated to officials that 
she no longer wanted to be married. These provisions varied, covering situations where 
the couple was living apart (the most protective for the woman), where the couple was 
living apart and the woman had filed a petition for separation, annulment, or divorce 
(intermediate protection), or where the couple was legally separated under a court order 
(providing the least protection for the woman).232 These conditions all presupposed that 
the woman had access to the means of leaving and a safe place to go if she did leave. 
                                                 
231 Ibid. In January 1985, this was the case in Alabama, Illinois, South Dakota, and Vermont.  
232 Ibid. In January 1985, the laws of Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia ended the exemption once a couple was living apart. The laws of Indiana, 
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee ended spousal protection once the couple was living apart and the 
wife had filed for legal divorce or separation. The law protected her from sexual assault by her husband 
once she filed the legal documents, rather than when the divorce was final. The laws of Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah entitled women to 
legal protection from spousal rape, but only once a court order finalized a separation between the couple. 
Thus, in those states, women at risk of spousal sexual assault were at the mercy of the bureaucratic system. 
A court-ordered separation could take as long as a divorce and it required the financial resources necessary 
to pay for attorneys and court costs.  
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 Finally, there were the jurisdictions that considered rape by a spouse to be a lesser 
degree of sexual assault, crimes that carried less social stigma and less prison time if 
convicted. This was the approach taken by California and South Carolina, as will be seen 
in later chapters.233  
 While the general trend in the 1980s and 1990s was to limit or eliminate the 
exemption, in eleven jurisdictions, legislators expanded the protection granted to married 
men to cover cohabitating boyfriends.234 If a man in one of those states raped his 
girlfriend, he could raise the affirmative defense that they were living together, thereby 
avoiding prosecution. Legislators may have believed that they were bringing the law up 
to date with modern trends. Unfortunately, the reality was that this style of legislation 
increased the number of men who could rape women with impunity and increased the 
number of women who might find themselves unprotected by the law.235 Interrogating 
these gender-based legislative distinctions presents an even more troubling reality when 
one considers that legislators have been reluctant to extend marital protections to women 
in cohabitating situations. As Joanne Schulman has reported: 
While men in these unmarried cohabitating relationships are increasingly granted 
the “marital privilege” of rape, women in these relationships have fared far worse 
in their attempts to obtain privileges of marriage such as spousal support 
(“palimony”), division of the couple’s property or civil orders of protection. In the 
few states where unmarried women are accorded these rights, courts have first 
required an express or implied agreement between the parties. No such 
requirement is made with respect to the expansion of the marital rape 
exemption.236 
                                                 
233 Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 147. For a comprehensive discussion of California’s spousal rape 
law, see Chapter 3. Chapter 4 details South Carolina’s approach to spousal rape.  
234 In 1980, thirteen states extended the privileges of marriage to unmarried persons: Alabama, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
West Virginia. The laws of eleven of those states extended the marital rape exemption to cohabitating 
relationships outside of marriage. Joanne Schulman, “The Marital Rape Exemption in the Criminal Law,” 
Clearinghouse Review 14, no. 6 (1980), 539.  
235 Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 148-49. 
236 Schulman, “The Marital Rape Exemption in the Criminal Law,” 539-40. 
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Viewed in this light, it is difficult to evaluate the legislative motives behind such actions 
as anything other than gender-biased.  
A second type of expansion of the marital rape exemption emerged in the form of 
protection for voluntary social companions. In the limited cases where such laws existed, 
men benefitted from partial immunity if they had previously had consensual sexual 
contact with women they later raped. In such a case, the perpetrator would be immune 
from the charge of first-degree rape. In effect, this dangerous expansion legally 
sanctioned date rape.237 A final way in which the marital rape exemption remained was 
through statutes that provided protection to husbands who engage in sex with their wives 
when those women are drugged, incapacitated, unconscious, or mentally handicapped, 
clearly all situations in which an individual cannot grant consent.  
The women’s activism discussed in this chapter spans more than 150 years, but 
the longevity of that activism eventually led to the criminalization of spousal rape in all 
fifty states. The efforts of first and second-wave feminists, who conquered issues like 
property and citizenship rights for married women, female suffrage, divorce, reproductive 
rights, and sexual autonomy, prepared American society to refute traditional ideas of 
marital unity and the impossibility of rape in marriage. As subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate, even at the height of the women’s movement, the elimination of male 
privilege and sexual entitlement within marriage was not a foregone conclusion.  
                                                 
237 Schulman, 540; Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 149. This was the law in Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maine, North Dakota, and West Virginia in 1985. Of the five states, West Virginia’s law came the closest 
to legalizing date rape, as the first-degree sexual assault statute in that state did not require evidence of 
prior voluntary sexual acts between the victim and defendant.  
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CHAPTER 2 
‘INVADING THE DOMESTIC FORUM AND GOING BEHIND THE CURTAIN’: 
NEBRASKA’S ELIMINATION OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COORDINATED VICTIM’S SERVICES238 
 
  Diana Willis and her estranged husband Charles separated in January 1985. On 
the evening of March 1 of that year, Charles stopped by Diana’s home in Custer County, 
noticeably intoxicated. When Diana asked him to leave, he departed but not for long. 
Frightened by his appearance, she called a friend. She soon heard Charles return; he 
began ringing the bell and pounding on the door. After instructing the friend to call the 
police, she hung up and went toward the door. Before she made it that far, Charles 
forcibly entered the apartment and started to undress. Fearing for her safety, Diana 
backed away, stating “You’re not gunna [sic] do this to me, I won’t let you do this.”239 
Despite her protest, Charles followed her and tore off her pajamas. He threw her on the 
“couch and subjected her to sexual penetration.”240 As Diana struggled and cried out, 
Charles “threatened to sodomize her if she didn’t shut up.”241 When he was finished, he 
released her, all the while taunting her and making vulgar remarks. Diana fled the 
                                                 
238 The title of this chapter comes from a statement made in State v. Black, a North Carolina case from 
1864. In Black, the Court explained: “A husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and he is required to 
govern his household, and for that purpose the law permits him to use towards his wife such a degree of 
force as is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself; and unless some permanent 
injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or such a degree of cruelty as shows that it is inflicted 
to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain. It 
prefers to leave the parties to themselves, as the best mode of inducing them to make the matter up and live 
together as man and wife should.” State v. Black, 60 N.C. 266 (1864). The position espoused by the North 
Carolina court reflected the practice of law enforcement across the country to ignore domestic conflicts 
except when it resulted in considerable physical injury to one of the parties. While state laws eventually 
reversed the right of a husband to use force to control his wife, the practice of turning a blind eye to 
domestic issues was still evident in the mid- to late-twentieth century. Nebraska’s decision to eliminate the 
spousal rape exemption in 1975 indicates the legislators’ willingness to break with tradition to protect 
marital victims. The conscious choice to use the word ‘victim’ in the chapter title reflects the use of the 
term in the 1970s.  
239 State v. Willis, Nebraska Supreme Court, docket no. 86-015, Appellant’s Brief, 5. 
240 State v. Willis, Appellant’s Brief, 5-6. 
241 Ibid., at 6. 
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apartment. When she was unable to gain assistance from a neighbor, she drove herself to 
the police department to report the crime.242  
 In the meantime, Officer Steve Scott arrived at the scene, responding to the report 
by Diana’s friend. Observing no disturbance from the residence, Scott returned to the 
police department, where he found Diana “very hysterical” and “upset.” She explained 
that Charles was at her home and asked the police to retrieve her children, who had been 
at the residence during the attack.243 After Diana made a formal statement to the police, 
they transported her to the hospital for a medical examination. The exam showed 
evidence of sexual penetration and revealed bruises on Diana’s breasts. Later that day, 
Charles admitted to a friend that he had been drinking before going to his wife’s house 
and “molesting” her. Police later arrested and charged Charles with first-degree sexual 
assault.244 In response to the charge, Charles filed a plea in abatement. Notably, this type 
of pleading by a defendant does not dispute that the charged offense occurred, but rather 
that there was something objectionable about the form of the charge. At the end of the 
hearing, the trial court “ruled that at common law a husband could not be found guilty of 
raping his wife and that the common law applied in Nebraska.”245 Therefore, since 
Charles was still legally married to Diana at the time of the sexual assault, the court 
quashed the evidence collected by the police and suspended the prosecution.  
 Incidents like the one involving Diana and Charles Willis have been too often a 
reality for much of United States history. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, activists 
                                                 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid., 6. The Bill of Exceptions indicated that one of the children was awakened by the sexual assault, 
and when the child went to investigate the noise, observed part of the attack. Appellant Brief, 13. 
244 Ibid. 
245 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. 844, 845 (1986). 
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started calling into question American statutes and legal practices that embodied the 
common law definition of rape, noting that the Common Law defined the crime too 
narrowly. The classical image under both British and American law prior to feminist 
challenges in the seventies was that rape was “a violent attack perpetrated on an 
unsuspecting victim who was not acquainted with her attacker. The [rapist was] . . . an 
evil criminal leaping out of the bushes with a knife in hand, grabbing a terrified woman 
by the throat, and forcing her into submission in a dark corner.”246 Over the next two 
decades, advocates demonstrated the falsity of this image, proving that stranger rape was 
far less common than intimate partner and acquaintance rape. At the same time, state 
legislators and jurists addressed the marital rape exemption in myriad ways. As noted in 
Chapter One, since state statutes, not federal law, regulate domestic relations and most 
crimes against the body, each state has the authority to pass, alter, or abolish regulations 
in these areas independently of the other forty-nine. Such is the case with laws relating to 
spousal immunity from rape charges.  
Nebraska’s elimination of the marital rape exemption and its subsequent 
development of a coordinated response to domestic violence and sexual assault serve as a 
noteworthy case study. Nebraska was among the first states to eliminate the marital rape 
exemption, a decision made by a nearly unanimous state legislature. When asked to 
determine the validity of the state’s sexual assault statute, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
firmly upheld the law regardless of the relationship between victim and perpetrator. 
                                                 
246 Lisa M. Cuklanz, Rape on Prime Time: Television, Masculinity, and Sexual Violence (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 30. Today, evidence illustrates the fallacy of this misconception: 
“It is a myth that sexual assault victims are primarily assaulted by strangers. In fact, most assaults are 
committed by someone known to the victim such as a friend, intimate partner, relative, classmate, or co-
worker.” 2004 Nebraska’s Task Force on Sexual Assault Crimes Report and Recommendations to the 
Attorney General, released January 2005.  
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Additionally, Nebraska demonstrated a progressive response to societal problems and 
victim needs related to domestic violence and sexual assault, years before the federal 
Violence Against Women Act, which was passed in 1994. Beginning in the early 1970s, 
victim advocates worked tirelessly to promote their agenda before an activist Unicameral, 
who willingly passed legislation that protected victims of sexual and physical violence. 
Nebraska is the only state in the Union to have a unicameral form of state 
legislature. In 1934, citizens passed an initiative to amend the state constitution, thereby 
replacing the bicameral with a single-house legislature. The first session of the 
unicameral legislature occurred in 1937. The Unicameral also has the distinction of being 
the only nonpartisan legislature in the country. Election ballots do not list candidate party 
affiliation. The two candidates who obtain the most votes in the primary election advance 
to the general election. The 49 members of the Unicameral are known as Senators.247 It is 
perhaps for this reason – a single-house, bipartisan legislature – that Nebraska Senators 
were able to address the marital rape exemption with little controversy or opposition. 
Nebraska first addressed the marital rape exemption in 1975. Prior to 1975, sexual 
assault laws in Nebraska were governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408, a rape law that 
dated back to 1887. The elements of the law included carnal knowledge of a female 
performed against the will of the victim. In addition, it included elements for statutory 
rape where the male was over eighteen and his consenting female partner was under 
eighteen, unless she was over fifteen and previously unchaste.248 For the purpose of this 
                                                 
247 To learn more about the history of Nebraska’s unicameral, see 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/ou_facts.php. 
248 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408 (Reissue 1956). In 1913, the state legislature amended the statute, creating 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-407 that addressed rape upon a daughter or sister and imposed a penalty of life 
imprisonment. With the promulgation of the incest law, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408 remained a rape statute 
that applied to carnal knowledge of any other woman or female child not the daughter or sister of the 
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statute, a chaste female meant one who had never had unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
male prior to the intercourse for which a defendant was charged.249 Nevertheless, while 
chastity is often considered to be synonymous with virginity, Nebraska courts have held 
that an act of sexual intercourse without a woman’s consent and against her will, if she is 
capable of consent, does not destroy [a woman’s] chastity.250 The punishment for a crime 
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408 had been between three and twenty years; however, a 
1969 amendment increased the range of penalty to three to fifty years.251 
In 1975, Senator Wallace “Wally” Barnett, seeking to repeal both of the above 
statutes and replace them with new legislation that used the term “sexual assault,” 
introduced Legislative Bill (L.B.) 23 to the Unicameral. The legislative intent of this new 
statute was: 
to enact laws dealing with sexual assault and related criminal sexual offenses 
which will protect the dignity of the victim at all stages of the judicial process, 
which will insure that the alleged offender in a criminal sexual offense case have 
[sic] preserved the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law procedures, and 
which will establish a system of investigation, prosecution, punishment, and 
rehabilitation for the welfare and benefit of the citizens of [the] state.252  
 
                                                 
offender. For the offense of statutory rape, previous chastity of the victim was an essential element of the 
crime. State v. Brionez, 188 Neb. 488 (1972).  
249 State v. Vicars, 186 Neb. 311 (1971). As noted elsewhere in this work, for much of recorded history 
women were considered the property of men, property whose value was measured largely by their sexual 
purity. As such, rape laws viewed the crime as one against the property interests of the victim’s father or 
husband, and a raped woman was less valuable than a virginal female. Penalties imposed for rape 
convictions often involved fines or similar compensation paid to the victim’s father or husband. Long after 
the law set aside the view of female-as-male-property, attitudes about chastity remained in rape and sexual 
assault statutes. As is demonstrated in the Nebraska statute above, the elements of rape laws often 
distinguished between chaste and unchaste female victims. Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical 
Investigation (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), 44-49, 68.  
250 State v. Brionez, 188 Neb. 488 (1972); State v. Richards, 193 Neb. 345 (1975); Marchand v. State, 113 
Neb. 87 (1925). 
251 L.B. 1263 (1969), introduced by Senator Henry Frederick Pederson, Jr., resulted in the increase in 
sentencing for rape. Legislators used L.B. 1263 to revise sentencing requirements for several crimes in 
addition to rape: mayhem, shooting, or stabbing with the intent to kill, assault with the intent to inflict great 
bodily injury short of death, and kidnapping. See, State v. Kelly, 190 Neb. 41 (1973). 
252 L.B. 23, as approved by Governor J. James Exon on May 1, 1975.  
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A further purpose of L.B. 23 was to “broaden the terms relating to criminal sexual acts 
and to make testimony less personal to the victim,” encouraging more victims to report 
the crime to authorities.253 During floor debates for L.B. 23 on April 8, 1975, Senator 
Barnett acknowledged that Nebraska’s rape statute was out of date: “It was written in 
1887 and it’s not been tampered with since that time so it might give you some idea of 
how it’s out of time with the world.” The tireless efforts of women’s groups from across 
the state, which included, but were not limited to, the Lincoln Coalition against Rape, the 
Governor’s Commission on the Status of Women, and the Personal Crisis Service of 
Lincoln, inspired Nebraska legislators to change the language used to describe the crime 
of rape, using instead the term “criminal sexual assault.” The rationale for this change 
was a broadening of the terms to include additional forms of offensive sexual contact and 
to make testimony less personal for the victims of sexually based crimes.254  
 The 1975 bill created the offenses of first- and second-degree sexual assault. L.B. 
23 defined sexual assault in the first degree as an occurrence where: 
Any person subjects another person to sexual penetration and (a) overcomes the 
victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception, (b) 
knew or should have known that the victim was mentally or physically incapable 
of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or (c) the actor is more 
than eighteen years of age and the victim is less than sixteen years of age.  
 
The penalty for a conviction was one to twenty-five years.255 L.B. 23 defined sexual 
assault in the second degree as an occurrence where: 
Any person subjects another person to sexual contact and (a) overcomes the 
victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion, or deception, or (b) 
                                                 
253 L.B. 23, Introducer’s Statement of Purpose, January 15, 1975.  
254 L.B. 23 Committee Records of January 22, 1975, p. 3.  
255 L.B. 23 § 3(1) and (2). In 1977, a revision of the criminal code resulted in sexual assault in the first 
degree being redesignated as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319. The revision resulted in no substantive changes to 
the statute. 
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knew or should have known that the victim was physically or mentally incapable 
of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct. 
 
The penalty for a conviction was one to fifteen years.256  
In passing such laws, Nebraska followed a path that many states took beginning in 
the mid-1970s. Barnett acknowledged that society often refers to victims of sexual assault 
as “she” because women are more often the victims of sex crimes than men.257 
Nevertheless, L.B. 23 made the crime of sexual assault gender-neutral. It did away with 
the female as victim, male as offender distinction, instead using the term actor to refer to 
“a person accused of sexual assault,” and victim to identify “the person alleging to have 
been sexually assaulted.”258 Additional word selection in the bill was very deliberate, 
using language that was more inclusive, was more sensitive to victims, and revised 
criminal statutes to reflect better the changing sexual culture of the era. The era 
highlighted the influence of a complex interplay between the new sexual culture of the 
1970s, the women’s liberation movement, and the influence of the gay rights movement, 
while still supporting “the dominance of heterosexuality over other sexual orientations 
and the subordination of women as objects of male desire.”259  
The changes brought by the passage of L.B. 23 reflected the efforts of women 
activists who hoped to make “positive contribution to the prevention of the crime [rape], 
the support of the victim, society’s awareness of the crime, and the affected treatment of 
the crime within a criminal justice system.”260 On January 22, 1975, five of these women 
                                                 
256 L.B. 23 § 4(1) and (2). 
257 L.B. 23 Floor Debate of April 8, 1975, p. 2232. 
258 L.B. 23 §2(1) and (6). 
259 Elana Levine, Wallowing in Sex: The New Sexual Culture of 1970s American Television (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 4-5.  
260 Karen Flowers, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. 
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testified before the Judiciary Committee, providing support for L.B. 23, using arguments 
espoused by activists throughout the United States.  
Karen Flowers, representing the Lincoln Coalition Against Rape, indicated that 
the Coalition’s Police Law Group was responsible for laying the groundwork for what 
became L.B. 23. Flowers noted that rape was the most under-reported violent crime in 
America, in part because of “the victim’s unwillingness to go through the ordeal that is 
presently a part of a rape prosecution.”261 She argued that the “ordeal” was a byproduct of 
myths about rape that reflected suspicion and mistrust of victims: “That the rape is 
primarily a crime of sex; that rape is a crime of impulse; that the rapist and the victim are 
strangers; that no healthy woman capable of resisting can be raped; that the woman asked 
for it; that women have a propensity to contrive false rape complaints; and that it can’t 
happen to me.”262 Flowers then highlighted the elements of the proposed bill, focusing on 
the gender-neutral language, the elimination of the marital rape exemption, and revised 
evidentiary rules that protected victim privacy.263 
While Flowers had briefly mentioned rape victims under-reporting, Kathy Smith 
provided more context for that phenomenon. Smith was the coordinator of the Lincoln 
Rape Line, a telephone crisis hotline. In discussing under-reporting, she used as an 
                                                 
261 Ibid. In 2015, rape remains the most under-reported violent crime in the United States. 
262 Ibid. 
263 At the time of her testimony, Flowers was a law student at the University of Nebraska College of Law. 
She went on to have a distinguished legal career. Flowers was the first woman appointed to the Lancaster 
County District Court. She presented at educational seminars for judges and lawyers, often on the topic of 
domestic relations. She was the recipient of the 2002 Distinguished Judge for Improvement of the Judicial 
System for her participation in the Lancaster County Adult Drug Court, and received the State Bar 
Foundation’s Legal Pioneer Award in 2006. Lori Pilger, “District Judge Flowers to Retire at Year’s End,” 
Lincoln Journal Star, November 27, 2013. 
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example the women who utilized the crisis hotline in the previous four months. 264 She 
explained: “Of the fourteen rape victims who have contacted us since October 1, 1974, 
only four of these women have chosen to report the crime to the Police Department.”265 
Smith cited common reasons that the other ten had decided not to report the crimes: fear 
of not being believed, fear of being blamed, a lack of physical evidence, and the fear of 
relating past sexual history at a resulting trial. Victims in other cities commonly echoed 
these reasons for not reporting their victimization to the police.  
 Dr. Frances Campbell, a psychiatrist employed by the Eastern Nebraska Human 
Services Agency in Omaha, testified as the Chairperson of the Rape Committee of the 
Omaha Mayor’s Commission on the Status of Women. According to Campbell, the Rape 
Committee “was established in 1973 with a goal of influencing how a rape victim is 
treated by sensitizing hospital personnel, police and attorneys to the needs and feelings of 
a rape victim.”266 The Rape Committee also provided public education programming, 
conducted research on the law regarding rape, and established a rape crisis line in Omaha, 
the largest city in Nebraska. Campbell opposed a defense attorney’s use of a victim’s past 
sexual history to establish consent, arguing: “what she did prior or since . . . has no 
bearing on the charge of rape.”267 Campbell, therefore, supported the section of L.B. 23 
that protected a victim from unnecessary intrusion into her private life.268 She also 
                                                 
264 Kathy Smith, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. Smith explained that the 
Lincoln Rape Line was co-sponsored by the Lincoln Coalition Against Rape and the Personal Crisis 
Service of Lincoln.  
265 Ibid.  
266 Frances Campbell, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. 
267 Ibid.  
268 While Chapter 4 of this dissertation discusses the topic of rape shield laws at length, L.B. 23 § 5 is 
notable for creating such a provision for Nebraska in 1975. The law indicated that the previous sexual 
conduct of the victim or the defendant would not be admissible unless a judge determined that it was 
relevant to the case. Even then, the judge would set clear parameters of how the parties could introduce that 
evidence at trial. Specifically, the law indicated that prior sexual activity between the victim and a person 
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questioned the paradox of victim resistance: “If she fights and resists in order to show 
bruises, she runs a great risk of being physically abused and seriously injured. If she does 
not resist, and thus shows no injuries, it is often assumed that she consented and thus rape 
did not occur.”269  
 A further issue covered at the hearing was the fear that passage of L.B. 23 “would 
[make] it easy for woman to make a false report and to convict an innocent man of 
rape.”270 Sherry Fairer, representing the Lincoln Police Department, responded to those 
concerns. From her experience as a police officer who had investigated rape cases, Fairer 
concluded that the procedural steps in an investigation of a rape complaint discourage 
women from making false reports. The victim must undergo a physical exam and be 
thoroughly questioned by the physician and then by the police. This process is lengthy 
and involves intimate and often embarrassing questions. The victim may also need to 
give a written statement, in which she recounts the details of her attack. Police officers 
next attempt to verify all of the information provided by the victim. The police forward 
their reports to the County Attorney’s Office, where attorneys may subject the victim to 
yet another interview. Finally, the victim might need to testify at trial. At any point 
during this process, the case may stall for lack of evidence, inconsistencies in the victim’s 
statement, if facts are disproven, or if the victim refuses to testify. According to Fairer, 
                                                 
other than the defendant was relevant only to establish a pattern of conduct suggesting consent on the part 
of the victim. What was unique about Nebraska’s rape shield provision is that it addressed prior conduct by 
both victim and the accused. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, in some jurisdictions the rules of evidence 
prevented a jury from hearing evidence of the defendant’s past sexual conduct, but not the victim’s. In 
2009, the Nebraska legislature revised the state rape shield law with LB 97 § 5. The most significant result 
of that change became Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allowed the introduction of evidence of similar acts 
of sexual assault which the defendant had been accused of committing. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Sherry Fairar, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. 
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the emotionally arduous nature of these procedures make it unlikely that women will file 
false reports of rape.  
 Jean O’Hara, Executive Director of the Governor’s Commission on the Status of 
Women, promoted a change in the range of sentencing for defendants convicted of sexual 
assault. Rather than have a defendant face one to fifty years for a conviction, O’Hara 
proposed one to twenty years. Her arguments foreshadowed the concerns raised by the 
jury and public in the Rideout case that made national headlines as the first trial of a man 
accused of raping his wife while they were still living together. Juries would be more 
willing to convict a (marital) rape defendant if they believed the sentence was an 
appropriate punishment for the crime. Here, O’Hara suggested that juries might find 
anything over twenty years to be excessive punishment for the crime of rape.271  
 The arguments that Flowers, Campbell, Smith, Fairar, and O’Hara made were by 
no means unique. Feminist activists across the country raised similar debates. What was 
unique in Nebraska was that the legislature accepted the evidence and passed the 1975 
sexual assault statute without a spousal rape exemption. Nearly twenty years would pass 
before all of the other forty-nine states followed suit.  
When Custer County prosecutors charged Charles Willis with first-degree sexual 
assault of his wife in 1985, Willis’ behavior was not the only thing facing legal scrutiny. 
Also called into question was whether the sexual assault law allowed a marital rape 
exemption to remain in Nebraska. The case against Willis did not end with the district 
court suspending the prosecution against him. In fact, George Rhodes, the County 
                                                 
271 Jean O’Hara, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. 
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Attorney, appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.272 In his application for 
appeal and subsequent appellant brief, Rhodes based his argument on two main issues: 
legislative intent and equal protection.  
Rhodes first argued that “the intention of the Legislature in enacting [Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 28-319] was to protect all persons, including spouses, from being subject to sexual 
penetration after having been overcome by force” and that the District Court had erred in 
finding that spouses are not protected by that statute.273  
 In his brief, Rhodes spent nearly fourteen pages describing the intent of the 
Legislature when it passed L.B. 23 in 1975. This argument sheds the most light on the 
intent of the spousal rape exemption. When L.B. 23 reached the floor of the legislature, 
its sixth section contained a provision that would exempt a spouse from the sexual assault 
statute unless the couple was living apart or had filed for separation or divorce. Senator 
John J. Cavanaugh moved for the adoption of an amendment that would remove the 
provision for spousal immunity. As Cavanaugh explained it, “among and between 
married partners sexual conduct is a matter of mutual consent and if either of the parties 
fails to consent,” the other should not have the right to “infringe upon the freedom and 
integrity of the other person. I don’t think that marriage should allow an immunity from 
that natural protection.”274 Senator Ernest “Ernie” Chambers supported the motion, 
explaining: “there is such a thing as integrity of your body. I don’t feel that you give that 
up by entering a marriage contract.”275 Senator Chambers elaborated: 
                                                 
272 State v. Willis, appeal number 86-015. Rhodes appealed the case directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court 
because the Nebraska Court of Appeals did not exist until September 1991. 
273 State v. Willis, Appellant’s Brief, 2. 
274 L.B. 23, 1975, Floor Debate 8 April 1975, p. 2238-2239. 
275 L.B. 23, 1975, Floor Debate 8 April 1975, p. 2239-2240. Chambers is the longest serving member of the 
Unicameral, and is a civil rights activist known for crusading for the rights of minorities and women. For 
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If a man would take a woman who did not consent to his advances even if she is 
called his wife, and beat her brutally into submission, then somebody would say 
you can charge him with assault and battery. But there is something far more 
fundamental involved in action of this kind. A person’s sexual [integrity] has a 
particular standing and a sociological significance in this society. To degrade 
somebody or to destroy them sexually . . . to keep somebody in that type of 
bondage against their will and brutalize them, I think is immoral and it ought to be 
made illegal by this state.276 
 
Chambers’ sentiment echoes the belief that sexual assault is not only a heinous act, but 
one that is distinct from the textbook definitions of assault and battery. As such, to charge 
a rapist with assault and battery fails to acknowledge the crime committed or its long-
term impact on the victim.  
 Only one member of the legislature supported the retention of the spousal 
exemption, Senator Glenn A. Goodrich. The foundation of Senator Goodrich’s argument 
was that if the couple was still living in the same house without a notice of separation or 
divorce proceedings, the immunity should prevail. Goodrich asserted that as long as the 
couple remained married, what happened in the privacy of their home, behind the marital 
curtain, should be between them. He unabashedly argued that the state “shouldn’t be 
sticking our nose into it unless he gets in a criminal way, violent, for example, which we 
have statutes to cover.”277 The statutes Goodrich was advocating were those for assault 
and battery. When questioned by Senator Cavanaugh if a husband has the right to 
sexually assault his wife without legal sanction, Senator Goodrich did not seem to 
recognize sexual assault as a violent act: “I’m not sure that a man can criminally assault, 
unless he uses violence or something like that.”278 Senator Goodrich went on: “The fact, 
                                                 
more on Ernest Chambers, see Tekla Agbala Ali Johnson, Free Radical: Ernest Chambers, Black Power, 
and the Politics of Race (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2012). 
276 L.B. 23, 1975, Floor Debate 8 April 1975, p. 2239-2240. 
277 L.B. 23, 1975, Floor Debate 8 April 1975, p. 2243. 
278 Ibid., at 2243-2244. 
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for example, that you sexually attack her, is between you and your wife until such time 
she is separated from you, divorced from you or under separate maintenance 
arrangements.”279 Such statements reflected a commonly held belief that domestic 
violence (including sexual assault) was a private family matter exempt from interference 
by the outside world – including law enforcement officers who had sworn to serve and 
protect individual citizens.  
 Both Senators Warren R. Swigart and Chambers verbally attacked Goodrich’s 
position, offering a number of reasons why an abused woman might stay in a marriage. 
Senator Swigart, who had volunteered for personal crisis services for several years, spoke 
of instances of inhumanity relating to marital discord. He recalled stories where a 
husband used his superior strength “to make a slave of his wife,” beating her, knocking 
out her teeth, leaving bruises and welts, all the while leaving his wife penniless and 
without resources to leave.280 Senator Chambers’ reaction was even stronger:  
There are a number of reasons if you know the fact of life Senator Goodrich why 
a woman may stay with a man even though she can’t stand him. There could be 
children involved. Because she has lived with him a certain period of time, she 
may not have gone to school while he went to school and she has no saleable 
skills or the ability to make a living for herself or her children on her own. Her 
health could have been destroyed. There are a thousand and one reasons why a 
woman may remain in a home and not file for divorce, seperate [sic] maintenance 
or be seperated [sic] from this beast that you say has the right to [do] anything he 
want[s] to a woman and the law ought to endorse it.281  
 
When the call for a vote on the bill came, “the legislature specifically voted 33-1 to 
remove a spousal exemption so that the protection afforded by the state would be 
                                                 
279 Ibid., at 2243, 2245. Separate maintenance, which is similar to alimony following a divorce, is financial 
support from one spouse to another before, during, and after a legal separation.  
280 Ibid., at 2240-2241. 
281 Ibid., at 2241-2242. 
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extended to wives.”282 Powerful though the legislative intent claim was in Willis, Rhodes 
raised as a second argument a constitutional challenge to the District Court’s actions. 
Rhodes contended that by sustaining the defendant’s plea in abatement on the grounds 
that the defendant and victim were husband and wife, the District Court 
“unconstitutionally deprive[d] spouses of equal protection of the law” since under that 
ruling “spouses would not receive the protection from forcible assaults . . . afforded to 
non-spouses.”283 Rhodes later argued that the Court, by supporting marital exemption for 
rape, was effectively relegating “wives to a station in life lower than that of slaves.”284 In 
support of this argument, Rhodes relied upon court decisions from New York and 
Georgia. In the New York case, People v. De Stefano, the Court declared a statutory 
spousal rape exemption unconstitutional. After dismissing several rationales for 
maintaining the exemption, Justice Kenneth K. Rohl quoted John Stuart Mill:  
A female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right . . . to refuse her 
master the last familiarity. Not so the wife . . . he can claim her and enforce the 
lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an 
animal function contrary to her inclination.285 
 
                                                 
282 Appellant brief, at 7. In passing the law, the senators acknowledge a broader societal implication. 
During the floor debate, Senator Chambers alluded to the harm that viewing domestic violence would have 
on children. Chambers proposed that young boys would learn to brutalize women and young girls would 
come to expect mistreatment from men. The implication of Chamber’s argument was that criminalizing 
spousal sexual abuse and punishing those who violate that law was one way to break the cycle of intimate 
partner violence. 
283 State v. Willis, Application for Leave to Docket an Appeal to the Supreme Court, filed December 20, 
1985. 
284 Appellant brief at 22. 
285 People v. De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (1983), quoting John Stuart Mill, The Subjugation of Women 
(1869). By suggesting that slaves could refuse a master’s sexual advances, Mill’s argument clearly presents 
an idealized view of the lives and agency of slave women. Nevertheless, his line of reasoning illustrates 
that even those who rejected a master’s right to force himself upon a female slave upheld the belief that a 
married woman had a duty never to reject her husband’s sexual advances. See, Mary Lyndon Shanley, 
Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England (Princeton University Press, 1993), especially 
Chapter 6, “A Husband’s Right to His Wife’s Body: Wife Abuse, the Restitution of Conjugal Rights, and 
Marital Rape.” 
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Justice Rohl then concluded: “No rule or statute granting a spouse immunity can in 
today’s world withstand any of the tests associated with equal protection, to wit, 
‘reasonable basis,’ ‘middle tier,’ or ‘strict scrutiny.’” 286 Therefore, the provision of the 
New York law that granted a husband immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife 
was violative of the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. Similarly, in 
Warren v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the medieval wives-as-chattel 
theory, reasoning women’s rights have changed significantly since the medieval period. 
Those rights were protected by the due process and equal protection provisions in the 
federal and individual state constitutions to uphold rights of all persons within their 
territory.287 
 In rebuttal to Rhodes’ claims, Carlos E. Schaper and Gregory Anderson, lawyers 
for Charles Willis, filed an appellee or respondent brief that presented two main 
arguments. Their first proposition was that it was inappropriate for the State to reference 
“the statements and opinions of legislators . . . where the language of a statute is 
unambiguous.”288 Schaper and Anderson suggested that the sexual assault statutes were 
not ambiguous and therefore the language of the statutes should be taken at face value. 
Notably, the Supreme Court ignored this proposition in its opinion. The second argument 
was that Nebraska had adopted the Common Law exemption, and since neither the rape 
nor sexual assault statutes explicitly stated that the criminal code would apply to spousal 
                                                 
286 Appellate brief at 23.  
287 Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151 (1985). 
288 State v. Willis, Appellee Brief, 7-11. Shaper and Anderson relied upon passages from American 
Jurisprudence (Am. Jur.) and Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), two legal encyclopedias, to support this 
assertion. What their analysis failed to mention was that while Am. Jur. and C.J.S. provide a clear statement 
of specific legal concepts as they have developed over time, these entries are general overviews that may 
not account for state variation. Specific to this case, Shaper and Anderson included no reference from the 
encyclopedias that related to Nebraska law. 
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rape, the common law exemption should apply.289 This argument referenced three prior 
Nebraska cases, Hanks v. State, Jump v. State, and State v. Holloman.290 Unfortunately 
for Willis, the Nebraska cases offered in defense of this position all related to the pre-
1975 rape statutes, not the current sexual assault law that Willis faced. Furthermore, 
while those cases involved charges of rape, none of them involved a defendant charged 
with the rape of his wife. The Supreme Court addressed this “oversight” early in its 
decision:  
In each of these cases it was never the contention of the defendant that the victim 
of the rape was his wife. The defendants were, instead, complaining that the State 
had offered insufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the type of rape 
with which the defendant had been charged; that being rape upon a female other 
than the defendant's daughter or sister. Thus, the [current defendant’s] addition of 
the word “wife” into the statutory list of sister and daughter was gratuitous at best 
and does not convince this court that we ever adopted the common-law spousal 
exclusion to rape.291 
 
The Court then spent the next four pages explaining why they would not read the 
common law exemption into the Nebraska sexual assault statute.  
 One effect of the Court’s decision was to refute the historical justifications for 
spousal immunity: irrevocable consent, marital unity, and women as chattel.292 The 
judges of the Nebraska Court joined with other jurists in dismissing Hale’s contention of 
irrevocable consent. The Court agreed with the Supreme Court of New Jersey that noted:  
                                                 
289 State v. Willis, Appellee Brief at 10.  
290 Hanks v. State, 88 Neb. 464 (1911); Jump v. State, 146 Neb. 501 (1945); and State v. Holloman, 197 
Neb. 139 (1976). Of note, all of the Nebraska cases offered in defense of appellee’s argument were based 
on the earlier rape statute, not the laws related to sexual assault that were in effect when Willis was charged 
with assaulting his estranged wife. In each of these cases, the defendant faced charges of rape under Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 28-408. On appeal, each raised as an assignment of error the fact that the prosecution had not 
established that the victim was not the accused’s sister or daughter. Such a familial relationship would have 
resulted in an acquittal or dismissal by the court since the crime of rape of a daughter or sister fell under 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-407. 
291 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 846.  
292 For a full discussion of the historical justifications for spousal immunity, see Chapter 1.  
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Hale cited no authority for this proposition and we have found none in earlier 
writers. Thus the marital exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister 
states has its source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago. 
Such a declaration cannot itself be considered a definitive and binding statement 
of the common law, although legal commentators have often restated the rule 
since the time of Hale without evaluating its merits.293 
 
The State of Florida took a similar position, also referenced by the Nebraska Court. In 
State v. Rider, the Florida Appellate Court noted: “That this single sentence, which stands 
alone, naked of citation to any authority judicial or otherwise, could be considered 
sufficient precedent to allow a husband to rape with impunity his wife baffles all sense of 
logic.”294  
 The Nebraska Court further acknowledged that Hale delivered his theory at a time 
when marriages were essentially permanent, ending only at the death of a spouse or an 
act of Parliament. Since the vows of marriage were not retractable, perhaps Hale believed 
that consent to intimacy was not either. Since that time, however, “attitudes towards the 
permanency of marriage have changed and divorce has become far easier to obtain.”295 
For this reason, the Court concluded that a rule created “under vastly different conditions, 
need not prevail when those conditions have changed.”296  
 The Willis court also dismissed Blackstone’s unity in marriage argument and the 
women-as-chattel theory in one fell swoop, stating: “both of these theories no longer 
support the spousal exclusion.”297 Citing a United States Supreme Court case, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court noted: “Nowhere in the common-law world – indeed in any 
                                                 
293 See, State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 200, 426 A. 2d 38, 41 (1981). 
294 See, State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. App. 1984).  
295 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 847-848. 
296 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 846-847 (citing State v. Smith, 85 N.J. at 201). See also, Warren v. State, 225 
Ga. 151 (1985). 
297 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 847. 
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modern society – is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of separate legal 
identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being.”298 The 
State of Nebraska itself had in effect done away with these legal disabilities for women in 
1871 when it passed its version of the Married Woman’s Property Act, granting married 
women the right to own and maintain separate property, contract, carry out business, and 
earn wages on their own.299  
 The Court acknowledged another theory supporting spousal exclusion from rape 
prosecution – the use of signifying language. For instance, California’s penal code to this 
day defines rape as “sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the 
perpetrator” [emphasis added].300 Similarly, “the use of the word ‘unlawful’ in rape 
statutes [often] signifies the incorporation of the common law spousal exclusion.”301 
While the word “unlawful” can be used in different ways, in the context of rape, it 
generally connotes “not authorized by law.” However, since “sexual intercourse between 
husband and wife is sanctioned by law,” standard judicial reasoning holds that the state 
could not prosecute a spouse for behavior that would otherwise be rape.302 As the Court 
                                                 
298 Id.; See, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).  
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301 State v. Willis 223 Neb. at 847. 
302 Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 131 (1981). See, Warren v. State, 225 Ga. 151 (1985). 
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explained, however, since the Nebraska rape statute never included the term “unlawful,” 
there was no basis for believing the spousal exclusion was the law in Nebraska.303 
 After concluding that the spousal exclusion had never been a part of Nebraska’s 
earlier rape law, the Court said such a conclusion was immaterial since the legislature had 
repealed the rape statute in 1975 when it passed the first-degree sexual assault law. At 
that point, the language of the new statute became the focus of the Court’s rationale – 
since it was, after all, the statute that Willis had been charged with violating. As a review, 
the new law declared a person guilty of sexual assault in the first degree if he or she 
subjected another to sexual penetration by force or threat of force.304 The Court 
concluded that there was sufficient difference in wording between the old rape statute and 
the new sexual assault law to abrogate any common-law inter-spousal exemption.305  
 The Court elaborated, providing evidence of several differences between the 
statutes. First, the Court acknowledged the position first articulated by 1970s feminist 
anti-rape activists – that rape was a crime of violence, not an act of sexual passion. “First 
degree sexual assault,” the Court noted, “is not a ‘sexual [act] of an ardent husband 
performed upon an initially apathetic wife, [it is an act] of violence that [is] accompanied 
with physical and mental abuse and often leave[s] the victim with physical and 
psychological damage that is almost always long lasting.”306 The Court’s statement was 
significant in that it echoed the “most important element of feminists’ anti-rape ideology 
of the 1970s: ‘The assertion that rape is violence provided feminists with a whole new 
                                                 
303 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 847. See, Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123 (1981) and State v. 
Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A. 2d 38 (1981), both of which reach a similar conclusion regarding the sexual 
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304 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1). 
305 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 487. 
306 State v. Willis, 223 Neb. at 488, citing Warren v. State, 225 Ga. 151 (1985). 
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framework in which to analyze rape, to remove blame from the victims, and to develop a 
convincing argument to gain acceptance for their claims.’”307 Nebraska’s highest court 
acknowledged that reality in Willis. The second major distinction the Court highlighted 
was that the former rape statute required the sexual intercourse be the result of force. 
Under the sexual assault statute, a perpetrator could overcome a victim in several ways 
short of force, including express or implied threat of force, coercion, or deception. The 
new law was more expansive by including additional sexual acts: any form of sexual 
penetration would be sufficient for an arrest, not just the traditional element of penile-
vaginal intercourse.  
 The decision in Willis stands as the definitive note on a marital rape exemption in 
Nebraska. The Willis court explained that since the passage of the 1975 sexual assault 
statute, there is no spousal immunity for rape in Nebraska. Since the Nebraska Supreme 
Court published the 1986 opinion, there have been fifty-seven appellate decisions related 
to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-319, the sexual assault statute. As of September 2015, none of those 
appeals challenged the standard established in Willis.308 
 In addition to being a notable example for its legal approach to marital rape, 
Nebraska’s approach to the domestic violence and sexual assault (DV/SA) movements 
stands out among other states in the nation. Since the 1970s, the domestic violence and 
sexual assault movements have generally operated independent of one another. Nebraska 
is among the minority of states that has dual programming, meaning that DV/SA 
programs operate in tandem rather than independently. Like the sexual assault statute that 
does not differentiate between spousal and non-spousal sexual assault, DV/SA advocacy 
                                                 
307 Levine, Wallowing in Sex, 211. 
308 By far, the majority of appellants were challenging convictions for the sexual assault of a minor.  
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programs in Nebraska do not treat victims of intimate partner violence differently than 
those who suffer at the hands of strangers. Therefore, it is appropriate to review 
Nebraska’s DV/SA programs through a broad lens, rather than one that pinpoints spousal 
rape victims.  
 Early efforts to address DV/SA in Nebraska illuminated the divide between the 
criminal justice system and victim advocates. Their varied organizational histories and 
differing roles when encountering sexual assault victims may help explain the conflict 
between the two groups. Although more women are employed “in law enforcement 
today, police departments are still generally male dominated, paramilitary 
organizations.”309 In contrast, “most sexual assault coalitions and community-based rape 
crisis centers were created as a result of the feminist movement, when women gathered 
together to demand better treatment for rape victims.”310 According to the Office for 
Victims of Crime, law enforcement have three primary responsibilities when responding 
to sexual assault cases. Police officers: protect, interview, and support the victim; 
investigate the crime with a view to apprehending the perpetrator; and collect and 
preserve evidence that prosecutors may use if the case goes to trial.311 Police departments 
and their officers did not always prioritize these duties equally, particularly since few 
officers received training on how to interview and provide support to DV/SA victims. 
The primary focus of victim advocacy has always been the physical and emotional 
wellbeing of assault victims, as well as safeguarding victim’s legal rights. As such, an 
                                                 
309 Kim Lonsway and Joanne Archambault, “Advocates and Law Enforcement: Oil and Water?” Accessed 
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310 Ibid. 
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advocate would want to ensure that victims receive all of the services to which they are 
entitled and that they have all the information they need to make sound decisions. 
However, over the past four decades the Nebraska criminal justice system – law 
enforcement, prosecutors, probation, and courts – and victim service providers have 
worked to ease this tension and to apply collaborative methods to combat DV/SA.  
Beginning as a grassroots movement in the 1970s, DV/SA advocacy in Nebraska 
has employed a variety of tactics to bring about change, the most successful of which 
employed collaborative efforts among advocates, law enforcement, court officials, and 
medical personnel. Early efforts to confront sexual assault occurred on the campus of the 
University of Nebraska.312 In 1974, VISTA workers on campus created a crisis line in 
support of victims who needed help beyond what the police offered.313 Two years later, 
operating under the name Lincoln Coalition against Rape, this group became part of 
Lincoln’s Family Services Association, an umbrella organization that provided services 
for those suffering from mental health and drug issues as well as rape crisis. While 
advertised as a rape crisis program, those working the crisis line received many calls 
from victims of domestic violence who did not self-identify as rape victims. As a result, 
in 1978 the group added services that targeted domestic violence and renamed itself the 
Rape and Spouse Abuse Crisis Center (RSACC).314 Both students and community 
members participated in the early years of the crisis line and subsequent Coalition. Two 
notable participants were Gina Washburn and Marcee Metzger, both of whom were 
                                                 
312 As discussed in this chapter, University of Nebraska refers to the institution in Lincoln, which is the 
flagship school in the University of Nebraska system. Also part of the Nebraska system are campuses in 
Omaha and Kearney.  
313 VISTA is the acronym used for Volunteers in Service to America, a national service program created in 
1965 as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty.  
314 Interview with Patsy Martin, Communications and Resource Development Coordinator for Voices of 
Hope, formerly RSACC, March 26, 2015.  
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actively involved in the women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Washburn was an 
early coordinator of the organization when it was the Lincoln Coalition Against Rape. 
Metzger served as the Director of the University of Nebraska Women’s Resource Center 
in the 1970s and is currently the Executive Director of Voices of Hope.  
In 1989, the staff of RSACC decided to break away from the Family Services 
Association, creating an independent non-profit corporation in order to focus more 
exclusively on the issues of sexual assault, domestic violence, and incest. For the first six 
months, RSACC operated out of the home of one of its volunteers, Elizabeth “Liz” 
Kurtz.315 Thereafter, it took up office space in an old federal building. The office proved 
to be inadequate and ill-suited to meet the needs of RSACC, however, and in 1992, 
RSACC began operating out of its current location, a house turned office near the city’s 
center. Following the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, RSACC 
experienced greater acceptance within the community. This legitimacy, as well as its 
larger facility, allowed the Center to expand its services. Able to operate around the 
clock, RSACC offered daily walk-in services and a 24-hour crisis line, provided legal 
advocacy to clients, and sponsored more support groups and educational programs. 
 Three pieces of legislation passed between 1969 and 1978 directly and indirectly 
assisted the efforts of victim advocates. In 1969, the Nebraska Legislature created the 
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Crime 
Commission).316 The Crime Commission has the authority to “educate the community at 
                                                 
315 Liz Kurtz remained active with RSACC until her death. Today, her children and grandchildren remain 
involved with Voices of Hope, the current name of RSACC. Telephone conversation with Patsy Martin, 
Communications and Resource Development Coordinator for Voices of Hope, October 27, 2015.  
316 The purpose for and responsibilities of the Crime Commission are codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-
1415 to 81-1429. 
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large to the problems encountered by law enforcement authorities, promote respect for 
law and encourage community involvement in the administration of criminal justice.”317 
With the exception of a few statutorily required members, the rest of those serving on the 
Crime Commission are gubernatorial appointees.318 The statute requires that at least one 
on the members serving from the “public at large” be a woman. Since 1970, women have 
filled between two and five seats on the Crime Commission. Accounting for fluctuating 
membership levels, women represented between ten and twenty percent of those serving 
on the Crime Commission between 1970 and 2013. While many held positions as 
members of the public, others served because of their political role or connection to law 
enforcement.319 According to current Director Darrell Fisher, until last year, there was no 
seat reserved on the Crime Commission for a victim advocate. In 2014, a change to the 
guidelines provided that one seat on the Crime Victim’s Reparation Committee should be 
filled by a victim advocate.320  
The legislature granted the Crime Commission, among other things, the power 
and responsibility to plan and implement improvements in the administration of criminal 
justice; to coordinate activities related to the administration of criminal justice; and to 
accept and administer funds from the federal government, the state government, and other 
                                                 
317 The current rendition of that statute is codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1416 (2015).  
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Task Force on Domestic Violence. Commission members Shirley Howell and Phyllis Lainson were mayors 
of the Nebraska towns of Fairbury and Hastings, respectively.  
320 Telephone interview with Darrell Fisher, October 27, 2015. The Crime Victim Reparation Committee is 
one of ten committees operating as part of the Crime Commission. See note 95 for more about the other 
committees.  
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sources for carrying out its functions.321 The Crime Commission embraced its role as an 
agency of state government, providing a forum for discussion and problem solving, and 
as the state’s justice advocate, developing comprehensive plans to improve the criminal 
justice system in Nebraska.322  
 In 1978, three years after the Nebraska legislature established the new guidelines 
for its sexual assault statute, the Committee on the Judiciary introduced the Protection 
from Domestic Abuse Act (L.B. 623).323 According to Senator Wally Barnett, who 
introduced L.B. 623: “The purpose of this Act would be to channel welfare services to 
the victims of domestic abuse. Such assistance would include emergency shelter and 
intensive counseling services. This bill also [sought] to increase public and official 
awareness of the problem in hopes that such maybe curtailed or at least controlled in the 
future.”324  
Recognizing that domestic violence was an ongoing problem in Nebraska, the 
Committee held a series of public hearings across the state to gauge the extent of the 
                                                 
321 Nebraska Blue Book (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska Legislative Council, 1970). The current rendition of the 
statute enumerating the Crime Commissions responsibilities is codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1423 
(2015). 
322 According to the Crime Commission’s website, ten standing committees make recommendations of the 
Crime Commission regarding specific concerns related to law enforcement and criminal justice in 
Nebraska. At least six of these committees have a direct or indirect impact on how the state addresses 
domestic violence and sexual assault. The standing committees, which may have a direct or indirect impact 
on DV/SA issues, include the Crime Victim Reparations Committee, the Juvenile Justice Coalition, the 
Office of Violence Prevention, the Police Standards Advisory Council, the Justice Behavioral Health 
Committee, and the Task Force on Human Trafficking. The remaining committees are the County Attorney 
Standards Advisory Council, the Criminal Justice Information Systems Advisory Committee, the Jail 
Standards Board, and the Racial Profiling Committee. http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov. 
323 In a telephone interview on October 28, 2015, former Senator Wally Barnett, 84, discussed what he 
recalled about the Protection Against Domestic Abuse Act. While Barnett did not recall being responsible 
for initiating the bill, as Chair of the Judiciary Committee, he was responsible for carrying the bill to the 
floor of the legislature. He explained that while serving as a state senator, he approached societal problems 
with “an aim to fix them.” Of specific note from the 1970s, Barnett said that there was a real problem with 
both alcoholism and domestic violence. He did remember introducing legislation to assist alcoholics 
needing treatment and reasoned that it was about the same time the Judiciary Committee addressed 
domestic violence.  
324 L.B. 623 (1978) Introducer’s Statement of Purpose, January 23, 1978. 
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problem and the attitudes of community members. A few common themes emerged from 
the hearings. Both men and women were asking for assistance from the state to address 
family conflict. Despite attempts to keep their families together, many women suffered 
beatings at the hand of their husbands. Female victims were afraid to leave their abusive 
homes because they feared physical reprisals that would be worse than what they had 
already endured. Victims also feared for the safety of their children.325  
 On January 23, 1978, the Committee held an open hearing on L.B. 623 at the 
Capitol Building in Lincoln. Individuals with a wide variety of experiences with domestic 
violence victims gave testimony. Karen Waller, State Coordinator for the Domestic 
Violence Project, testified in favor of L.B. 623. Waller was encouraged by the level of 
attention the Judiciary Committee was giving to the problem of domestic violence. She 
was proud that “Nebraska [was] one of the first states to attempt statewide coordination 
of community involvement in the domestic violence issue.”326 
Witnesses testified about the negative effects of domestic violence. Joseph Julian, 
Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Nebraska, explained that despite 
the misconception that domestic violence is a characteristic of impoverished families, it 
occurs across all socioeconomic classes and geographic locations.327 Kappie Weber, 
representing the League of Women Voters in Nebraska, supported Julian’s comment by 
expressing the sobering reality that everyone on the room had some experience with 
abuse, albeit some more remotely than others.328  
                                                 
325 Senator Wally Barnett, Legislative record, March 2, 1978. 
326 Karen Waller, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. Waller explained that 
funding for the Domestic Violence Project came from a grant distributed under the Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act. The project focused on rural areas in Nebraska that suffered from a lack of 
support services for the victims of domestic violence. 
327 Joseph Julian, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
328 Kappie Weber, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
 113 
 
Witnesses provided testimony about the frequency at which domestic violence 
occurred in communities of various sizes throughout the state. Robert Coupland, a lawyer 
from the rural community of Valentine in north-central Nebraska, indicated that he had 
twelve to sixteen abused women come into his office in the previous year. They suffered 
from cracked ribs, lacerations near the eyes, knees twisted out of joints, and/or facial 
bruises. The women found their way to his office only after they had received medical 
treatment and their injuries had started to heal.329 Benny Kling, Police Chief of Syracuse, 
Nebraska, indicated that his officers had responded to fifty-six domestic violence calls in 
the past twelve months. While some of the calls were to the same residences, the number 
seemed unusually high given that the population of Syracuse was about sixteen hundred 
in 1978.330 Richard Dunning, City Prosecutor for Omaha, Nebraska, revealed that his 
office regularly met with nearly one thousand domestic violence victims each year. 
Dunning was quick to point out that the number did not include any cases involving 
felonies, reasoning the total number of victims in Omaha was actually much higher. Of 
the domestic violence victims Dunning saw, half filed a complaint, and only about fifteen 
percent actually made it to trial. He also testified that he was aware of four or five women 
in the previous three years who were murdered by their significant others after the 
women had visited the City Prosecutor’s Office. Consequently, he said there was a real 
need for L.B. 623.331 
Others described marital rape as a form of domestic violence. Jan Kohl, Vice 
President of the Lincoln Chapter of the National Organization for Women, indicated that 
                                                 
329 Robert Coupland, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
330 Benny Kling, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978.  
331 Richard Dunning, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978.  
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historically marital rape was a condoned part of marriage. While legislation in many 
states was criminalizing such behavior, Kohl asserted that it remained a form of domestic 
violence.332 Senator Herbert Duis of Gothenburg publicly acknowledged that rape was an 
intrinsic part of domestic violence during a March 2, 1978 session of the legislature. Such 
public recognition by Kohl and Duis demonstrated Nebraska’s continued commitment to 
hold spousal rapists accountable for their actions and provide assistance to their victims. 
A concern raised by both law enforcement and prosecutors was a lack of training 
related to domestic violence situations. Kling indicated that twenty-two percent of 
injuries officers experienced occurred during domestic violence calls. When injury did 
occur, it was generally at a home that police had visited multiple times. Kling argued that 
law enforcement officers needed more training on responding to domestic violence calls. 
On a related note, Kling supported the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, but 
noted that it was understaffed, underfunded, and operating in too small of a facility.333 
Dunning also raised concerns about lack of training for the employees in the Prosecutor’s 
Office. He noted that the prosecutors in his office simply lacked the training to 
successfully advise and assist battered women. They attempted to help the families work 
out their problems, but the best they could do was file assault and battery charges against 
the abusers. Even then, most of those cases did not go to trial because the victims were 
too scared to show up to testify.334 
                                                 
332 Jan Ellis Kohl, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. Kohl explained: “Women 
have, in the past, been considered to be the personal property of the man; thus, the man had the right to use 
his property as he saw fit. . . . Today, women are beginning to declare their individuality and independence 
in striving to be recognized as free persons in their own right with all the rights and responsibilities that 
freedom entails. No longer should the husband have the right to do with this free person as he chooses or 
treat this individual as his property. In many states, thankfully, a husband may no longer legally sexually 
assault his wife.”  
333 Kling Testimony. 
334 Dunning Testimony. 
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Multiple witnesses provided support for L.B. 623 because it would provide 
necessary assistance to both victims and abusers. Marty Beach, representing the 
American Association of University Women, strongly supported the preventive measures 
in the bill. She explained that making people aware that violent behavior is not acceptable 
is vitally important. She was pleased to see provisions in the bill for emergency housing 
that would give victims a place of safety to go to when in crisis.335 Beach also referenced 
the International Women’s Conference held in Houston, Texas in 1977. Of special note 
was the Conference Resolution that concerned battered women. Participants at the 
conference prioritized financial assistance to provide emergency shelter and support 
services to battered women and their children. Pastor Richard Mintzlaff of Burwell, 
Nebraska, supported L.B. 623 in its entirety, but focused his testimony on the value of 
counseling for abusers. He promoted the inclusion of counseling as part of a probation 
plan, positing that most abusive men will not voluntarily seek out assistance for their 
behavior or underlying difficulties. On the other hand, many might benefit tremendously 
from individual or group counseling.336 Debbie Reynolds, of the Lincoln Council on 
Alcoholism and Drugs, proposed that both victims and abusers needed assistance and 
counseling. Reynolds noted that she worked with women weekly who lived in abusive 
situations where alcohol was involved. She believed the resolution of alcohol problems 
would reduce domestic violence significantly. While most of the clients she saw were 
female, Reynolds noted that more men were beginning to visit her office. The men 
                                                 
335 Mary Beach, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
336 Richard Mintzlaff, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
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acknowledged their alcoholism and abuse, and they shared stories of wives and 
girlfriends who responded by becoming violent themselves.337  
The Committee also heard from Eldin Ehrlich, the Director of the Department of 
Public Welfare. Under the terms of L.B. 623, Welfare would administer the provisions of 
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act. Ehrlich acknowledged that some of the services 
indicated in the bill were outside the current purview of Welfare. To implement the Act, 
the Department would need an increase in staff, additional training for the current staff, 
and the ability to outsource services to agencies and programs already equipped to assist 
victims and their families. 
Kurt Freibert, representing Dads of America, Inc., presented the only testimony in 
opposition to L.B. 623. Referencing the Reverend Billy Graham, Freibert argued that 
people needed to turn to God and churches rather than legislation and government 
interference when they have “family difficulties.” A few moments later, the strength of 
Freibert’s argument waned when he suggested that most clergy are not qualified with the 
expertise necessary to help abused men and women. Freibert blamed no-fault divorce for 
broken homes and, portrayed his gender-biased views when he claimed, “LB 623 gives 
incentive to women to run away from home, break up marriages, promote divorces, [and] 
destroy families.”338 The most controversial portion of Freibert’s testimony was his 
assertion: “There are more abused and battered, mentally destroyed husbands, than 
women.”339 Soon thereafter, the Committee ended Freibert’s testimony.  
                                                 
337 Debbie Reynolds, testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
338 Kurt Freibert, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 23, 1978. 
339 Ibid. 
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Two months after the Committee hearing, then Governor J. James Exon signed 
the bill into law. The bill was codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 to 42-931. In passing 
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, the Nebraska Legislature publicly declared that 
domestic violence, including sexual assault, was a statewide issue, and that the 
government would join advocacy groups in confronting and working to end the cycle of 
violence. 
 Another innovation was in the area of law enforcement training. Specifically, 
lawmakers introduced legislation in 1969 that would require those interested in law 
enforcement to receive standardized training prior to becoming fully certified officers.340 
The legislature mandated that the newly established Nebraska Law Enforcement Training 
Center (Training Center), under the supervision of the Police Standards Advisory Council 
(Council): 
(1) test all law enforcement candidates on behalf of the council to ensure that they 
meet pre-certification and certification requirements, (2) oversee and monitor 
other training schools and training academies to ensure that pre-certification and 
certification requirements as set by the council are being met, and (3) conduct pre-
certification programs, certification programs, and advanced law enforcement 
training programs as directed by the council.341 
 
                                                 
340 According to Training Center guidelines, individuals may apply to attend the Training Center prior to or 
after being hired by one of Nebraska’s police departments. However, because space is limited in each 
training class, currently all seats are reserved for those who already work for a law enforcement agency. 
Interview with Brenda Urbanek, Deputy Director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, 
March 3, 2015.  
341 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1402. This provision was first introduced in 1969 (Laws 1969, c. 773, §, p. 2926), 
revised in 1971 (L.B. 929, § 2), and took its current form with a 2000 revision (L.B. 994, § 3). The Training 
Center is responsible for auditing police academies operated by the Lincoln Police Department, the Omaha 
Police Department, and the State Patrol. The Council develops the rules and regulations that govern 
admission criteria to any training academy. Such criteria include physical, mental, and emotional fitness, 
and the disclosure of any criminal history. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1410 (2000). The legislature passed 
earlier versions of the statute in 1969, 1988, and 1994. Beyond this initial certification, current law 
enforcement officers in Nebraska must annually complete a minimum of “twenty hours of continuing 
education courses in the areas of criminal justice and law enforcement” that are meant “to maintain or 
improve the skills of the law enforcement officer in carrying out his or her duties and responsibilities.” 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1414.07. 
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The Council and Training Center had primary responsibility for the curriculum that 
candidates received. Nevertheless, when Nebraska senators passed the Protection from 
Domestic Abuse Act, that legislation required all law enforcement employees attend a 
training program on domestic violence. This program would “inform the officers of the 
problems of domestic abuse, procedures to deal with such problems, the Protection from 
Domestic Abuse Act, and the services and facilities available to abused family and 
household members.”342  
The Training Center took action to incorporate such material in their curriculum 
for cadets. One of the challenges that instructors faced, even decades into the program, 
was to convince cadets and veteran officers that domestic violence constituted criminal 
behavior. Like many law enforcement personnel across the country, Nebraska officers 
maintained the position that what happened among family members in the home was 
private business.343 To combat this perspective, the Training Center modified lesson 
plans to incorporate domestic violence education for cadets and veteran officers returning 
for continuing education credits. Training Center personnel coordinated these efforts with 
local victim advocates and the Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual and Domestic Violence 
to present interactive lesson on the myths and realities of domestic violence and sexual 
assault, best practices for questioning victims and investigating these crimes, and 
enhanced safety measures that law enforcement should employ when encountering an 
explosive situation.  
Brenda Urbanek, Deputy Director of the Training Center, has spent more than 
thirty years in Nebraska law enforcement. As a new police officer in the 1980s, Urbanek 
                                                 
342 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-927.  
343 Interview with Brenda Urbanek.  
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was among the minority of women who entered the profession.344 Because she was a 
female officer, Urbanek was often the one to interview victims of domestic violence and 
sexual assault. This paralleled the policy within the Lincoln Police Department beginning 
in the mid-1970s, whereby female officers always performed the questioning of 
victims.345 From Urbanek’s perspective, however, compassion for the victim is far more 
important than the gender of the interviewer during domestic violence and sexual assault 
cases. Urbanek was able to utilize this experience when she moved to a position as 
instructor at the Training Center twenty-five years ago. Since that time, she has been 
responsible for teaching the domestic violence/sexual assault segment of cadet training.  
According to Urbanek, in recent years, program requirements have changed and 
instructors have adapted the content of their lessons to reflect changes in the law, court 
procedures, and social attitudes. To address these considerations, in-class and practical 
training for cadets increased to include 605 hours of training and assessment. A small 
fraction of those hours directly relate to issues involving domestic violence and sexual 
assault, but earlier lessons on investigative practices, questioning witnesses, defusing 
situations, and problem solving provide a foundation for those targeted discussions. In 
addition to legal and procedural training related to domestic violence and sexual assault, 
cadets learn about the impact these crimes have on children, the dynamics between 
victims and attackers, and the gendered nature of these crimes. Cadets attend a lesson on 
stalking and participate in mock trials that give them practical experience in providing 
                                                 
344 According to the Training Center website, females currently compose about ten percent of each training 
class, which is about the percentage of women in Nebraska law enforcement jobs. http://nletc.nebraska.gov/ 
345 Sherry Fairar, Testimony before the Judiciary Committee, January 22, 1975. Fairar proposed that the use 
of female officers to interview victims of sexual assault or domestic violence led to an increase of 
reporting.  
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testimony at trial. Working with victim advocates, cadets role-play different scenarios 
that they may encounter at crime scenes and follow-up meetings with victims. This 
interactive approach allows them to hone their interview skills while developing an 
understanding of the different roles that members of the coordinated response team will 
play with victims. Ultimately, this understanding can serve to soften the traditional 
animosity that can exist between law enforcement, the criminal justice system, and victim 
advocates.346 
The role of the Crime Commission has also adapted in the last two decades. In 
1995, then Governor Earl Benjamin “Ben” Nelson “designated the Crime Commission as 
the state agency responsible for the administration of the federal STOP Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) Formula Block Grant Program.”347 Since that time, the Crime 
Commission has been responsible for developing and administering Nebraska’s State 
Implementation Plan that sets forth how the state will utilize VAWA funds that it 
receives.348 The mission of the Implementation Plan is as follows: 
The criminal justice system in Nebraska in collaboration with victim services and 
other community agencies and individuals responding to all victims of domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault and stalking in a consistent, coordinated 
and positive way that will make victims safer, hold offenders accountable and 
work to STOP the violence.349 
   
                                                 
346 Interview with Brenda Urbanek. 
347 See Nebraska’s Violence Against Women Act State Implementation Plans for 2007-2009 and 2010-
1012. http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/documents/strategic_plans.htm.  
348 Each Implementation Plan covers a three-year period. STOP grants award federal funding to states, 
which may then distribute money to programs at the state and local level that combat crimes against women 
and strengthen victim services. When distributing STOP grant funds, states must allocate twenty-five 
percent each for law enforcement and prosecutors, thirty percent for victim services, and five percent to 
courts, with the remaining fifteen percent available for discretionary distribution. 
http://www.justice.gov/ovw/grant-programs.  
349 Nebraska State Implementation Plan STOP Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 2014-2016. 
http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/pdf/strategic_plans/2014_VAWA_State_Implementation.pdf. Similar 
mission statements appear in the text of earlier Implementation Plans.  
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Nebraska Implementation Plans going back to 2007 have identified seven primary areas 
of need in the state’s efforts to improve the criminal justice system’s response to 
DV/SA.350 With input from statewide community meetings, the Crime Commission 
enumerated needs and solutions for problems that fell within those primary areas – those 
gaps most in need of support from VAWA funding. It is possible to narrow those “gaps” 
to three: a lack of consistent training, a lack of knowledge and understanding, and a lack 
of services.  
The Crime Commission identified a lack of consistent training for coordinated 
response teams, “defined as a local group of representatives from law enforcement, 
prosecution, probation, victim services and other agencies who work together in a 
coordinated manner to improve the criminal justice system’s response to women who are 
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.”351 The Crime Commission also noted a 
lack of knowledge about DV/SA and compassion for victims by government officials and 
members of the public. The Implementation Plan noted a perception among the 
legislature that DV/SA is not “violence against women,” but rather that “these [victims] 
are just folks caught in incidents.” Another concern raised was that Child Protective 
Services holds victims more accountable than offenders, a lingering example of victim 
blaming. The Implementation Plan also identified a lack of public awareness regarding 
the use of technology among school-age children leading to sexual assault and stalking; 
male domestic violence victims; and elderly victims of domestic violence. Finally, the 
                                                 
350 The three most recent plans cover the periods 2007-2009, 2010-2012, and 2014-2016. Research for each 
of these plans began one or two years in advance of the plan release. For example, research for the 2007-
2009 plan began in October 2005 with a series of community meetings at various locations across the state. 
Congress reauthorized VAWA in 2013, after which time the Nebraska Crime Commission developed the 
state’s implementation plan for the years 2014-2016. 
351 Nebraska’s 2010-2012 Violence Against Women Act State Implementation Plan. 
http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/pdf/strategic_plans/2010-2012_VAWA_State_Implementation_Act.pdf.  
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Crime Commission identified a lack of services, particularly for those victims from rural 
areas and those within marginalized groups; for instance, members of the LGBT 
community, the hearing impaired, victims with mental health issues, non-documented 
immigrants, male victims, and victims living on tribal land.352  
 The Crime Commission recommended community-based and statewide 
coordinated efforts to resolve these shortcomings. In addition to legislative changes that 
would enhance penalties and consistent judicial response in dealing with offenders, the 
Crime Commission recommended increased education programs, greater collaboration 
between the criminal justice system and victim advocacy groups, and increased services 
for victims and victim families.353 To achieve these goals, money from the STOP grant 
would fund new and expand existing domestic violence and sexual assault programs. 
Examples from three segments of society – legislative mandates regarding law 
enforcement, efforts of victim advocacy groups, and prevention programs within 
educational settings – serve as exemplars of collaborative endeavors to address and 
eradicate domestic violence and sexual assault within Nebraska.  
Like other DV/SA organizations across America, RSACC evolved to meet the 
needs of victims in the community.354 In addition to rape and domestic violence services, 
Voices of Hope provides assistance to others who have experienced relationship violence, 
                                                 
352 http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/documents/strategic_plans.htm.  
353 Ibid. 
354 Voices of Hope reported that the total number of clients to whom they have assisted has gone up in 
recent years. For instance, 1,357 adults received assistance through face-to-face encounters in 2011, while 
that number increased to 1,926 by 2014. Callers to the crisis line increased from 7,761 to 8,600 during the 
same period. One challenge that the staff faces is how to interpret these numbers. Certainly, they might 
reflect an increase in violent crime in Lincoln, but at the same time, the increase could indicate that more 
individuals are aware of Voices of Hope and are more willing to seek help. The staff believes that it is the 
latter, which is in part due to more effective outreach programs and partnerships with Latino, Asian, and 
Native American cultural centers. Martin interview.  
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harassment, and stalking. They engage in programs that address safety issues: acquisition 
of restraining orders, changing locks, filing police reports, and anonymous reporting. The 
connection to the University of Nebraska has come full circle as well. A campus 
advocate, employed by Voices of Hope and contracted by the University of Nebraska, 
operates out of the Women’s Center, providing campus-wide support: offering direct 
assistance to victims; educating student groups, residence hall staff, and campus police 
officers; and serving on the Campus Threat Assessment Group.355  
In 2007, RSACC became Voices of Hope, believing that its name had become too 
narrow to describe all of the services offered. The new name was a joint effort by board 
members, staff, and clients. The board and staff selected the term “Voices” to identify 
their multiple roles speaking on behalf of victims and advocating to the community 
through educational programs. Clients added “Hope” as representative of the hope clients 
derived from the center and its programs. The decision to change the name was not 
unanimous. Critics of the new name argued that “Voices of Hope” did not clearly identify 
what the services the organization provided; rather, they stressed that domestic violence 
and sexual assault are still hidden crimes, and the new name cloaked the advocacy 
provided. With the support of donors and outreach programs, the “hidden” purpose of 
Voices of Hope never developed into a significant problem.356 
                                                 
355 Ibid.; Interview with Jan Deeds, Director of the Women’s Center and Associate Director of Student 
Involvement at the University of Nebraska, April 29, 2015. 
356 According to statistics kept by Voices of Hope, between 350 and 450 women attend support groups at 
their facility each year. In recent years, the number of male victims who have contacted Voices of Hope has 
increased from five percent to more than eleven percent between 2009 and 2014. During the same period, 
the percentage of non-white clients has increased, due in part to an increase in the immigrant population 
and targeted outreach to those immigrant groups. The one service that has seen the greatest decline is a 
request for medical advocacy, dropping from 216 calls for assistance in 2012 to 124 calls in 2013. The staff 
attribute this decrease to the enforcement of HIPPA laws. Martin Interview. 
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Voices of Hope is one of twenty community-based domestic violence/sexual 
assault programs in Nebraska that receives support from the Nebraska Coalition to End 
Sexual and Domestic Violence (Coalition).357 Like the organization that became Voices 
of Hope, the origins of the Coalition trace back to the mid-1970s when it began as a 
volunteer organization called the Nebraska Task Force on Domestic Violence. In 1987, 
the Coalition hired its first director, symbolizing a move away from an all-volunteer staff. 
It was during this period that the Task Force changed its name to the Nebraska Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Assault Coalition, emphasizing a conscious restructuring to include 
problems related to sexual assault. Reflecting a change in its mission statement, the 
Coalition adopted its current name in 2014.358 The Coalition has several primary goals: to 
create a world where there is no more sexual assault or domestic violence, which 
involves changing the power structure that leads to domestic violence/sexual assault; to 
provide victims/survivors access to safety and services; to improve coordination between 
law enforcement, victim services, and hospital response teams; and to work with law 
enforcement and the state Department of Health and Human Services to adopt policies 
that will best serve victims and their families.359  
Working to achieve these goals requires Coalition staff to collaborate with 
community-based programs and other organizations throughout the state. The Coalition 
provides statewide, regional, and local training for domestic violence/sexual assault 
program staff and volunteers to ensure that consistent, quality services are available 
                                                 
357 There are also four tribal programs serving members of the Santee Sioux Nation and the Omaha, 
Winnebago, and Ponca Tribes.  
358 Interview with Michelle Miller, Sexual Violence Program Coordinator, Nebraska Coalition to End 
Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence, April 8, 2015.  
359 Miller interview. 
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across the state. The Coalition also collaborates with agencies within the criminal justice 
system such as the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, the Department of 
Corrections, and the Department of Probation. As explained by Michelle Zinke, Training 
and Resource Coordinator, the Coalition provides outreach assistance to other 
organizations, particularly those targeting underserved or marginalized members of the 
population. Currently, this includes the Nebraska Tribal Family Violence Coalition’s 
housing/homelessness groups; Heartland Deaf Abuse Advocacy Services; three cultural 
centers in Lincoln; Nebraska’s Court Appointed Special Advocate Association; and 
Outlinc, an organization that supports the LGBTQ population in Lincoln.360 Additionally, 
the Coalition supports prevention programs that target Nebraska's youth. The Step Up 
and Speak Out campaign, for instance, seeks to reduce violence by “providing teens with 
clear and accurate information on all forms of violence – including sexual harassment, 
sexual assault, dating violence, and gender violence.”361 Collaboration with the Nebraska 
Department of Health and Human Services allows Coalition staff to deliver intervention 
and healthy relationship programming in Nebraska’s public schools.362 This level of 
collaboration allows the deliverance of domestic violence/sexual assault programming in 
communities across Nebraska that might otherwise not occur.  
                                                 
360 Interview with Michelle Zinke, Training and Resource Coordinator, Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual 
Assault and Domestic Violence, May 1, 2015. 
361 The Coalition created the Step Up and Speak Out program with support from the Verizon Foundation, 
illustrating an additional example of collaborative advocacy taking place in Nebraska. For more on this 
preventative program, see http://www.stepupspeakout.org. 
362 According to Michelle Miller, funding for some of these programs comes from the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) as part of the CDC’s Division of Violence Prevention. In 2011, the CDC 
released the results of the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, noting: “Intimate partner 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking are important and widespread public health problems in the United 
States.” http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs.  
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 While Nebraska’s dual-programming paradigm for domestic violence and sexual 
assault advocacy represents a common structure for a minority of states, the level at 
which its advocacy groups collaborate with community-based programs and other 
organizations throughout the state exemplifies collaborative efforts across the nation in 
the post-VAWA era. Nebraska’s elimination of the marital rape exemption also stands in 
contrast to legislative action in other states. A nearly unanimous legislature rejected legal 
immunity for spousal rapists with a single statutory amendment in 1975. In 1986, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court definitively upheld the validity of that statute. Not all states 
criminalized marital rape in such a straightforward manner. The following two chapters 
will illustrate the alternate approaches utilized by California and South Carolina.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BURDEN OF MARRIED WOMEN IN THE GOLDEN STATE: 
CALIFORNIA’S LONG STRUGGLE WITH SPOUSAL RAPE LAWS, 1979-2006 
 
 On September 30, 1979 Dianna Green, a twenty-year-old resident of Tustin, 
California, was two weeks overdue with her first child. She and her Marine husband, 
Kevin, were known to friends and neighbors as having a volatile relationship. The police 
had responded to several previous requests to intervene at the Green residence. That 
night, Dianna was attacked; she was strangled, struck in the head with a blunt object, 
raped, and left for dead. At the hospital, doctors performed a Caesarean section only to 
find the baby dead upon delivery. Because of the blow to her head, Dianna fell into a 
coma.363 
With little evidence discovered at the crime scene and no evidence of forced 
entry, the police suspected Dianna’s husband. Green admitted during questioning that he 
and his wife had a marriage fraught with difficulty, and that both had resorted to physical 
confrontations. He conceded that earlier in the evening, Dianna had resisted his request 
for sex, but he denied raping and beating her. His alibi, which a witness later confirmed, 
was that he was across town purchasing burgers from a fast food restaurant. Green told 
the detectives that he had seen a young black man near the apartment complex as he left 
to get the take-out food, and that he saw this other man getting into a van and driving 
away when he returned.364 While the police were confident that Green was guilty, 
without solid evidence to support their theory, they could not move the case forward. The 
                                                 
363 Jennifer Donovan, “When A Husband Rapes His Wife,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 14, 1985; 
Heather Buchanan, “The Unreliable Eyewitnesses,” Crime Magazine, September 16, 2013, 
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364 While the man Green described was African American and both Green and his wife were white, there is 
no evidence that Green’s description of the man he saw was racially motivated.  
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case remained stalled until Dianna regained consciousness a month later. Doctors who 
examined Dianna quickly observed residual effects from the head trauma. Dianna 
suffered from amnesia and aphasia, a language impairment characterized by a loss of 
ability to understand or express speech. Upon her release from the hospital, Dianna 
moved in with her parents and began a lengthy period of speech rehabilitation. 
Approximately three months later, she contacted the police to tell them that she 
remembered that her husband was the one who attacked her.365  
Green’s trial began in October 1980. Still declaring his innocence, Green was 
convicted of second-degree murder for the death of the unborn child, the attempted 
murder of his wife, and assault with a deadly weapon. He received a sentence of fifteen 
years to life in prison.366 Noticeably absent from the charges Green faced was the specific 
crime of rape or sexual assault. At least one account of the events reported that initially, 
prosecutors wanted to charge Green with spousal rape, but this was not possible. In 1979 
California, the rape statute excluded sexual crimes committed by a man against his wife. 
Thus, the charge of assault with a deadly weapon covered the blow to the head, 
strangulation, and the sexual assault.367 Green spent the next sixteen years in prison, 
during which time he received a dishonorable discharge from the Marine Corps and faced 
a civil suit brought by Dianna for the wrongful death of their unborn child.368  
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compensation from the State of California for the years he unjustly spent in prison. Nevertheless, Dianna 
still believes that her ex-husband was connected to her attack. She has stated on numerous occasions that 
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While the introduction of new evidence exonerated Kevin Green, the value of this 
case study as it played out between 1979 and 1996 helps to illustrate the state of the legal 
system concerning marital rape in California at that time. Police, prosecutors, the victim, 
and the public all believed that Green was guilty. The little evidence available and 
Dianna’s testimony pointed to Green as the perpetrator. The attack occurred in 1979 
when, due to a marital exemption in the law, spousal rape was not a crime in California. 
Therefore, prosecutors could only charge Kevin Green for the sexual assault of his wife 
under penal codes related to assault with a deadly weapon.  
California has a complex history of policing and regulating those marginalized in 
society. On the one hand, there is the perception of the West Coast state being more 
liberal, forward thinking, accepting, and willing to provide equal protection to its 
citizens.369 On the other hand, California – through law and public sentiment – has 
historically discriminated against those seen as foreign, different, or simply outside the 
dominant power structure. For instance, racism as a form of white, male hegemony was 
present from the early years of California statehood. Conflict between white settlers and 
Native Americans, Mexicans, and immigrants from China and Japan often related to 
control of property, economic resources, and access of minority men to white women.370 
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Male control of women also played a part in California history, as it did in other parts of 
the country: men dominated the government, constructing laws related to citizenship, 
employment, voting rights, and jury service that had the effect of making women second-
class citizens.  
 In the area of spousal rape laws, California has a complex history as well. 
California’s legislative record with spousal rape stands in stark contrast to that of 
Nebraska. Nebraska’s straightforward approach to eliminating distinctions between 
spousal and non-spousal rape occurred with a single legislative revision in 1975 and a 
single decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 1986.371 In contrast, California 
legislators took twenty-seven years and eight amendments to reach virtually the same 
result. While California passed a series of laws protecting women from domestic violence 
and non-spousal rape during the height of the women’s movement, it consistently 
hesitated to extend full protection to spousal rape victims. California was one of the 
earliest states to pass a spousal rape law. However, there were exceptions built into the 
statute that continued to distinguish spousal rape from non-spousal rape, resulting in 
disparate consequences for those who violated the laws. Because of such exceptions, for 
years California lagged behind other states in its protection of married women. 
Nonetheless, California’s history of spousal rape legislation offers a valuable case study, 
illustrating several of the thematic controversies surrounding rape in marriage that played 
out across the nation in the last three decades of the twentieth century.  
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371 While it is true that Nebraska legislators have amended the sexual assault statute several times since 
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Participants on both sides of the debate about spousal rape had to evaluate a series 
of questions. Taken as pairs, an affirmative response to one meant that the answer to the 
other necessarily had to be the negative. Did the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause require that marital rape victims receive the same legal protection as non-spousal 
rape victims, or did the doctrine of marital privacy protect the marital bedroom from 
intrusion by governmental influence? Did the criminalization of spousal rape provide 
marital rape victims an appropriate remedy under the law or did marital rape laws 
encourage false reporting by vindictive wives seeking better settlements in divorce and 
child custody cases? Was the criminalization of rape in marriage necessary to protect the 
bodily autonomy of married women or were current assault and battery statutes inclusive 
enough to address sexual assault in marriage? The restricted options presented by such 
questions represented the conflict between women’s advocates and anti-feminists whose 
perspectives reflected the beliefs espoused by the Religious Right in California and the 
rest of the nation.372 As women’s advocates promoted the criminalization of marital rape, 
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anti-feminists presented both historical and modern justifications for maintaining the 
marital rape exemption. 
This chapter traces four major themes in the legislative history of those laws to 
demonstrate that female victims of spousal rape, who because of their status as married 
women, faced marginalization and a denial of equal protection. The first theme analyzes 
California’s first spousal rape law passed in 1979, considering the competing interests 
that surrounded the issue. Subsequent themes address a series of amendments regarding 
different stages in the execution and prosecution of the crime of spousal rape: a showing 
of a victim’s resistance or lack of consent; prosecutorial discretion to indict spousal rape 
defendants on either misdemeanor or felony charges, an option not available in cases of 
non-spousal rape who were always faced felony charges; and a reporting requirement that 
effectively reduced the statute of limitations for spousal rape to thirty days, a mere 
fraction of that for non-spousal victims.  
 In 1979, California Penal Code (P.C.) § 261 defined rape as “sexual intercourse 
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,” a fairly common definition utilized by 
many states. That same year, Assemblyman S. Floyd Mori introduced Assembly Bill 
(A.B.) 546, which would be codified as California Penal Code § 262, spousal rape.373 In 
1979, Mori was serving his fourth of six years as a California State Assemblyman. The 
child of Japanese immigrant parents, Mori was, and remains today, a strong supporter of 
many civil rights organizations and has received awards for his extensive community 
service.374  
                                                 
373 Governor Jerry Brown signed A.B. 546 into law on 22 September 1979. 
374 When elected to the California Assembly in 1975, Mori was one of the first two Japanese Americans to 
serve in the State Assembly. Following his time in the Assembly, Mori served as the Director of the Office 
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Mori’s 1979 bill was not the state’s first attempt at spousal rape legislation. Two 
years earlier, Mori had introduced spousal rape legislation that simply would have 
deleted the phrase “not the wife of the perpetrator” from section 261, similar to the 
philosophy Nebraska applied in its 1975 legislation. After Mori amended the bill to apply 
only to spouses who had legally separated or had applied for dissolution, it passed to the 
Assembly Criminal Justice Committee and was heard on the floor. The whole of the 
Assembly, however, declared the bill too limited and referred it back to the Criminal 
Justice Committee. Mori amended it back to its original form, only to have it die in 
committee. Assemblyman Mori introduced a similar bill in 1978, but it also failed to 
pass.  
Assemblyman Mori summarized the need for the spousal rape law in his address 
to the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee on April 23, 1979. Mori reasoned: 
“marriage and the home should enhance the lives of the participants,” as a place of love 
and security. However, he continued, the “incident of violence in the home is a major 
problem.”375 He promoted A.B. 546 as a “positive statement that all spouses are 
guaranteed protection against sexual pressure and abuse,” requiring spouses to respect 
one another’s sexual autonomy. He went on to explain that A.B. 546 would assure the 
public that the legislators of California would not tolerate abuse in marriage.376  
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Mori made five substantive arguments in his address, each of which focuses on an 
issue of morality and/or legality with the status of California’s laws. Mori’s first 
argument reflected a time in early California history when racism prevailed, comparing 
the disparate treatment of Chinese immigrants to that forced upon married women in 
1979 California. He argued: “In early California history, Asian Americans had no civil 
rights and were not recognized in courts of law. The attitude was, ‘If, you don’t like it, go 
back to China.’ We now strip wives of their civil right to their own body and tell them, ‘If 
you don’t like it, get a divorce.’”377 Through this comparison, Mori was arguing that the 
previous behavior was, in time, deemed morally and legally wrong; as such, the 
inequitable treatment of the spousal rape victim should also be recognized as morally and 
legally unacceptable.  
In his second argument, Mori put the spousal rape victim front and center, 
challenging the male-centered nature of rape in Anglo-American history. Such a history 
encompassed several realities: rape was often considered a crime against male interest in 
a daughter or wife; to establish their innocence, male perpetrators often had a lower 
burden than their female victims had to prove that a crime was actually committed; and to 
date, married men had escaped prosecution for the sexual assault of their wives because 
of the legal unity represented by that union. Mori challenged the members of the 
Assembly to overcome this checkered past: “We are faced with a choice in which we can 
either protect the rape victim or the rapist. It’s time we gave consideration to the victims 
and potential victims and to the children who are often the witnesses of such abuse.”378  
                                                 
377 Ibid.  
378 Ibid. 
 135 
 
 Mori’s third argument suggested the marital rape exemption denied equal 
protection under the law to married women.379 Mori explained: “There is no compelling 
reason for a woman to give up her civil rights regarding sexual intercourse when she 
marries, while a woman who lives with a man for ten years [without marriage] maintains 
those rights.”380 Mori’s approach foreshadowed the equal protection arguments that 
activists would raise in states across the country during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century.  
The fourth argument is also quite telling. While there was and still is a perception 
of California being more liberal, forward thinking, and willing to provide equal 
protection to its citizens than more conservative parts of the country, the spousal rape 
statute provided an example of the Golden State trying to catch up with other states. Mori 
explained: “Oregon and Nebraska have deleted the marital exemption. Twenty-two states 
have partial exemptions addressing such circumstances as physical, mental or emotional 
injury, living arrangements, and legal actions.” 381 This game of “keeping up with the 
Joneses” would be used as a justification for later amendments to P.C. § 262 (spousal 
rape).  
Mori’s fifth and final argument touched on a reality in many states’ legal history. 
While statutes across the country, like California’s, consistently defined rape as carnal 
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knowledge or sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, many 
states did provide for prosecution of a man who aided (or encouraged) another to rape his 
wife.382 Mori reminded the members of the Assembly that under the 1979 “California 
law, a husband can be guilty of rape if he aids and abets a third person in raping his wife 
but not if he commits the crime himself.”383  
 Supporters of the 1979 bill spoke out against historical arguments like irrevocable 
consent, women as property, and violence in marriage. One line of argument, irrevocable 
consent, posited that “a woman does not give up her right to consent to sexual intercourse 
by virtue of marriage, and that the existing definition of rape treats married women in an 
unequal and unfair fashion.”384 As noted by the Senate Democratic Caucus, “under 
present California law, even if a husband and wife separate, he can legally rape her. Yet 
if the couple does not get a marriage license, but he and she simply live together as 
husband and wife, she is protected by the rape law. This . . . is inequitable and insulting 
to married women and the institution of marriage.”385 Assemblyman Mori furthered this 
idea, stating: “In this day and age of our quest to protect civil liberties and to promote 
equality under the law, it is an anachronism for the State to tell a woman that if she is 
legally married she gives up her right to be free from humiliation and violence of her 
personal being; yet, if she enters into a common-law marriage, she is treated as a first-
class citizen.”386 Each of these arguments highlights the disparate treatment that marital 
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rape victims faced for no legally justifiable reason, but rather solely because they were 
married to the man who raped them.  
 Another line of argument in favor of the new legislation was that the current law 
reflected archaic notions that the wife was a man’s property to be used or abused as he 
saw fit. In support of the bill, the California National Organization for Women 
maintained that: “A.B. 546 . . . adds equity to California law; no longer could women be 
considered ‘property’ of their husbands and thusly denied legal protection from spousal 
rape.”387 Yet another line of reasoning in favor of the bill emphasized that rape is not 
about sex, it is a crime of violence, even in marriage, which is an argument designed to 
counter ideas about sex being an expectation in marriage. The San Francisco 
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation argued this point: “Rape is rape regardless of 
the legal relationship of the persons involved. Often battered women suffer this type of 
abuse in addition to other physical and psychological battering. By declaring such abuse a 
crime, A.B. 546 states that our society will not tolerate or condone such violent 
behavior.”388 The Los Angeles Section of the National Council on Jewish Women also 
sent their views to the Senate Judiciary Committee and to Governor Jerry Brown, calling 
for a statute that standardized the crime of rape, regardless of a relationship between 
victim and perpetrator:  
We believe that the nature of the crime of rape is the same no matter who 
the perpetrator and victim are, and that a marriage contract should not be a 
permit to commit violence. . . . Spousal rape is a fact, and victims should 
have full recourse to law. Current law denies wives the protection given to 
other women. It tells them that their only recourse from rape by their 
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spouses is divorce. This new law would recognize that women do not 
cease to be individuals with human rights when they become wives.389  
  
Each of the above-noted supporters of the marital rape bill challenged a traditional 
justification for insulating men from legal action if they had raped their wives. Supporters 
argued that the law should protect women as victims regardless of their marital status.  
  Opposition to A.B. 546 was as plentiful as the support. One line of opposition 
attempted to be sympathetic to the cause of domestic violence, but argued that it was an 
issue best left to family courts, rather than criminal courts. The California Attorneys for 
Criminal Justice (CACJ) took this approach: “The fundamental problem with deleting the 
spousal exemption from the rape statute is that it thrusts upon the criminal justice system 
a problem which more appropriately belongs in the courts dealing with domestic relations 
problems.”390 This perspective was indicative of the attitude held by many in the criminal 
justice system – law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and jurists – that domestic 
violence in its many forms was simply a “family matter,” best handled with a cooling-off 
period or on-site counseling by the officers sent to the scene. When cases of domestic 
violence and sexual assault in marriage did make it to family court, which was not often, 
a judge was more likely to scold the male instigator for violent outbreaks in the home 
than to sentence him to any jail time. A promise by the accused that he would not do it 
again was often enough to appease the court.  
 Similarly, the CACJ, joined by the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA), 
acknowledged the importance of addressing domestic violence, but argued that a spousal 
rape statute was not the solution. They argued that passing such a law would “interject 
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the criminal courts into the privacy of the marital bedroom.”391 Four days after the CTLA 
expressed their concern, Assemblyman Mori countered: “Rape is not a sex act to be 
confused with consented sexual activity. Each couple is free to work out their own sexual 
relationship, and this bill is not going to affect that relationship. Rather, it applies when 
the marriage relationship had fallen apart and when trust and caring have ceased.”392 
Similarly, the Los Angeles Section of the National Council on Jewish Women argued: 
“rape is not a sexual crime. It is a crime of violence. Marriage is a sexual relationship, but 
a sexual relationship does not negate the right [of a partner in that marriage] to consent or 
not to consent.”393  
Earlier that year, an editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle had raised the same 
concern about A.B. 546 that the CACJ had: “The problem here is that such a law 
constitutes an invasion by the government of the marital bedroom; a place from which we 
have been largely successful in removing its prurient eye. Those old laws forbidding 
‘crimes against nature’ even between married couples no longer operate. And we are the 
more civilized for that.”394 Assemblyman Mori responded to the editorial with a letter of 
his own, arguing that A.B. 546 did not constitute “an invasion by the government of the 
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marital bedroom.” He added that, “There will be no proverbial policeman under every 
bed, nor would anyone know what goes on in the privacy of the home unless an occupant 
found it necessary to speak out.”395 In further support, legislative analyst Patti Jo McKay 
noted: “the state has an obligation to protect all citizens from crimes of violence and this 
protection should not be withheld because the victim and the perpetrator were legally 
married at the time of the incident.”396 If that meant responding to a claim of spousal rape 
in the marital home, that is what the criminal justice system should be obligated to do. 
 The CACJ and the CTLA raised another argument against Mori’s proposed bill, 
contending that current laws provided for recourse in a case of sexual assault by a spouse: 
assault and battery. Neither group referred to such an incident as sexual assault or spousal 
rape, preferring to use terms like assault, battery, or assault with a deadly weapon. One 
has to wonder if this preference was borne out of practicality or avoidance. From a 
practical perspective, the alternate charges of assault and battery had a long history in the 
legal system with plenty of case law behind them; at the same time, falling back on 
preexisting terms made it possible for these groups to avoid addressing the idea of rape in 
marriage. A private citizen, who identified himself only by first name, in a letter to 
Governor Brown, provided a more politically-charged example of this argument: 
“Legislative passage of this bill is just another example of the power that groups which 
claim to be oppressed have in this state. This bill is simply a device by feminists who 
look upon the penis as a tool of the oppressor to punish men with a bill that only applies 
to them. As such it should be vetoed and use of force in marital acts should be handled 
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under assault and battery laws.”397 Of note, the letter’s semi-anonymous author does not 
deny that men sometimes use force in intimate relations with their wives. His only 
concern seems to be that feminists and their supporters in the legislature were acting 
“unreasonably vindictive” by holding men responsible for their behavior. 
 Countering the use of assault and battery statutes to prosecute spousal rapists, 
private citizen Barbara Debuse sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
expressing her strong belief that the only present alternative to a spousal rape law was to 
prosecute the sexual assault as “a battery in which it is classified as ‘offensive touching.’” 
She went on to say that this option “is offensive to the dignity of women who have been 
raped by their husbands. . . . ‘Rape cannot be synonymous with touching . . . Rape is a 
very violent crime that violates a woman’s very being.’”398 Another line of reasoning, 
introduced by Patti Jo McKay, suggested that the charge should fit the actual crime. 
Thus, if a man used force and violence to rape his wife, he “should be prosecuted for the 
actual crime that he committed. To say that a man should not be prosecuted for raping his 
wife is to adhere to that barbaric notion that a wife is a man’s property to do with as he 
pleases.”399 This sentiment once again called for the overturning of archaic notions of 
women as chattel. 
 Yet another argument in opposition to A.B. 546, raised by private citizens like 
Mark Keeler, was that enforcing the bill’s provisions could present difficult problems of 
proof, thereby opening the floodgates for many false claims by vindictive wives. Keeler 
put it this way:  
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This is the kind of charge that cannot honestly be proved. . . . Can a man deny he 
has had sex relations with his wife? Hardly. Nobody would believe him. Does the 
wife have bruises on her body which she claims he put there when he raped her? 
Of course she has bruises. The wife can bruise herself very easily, and without 
much pain. Women bruise very easily, very much easier than a man. The slightest 
bump produces a big black and blue spot on a woman. So it’s easy for a wife to 
manufacture false evidence of a rape, and it’s impossible for a husband to 
disprove.400 
 
Had Keeler stopped after the first two sentences, his argument would have appeared more 
legitimate. Keeler fails to acknowledge that prosecutors have the discretion to decide 
when to file criminal charges and when the evidence is too inconclusive to support 
prosecution. This is the standard for any crime, and there is no evidence to suggest that 
prosecutors would establish a separate standard for spousal rape cases. In any event, the 
requirements of the bill undoubtedly would insure that some evidence other than the 
victim’s testimony would be necessary for the case to advance to trial.401  
 Keeler was not satisfied with the legitimate proof argument. He added to it by 
charging: “women are not chattels today. They can easily walk out of their husbands’ 
lives and get divorces if they wish.”402 In his view, to pass A.B. 546 would be giving 
women a vicious weapon with which to punish their husbands. Keeler does not consider 
the financial dependency of many women on their husbands and he never considers 
whether rape of a spouse is possible, whether the perpetrator of rape deserves 
punishment, or that women are victimized in this way. 
 A final strand of opposition raised a constitutional challenge to the law. Arguing 
that marriage is, for the most part, a religious rite, Joseph B. D. Saraceno contended that a 
                                                 
400 Mark Keeler letter to Governor Jerry Brown dated August 25, 1979. Additionally, an undated, 
anonymous letter sent to the Governor from someone in Albion, CA, claimed that the bill was a “set up for 
blackmail” supposedly by women who are angry with their husbands. 
401 See McKay analysis of 20 September 1979.  
402 Ibid. 
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bill making it a crime for husbands to rape their wives was not only a pagan law, but also 
a violation of the First Amendment establishment and free exercise clauses. He went on 
to explain:  
Under Canon Law of the Catholic Church, marriage consent, is mutual consent, 
duly manifested, is a requirement for the Validity of a Marriage. Consent is, “an 
act of the will by which each party gives and accepts a perpetual and exclusive 
right over the body, for acts which are of themselves suitable for the generation of 
Children.” Consent is so essential to the validity of marriage that No Human 
Power can dispense from it or supply it if it is lacking.403 
 
No matter how devout his beliefs, Saraceno failed to acknowledge that rights – even 
those provided in the Constitution and its amendments – are not absolute. Rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution will not allow a person to infringe unduly upon the 
rights of others, nor will they insulate absolutely a person’s criminal behavior.404  
Amid the plethora of public support and opposition to A.B. 546, Governor Brown 
signed the bill into law on September 22, 1979.405 The spousal rape law went into effect 
January 1, 1980.  
Less than ten days later, Frank Martinez became “the first man in California to be 
charged under the new spousal rape law.”406 On January 6, Martinez kidnapped a female 
employee of an El Monte automobile dealership while test-driving a van. The victim later 
testified that Martinez had sexually assaulted her in the ten hours he held her captive. The 
                                                 
403 Joseph B. D. Saraceno letter to Governor Brown dated September 6, 1979, which included a similar 
letter he had sent to the state Senate on 27 August 1979. Saraceno, while passionate in his beliefs, is 
speaking as an individual when addressing Governor Brown, not as a spokesperson for all Catholics or the 
Catholic Church at large.  
404 See, United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)(holding that the solicitation or pandering of child 
pornography is not protected under the First Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008)(limiting the Second Amendment right to bear arms); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919)(holding that words uttered during a time of war that created a ‘clear and present danger’ were not 
protected under the First Amendment); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)(in which the 
Court upheld the internment of those of Japanese descent by declaring that the nation’s right to protect 
against espionage during a time of war outweighed individual rights). 
405 The bill passed in the Assembly by a margin of 55 to 16. In the Senate, the vote was 27-6. 
406 Russell, Rape in Marriage, 366. 
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next day, Martinez went to the South El Monte home of his estranged wife, Rena, forced 
her into the van and drove off. When police officers arrested Martinez on January 8, Rena 
told police investigators that her husband had raped her four times. The Los Angeles 
County District Attorney’s Office charged Martinez with four counts of spousal rape, five 
counts of (non-spousal) rape and one count of oral copulation with the other woman, two 
counts of kidnapping, and one count of grand theft.407 Upon being found guilty, 
“Martinez was sentenced to 16 years in prison. . . . Without a spousal rape charge, 
Martinez might have received a sentence of four years for the battery and kidnap of his 
wife,” explained Reggie Yates, the deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County who 
successfully prosecuted Martinez.408  
The case of Frank Martinez, as well as other defendants charged and convicted 
that year, demonstrated a need for a spousal rape law in California. According to the 
Lodi, California, News-Sentinel, police arrested at least 15 men for the sexual assault of 
their wives in 1980. In most of the cases, the couples were living apart at the time of the 
offense and the alleged assaults were brutal.409  
Despite arrests and prosecutions under the new spousal rape law, legislators and 
members of the public realized that the law had room for improvement. In the years that 
followed, California legislators amended P.C. § 262 eight times. These amendments 
better defined spousal rape to comport with the language of P.C. § 261 (rape) and 
addressed consent, sentencing, and reporting.410  
                                                 
407 Bill Hazlett, “Man Gets 16 Years in Spousal Rape,” Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1980; Russell, 
Rape in Marriage.  
408 “New state law on rape still hot topic of dispute,” Lodi News-Sentinel, December 29, 1980.  
409 Ibid. 
410 Amendments not relevant to the current discussion addressed restitution paid by those convicted of 
spousal rape. A 1992 amendment to § 262 (A.B. 2439, introduced by Assemblywoman Hilda Solis) 
addressed restitution by the perpetrator. As a condition of parole/probation, the individual would have to 
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Consent 
The first provision attracting legislative attention regarded consent by the victim, 
determined often by the extent to which the victim resisted the attack. Over the next 
fifteen years, legislators and victim advocates frequently faced off on the issue of 
consent. The eventual result was an amended statute recognizing the numerous reasons 
why a rape victim might not put up a fight and preventing a lack of resistance from 
protecting rapists. Notably, the pace by which the legislature reached such a standard for 
spousal rape victims was often out of step with that for non-spousal rape victims. 
Additionally, as the following example demonstrates, some instances of sexual violence 
endured by spousal victims did not meet the legal definition of spousal sexual assault 
until a 1995 amendment became operative.  
Mrs. S., a seventy-three year old bedridden stroke victim, lived at home. Her 
husband was her primary caregiver. The home health aide that visited the family home 
observed marks on Mrs. S.’s wrists and ankles. Further examination revealed unexplained 
vaginal bleeding. When asked about these symptoms, Mrs. S. became agitated. The home 
health aide contacted elder protective services to report possible abuse. That agency 
dispatched a social worker to investigate. During the course of the interview, Mrs. S. 
revealed that several times a week her husband would tie her wrists and ankles to the bed 
and rape her. Upon learning this, the social worker attempted to have Mrs. S. moved to a 
nursing home. Mrs. S. refused, and because she was legally competent, social services 
respected her decision. However, the social worker continued to visit regularly, trying to 
                                                 
provide payments to a woman’s shelter and/or reimburse his victim for the cost of counseling and other 
expenses related to the spousal abuse. A 1996 amendment to § 262 (A.B. 2898, introduced by 
Assemblyman Bowler), also made changes to the administration of the California Victims of Crime 
Restitution Fund. 
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understand why Mrs. S. would remain with her husband. In time, Mrs. S. revealed that 
her husband was pressuring her to stay by threatening to rape the couple’s 
granddaughters if she relocated. Mrs. S. truly believed that she was protecting her 
grandchildren by staying with her abusive husband.411 Despite the heinous nature of her 
husband’s behavior, under California law prosecutors could not classify the repeated 
sexual assaults endured by Mrs. S. as spousal rape until 1995. Mrs. S.’s situation 
highlights a number of issues demonstrating the complexity of consent.  
Revisions to the spousal rape law began in 1980, the same year the bill went into 
effect. Responding to concern raised by the Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment 
Center, Assemblyman Mel Levine introduced Assembly Bill 2899, which sought to 
eliminate the resistance element in rape legislation that was used to demonstrate an 
absence of victim consent.412 In 1980, to get a conviction for rape, a prosecutor had to 
prove either that the victim had resisted the attack and that resistance was overcome by 
force or violence, or that the victim had been prevented from resisting because of threats 
of great and immediate bodily harm that were accompanied by the apparent power of 
execution.413 This last provision – apparent power of execution – later proved especially 
significant, as cases hinged on whether the victim’s fear of imminent harm was 
                                                 
411 Laura X provided this case study to the California legislature in 1993. Laura X cited it as an excerpt 
from a chapter in Elder Sexual Abuse: The Ultimate Taboo by Holly Ramsey-Klawsnik and Malcolm Holt, 
which was to be published by Jessica Kingsley Publishers. While both Ramsey-Klawsnik and Holt went on 
scholarly careers with a focus on elder abuse and elder law, neither published a work with the title 
suggested by Laura X.  
412 Created in 1974, the Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center is now joint partners with the 
UCLA Medical Center. Nationally recognized for its treatment, prevention and education programs, the 
Rape Treatment Center has provided over 30,000 victims with comprehensive care at no charge over its 
forty-year lifespan. At the time Assemblyman Levine introduce A.B. 2899, the Treatment Center had 
served over 2,000 sexual assault victims.  
413 As applied in this situation, power of execution means that the victim believes that her attacker has the 
power to fulfill the threats that he is using to overcome any resistance she might exhibit. A.B. 2899 bill 
description as amended April 7, 1980.  
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reasonable. In other words, did the woman believe her husband had the ability to fulfill 
his threats?414 From its inception, A.B. 2899 was meant to apply equally to both 
California Penal Codes §261 and §262. Thus, there was no distinction made for acts 
involving spousal rape.415  
These proposed changes were significant, acknowledging that failure to resist 
does not indicate consent to acts of sexual violence. The revisions sought by A.B. 2899 
were threefold. First, the bill would redefine rape under threat. Rather than demonstrating 
that the victim was unable to resist because of “threats of great bodily harm,” A.B. 2899 
would require proof that the sexual assault was accomplished by means of “fear of 
unlawful bodily injury.” Second, A.B. 2899 would eliminate the requirement that the 
threat of injury be accompanied by the apparent power of execution and instead require 
merely that the victim be in fear. Third, the bill would expand the threats of injury to 
encompass threats to harm individuals other than the victim.416 A woman whose children 
are asleep in a nearby room may not resist her attacker in an attempt to ensure the safety 
of those children. A victim who experiences shock may be immobilized by her fear and 
therefore unable to resist.  
                                                 
414 The language of A.B. 546 also purported to be gender neutral, applying to both male and female 
perpetrators. However, unanswered questions swarmed the state legislature as to the motive of this 
provision. Was it possible for wives to rape their husbands? Was the gender-neutral language simply an 
attempt to avoid equal protection challenges? Was it possible that rape, by definition, was a crime only 
against women in the way that child molestation was a crime committed against a child? These questions 
lingered long after Governor Brown signed A.B. 546 into law; some would be addressed in later 
amendments. 
415 Assembly Ways and Means Committee Staff Analysis dated May 12, 1980.  
416 The intent of the bill was to acknowledge that rapists might overcome their victims’ resistance by 
threatening to harm a loved one, often a child, sibling, parent, etc. A.B. 2899 bill description as amended 
April 7, 1980.  
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Assemblyman Levine’s bill received local and statewide support.417 One line of 
support for A.B. 2899 was that resistance is dangerous and can actually result in greater 
harm to the rape victim. The Los Angeles County Commission on the Status of Women 
pointed out that “resistance to attack may result in greater bodily harm or even death” for 
the victim.418 The Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center cited two studies 
showing that the danger of physical injury – beyond that of the rape itself – actually 
doubles when the victim resists her attacker.419 Los Angeles Talk Radio station KFWB 
News 98 issued an editorial in support of A.B. 2899. In that editorial, Vice President and 
General Manager Frank Oxarart stated: “all of the statistics show that there is a better 
chance of avoiding serious injury if the victim does not resist. But in California the law 
says that the victim must resist – or, the rape may not be prosecuted.”420 
 Another argument in support of A.B. 2899 was that the current rape laws were 
discriminatory, treating rape victims differently than victims of other crimes. The Santa 
Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center explained that the resistance provision in the 
rape statutes was “discriminatory because no other criminal law, including the similar 
                                                 
417 In addition to the Santa Monica Hospital Rape Treatment Center, who spearheaded the bill, the official 
record includes documented support from Women in Politics; the California Attorney General George 
Deukmejian; Los Angeles County; the National Organization for Women; Women Lawyers of Sacramento; 
the Los Angeles County Bar Association; the California District Attorneys Association; the Los Angeles 
Times; the Herald Examiner; Los Angeles District Attorney John Van de Camp; Los Angeles County 
Sheriff Peter Pitchess; Santa Monica Police Chief James F. Keane; the ACLU of Southern California; the 
YWCA of Southern California; and the American Association of University Women.  
418 Cited in a letter to Bob Wilson, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated May 29, 1980, and 
signed by Jerald E. Wheat, Legislative Representative for the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County.  
419 See the editorial “Of Rape and Resistance in the Law,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1980. The first was 
a report released by the U.S. Department of Justice, while the second was issued by the National Institute of 
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research, development and evaluation agency of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice was renamed the 
National Institute of Justice in 1978; however, it is referred to here by its original name as it was in the 
Times editorial. 
420 Frank Oxarart, “Rape – You Shouldn’t Have to Risk Your Life,” Editorial issued on KFWB New 98, 
Los Angeles, July 11 and 12, 1980. 
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offenses of forcible sodomy and oral copulation, requires victim resistance as an element 
of the crime in any situation.”421 To bring the rape statutes in line with the language 
defining other criminal offenses, Levine modeled A.B. 2899 after the “time tested 
robbery statute” that never included resistance as an element of the crime. To do 
otherwise, argued the Rape Treatment Center, would preserve the arbitrary distinction 
between rape and other violent crimes.422 The Los Angeles County Bar Association came 
to the same conclusion after the Association’s ad hoc Rape Legislation Committee 
conducted a six-month study. The Committee’s detailed report concluded that the “victim 
resistance provisions in the rape statutes are discriminatory, antiquated, and may even 
promote a dangerous standard of behavior by victims in some situations.”423 In a 
resolution adopted May 14, 1980, the Association’s Board of Trustees posited that the 
removal of the resistance requirement would “help to educate the public that a rape 
victim has the right not to resist an assailant, without guilt, just as she probably would do 
if she were being robbed.”424 Frank Oxarart ended his KFWB editorial by boldly 
advocating jail time for rapists “regardless of whether the terrified victim risked her life 
to resist.”425 
Advocates for A.B. 2899 also suggested that passage of the amendment might 
lead to greater reporting of and conviction for rape. California Attorney General George 
Deukmejian certainly believed that this was the case. He sent a letter to the members of 
                                                 
421 Undated letter to Senator Bob Wilson from Gail Abarbanel, Director, and Aileen Adams, Legal 
Counsel, for the Rape Treatment Center at Santa Monica Hospital.  
422 Letter to Assemblyman Mel Levine dated June 13, 1980 from Gail Abarbanel, Director, and Aileen 
Adams, Legal Counsel, for the Rape Treatment Center at Santa Monica Hospital.  
423 Letter to Bob Wilson, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated June 5, 1980, and signed by John 
H. Brinsley, Trustee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association. 
424 Attached to the letter noted in the previous footnote was a copy of the Resolution. 
425 Oxarart, “Rape – You Shouldn’t Have to Risk Your Life.”  
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the state Senate Judiciary Committee explaining that at trial rape victims often face 
questioning by defense attorneys during cross-examination that require the victims to 
justify their lack of resistance. This could be a harrowing experience for a victim, 
suggesting that fault remains with a victim who has not put up enough of a fight to 
prevent the rape from occurring. Deukmejian suggested that removing the resistance 
requirement might help to minimize a rape victim’s reluctance to report the crime and 
ease her fear of testifying at the subsequent trial.426 If Deukmejian’s suggestion was 
correct, the natural consequence of removing the resistance requirement would be an 
increase in reporting that would lead to a greater number of prosecutions for rape.427 
While an increase in reporting is important, it is noteworthy that other factors may 
influence a victim’s willingness to report a crime. Therefore, the value of the proposed 
amendment cannot be judged solely on its potential to cause a boost in victim reporting.  
Ultimately, A.B. 2899 faced no opposition, passing unanimously in both the 
Senate and Assembly. This certainly sets the bill apart from the 1979 spousal rape bill. 
However, one has to wonder if members of the California legislature would have readily 
accepted the bill if it applied only toward spousal rape rather than all cases of rape. 
A 1981 amendment to California’s general rape statute fine-tuned the definition 
of rape to further define consent. Under this amendment, rape included an act of 
intercourse that “is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to retaliate in 
the future against the victim or another person, and there is a reasonable possibility that 
                                                 
426 Letter to All Members of the Senate Judiciary dated June 4, 1980 from California Attorney General 
George Deukmejian.  
427 See, Undated letter to Senator Bob Wilson from Gail Abarbanel, Director, and Aileen Adams, Legal 
Counsel, for the Rape Treatment Center at Santa Monica Hospital; Resolution of the Board of Trustees of 
the Los Angeles County Bar Association, adopted May 14, 1980.  
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the perpetrator will execute the threat.”428 The bill further defined “threatening to 
retaliate” to encompass kidnapping or false imprisonment, the inflicting of extreme pain, 
causing serious bodily injury or death. Recognizing the incongruity between these 
statutes, Levine introduced Assembly Bill 3458, the purpose of which was to provide the 
same protection for wives from coerced sexual intercourse by threats of future violence 
as for all other victims.429 The key questions before the California legislature were 
whether spousal rape should include coerced intercourse with a spouse by threat of future 
harm, and if so, whether the criminal justice system should treat that offense as a felony 
under the spousal rape law.  
 Again, while there was significant support for A.B. 3458, there was no 
opposition.430 The bill moved though the Assembly and Senate with little debate before 
receiving unanimous approval in both houses. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. received 
the bill on August 23, and signed it into law twenty-four days later. However, the law did 
not yet go far enough in addressing coercive circumstances in a marriage that may result 
in spousal rape.  
In the 1990s, state legislators further revised the definition of spousal rape in 
recognition of a need to expand the understanding of threats to others and threats of 
future harm. Such amending was necessary, as can be seen in example of Mrs. S. 
presented earlier in this discussion. In 1994, legislation introduced by Senator Milton 
Marks and Assemblyman Diane Martinez, modified P.C. § 261 concerning the issue of 
                                                 
428 Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice report on A.B. 3458, as amended April 12, 1982. 
429 Assemblyman Mel Levine introduced Assembly Bill 1151 in 1981. The California District Attorneys 
Association sponsored the bill.  
430 In addition to the California District Attorneys Association who sponsored the bill, the official record 
includes documented support from the California Attorney General’s Office, the California Peace Officers 
Association, the National Organization for Women, the Woman Lawyers Association, the Legal Affairs 
Unit of the Governor’s Office, the Department of Corrections, and the State Finance Department. 
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consent.431 Additional legislation passed that year “was designed to remove all remaining 
disparities between Penal Code Sections 261 and 262 as they are referenced in other 
sections of the law.”432 Unfortunately, the two amendments relating to consent 
“inadvertently escaped the attention of” the bill designed to do just that. In 1995, S.B. 
208, a bill introduced by State Senator Hilda Solis addressed this omission by forwarding 
the legislative intent “that survivors of rape receive the same protections, whether they 
are married to their perpetrators or not.”433  
Once again attempting to bring the state’s rape laws into accord with the 
experiences of rape victims, S.B. 208 refined the definition of spousal rape to include two 
provisions, both of which related to victim consent. For the purpose of both rape statutes 
(§ 261 and § 262), consent meant “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an 
exercise of free will” where the individual must “act freely and voluntarily and have 
knowledge of the nature of the act or transgression involved.”434 The first provision 
amended existing law “to include a situation where the accused knows or reasonably 
should have known that the victim is unable to resist because they are under the influence 
of an intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or a controlled substance.”435 Previously, to 
negate victim consent, the prosecutor had to prove that the defendant was the one who 
had administered the substance.436 The second provision added spousal rape to the list of 
                                                 
431 Senator Marks introduced S.B. 1351, while Assemblywoman Martinez introduced A.B. 85X. 
432 Senator Dan McCorquodale introduced S.B. 59, the bill calling for the conformity of Penal Code 
Sections 261 and 262. 
433 Letter to Governor Pete Wilson from Senator Hilda Solis dated July 12, 1995; Senator Hilda Solis, 
Assembly Committee on Public Safety Background Information SB 208, which explained the need for and 
the effect of the bill should it be voted into law.  
434 Senate Third Reading of S.B. 208. The Senate vote on the bill was 39-0.  
435 Charles L. Pattillo, Assembly Committee on Appropriations hearing notes, June 21, 1995. 
436 California rape statutes have consistently provided that submission is not consent when the defendant 
knows that the person is unconscious. Interestingly, this has not been the case in all states. In fact, House 
Bill 74, a 2015 bill in the Utah legislature, intended to clarify the state’s rape statute by making it clear that 
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sex offenses in which consent is at issue, noting that any evidence “that the victim 
suggested, requested, or otherwise communicated to the [perpetrator that he] use a 
condom or other birth control devise, without additional evidence of consent, is not 
sufficient to constitute consent.”437 S.B. 208 passed unanimously in both the Senate and 
Assembly, followed by Governor Pete Wilson signing it into law.438 The result was, at 
least for the purposes of consent, spousal and non-spousal rape were the same under 
California sexual assault laws.  
Sentencing 
The second area of concern in the 1979 spousal rape law subject to controversy 
and eventual revision was the provision that allowed flexibility at the point of prosecution 
and sentencing. The law designated marital rape as a wobbler, meaning that those 
arrested for marital rape could be charged with either a felony or a misdemeanor, 
determined solely at the discretion of the prosecutor. If the defendant was charged with a 
felony, sentencing would follow in line with P. C. § 261 (rape), which carried a penalty 
of three, six, or eight years in state prison. In contrast, a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor would face up to one year in county jail. Critics raised concern about the 
                                                 
an unconscious person cannot give consent. The discussion of the bill raised concerns with at least two 
state lawmakers who considered the bright line rule too broad, suggesting that it should not always apply in 
the case of married couples or those with a prior relationship. Annie Knox, “Utah lawmaker questions 
whether sex with an unconscious person is rape ‘in every instance,’” The Salt Lake City Tribune, February 
3, 2015; Glen Mills, “ABC 4 anchor gets personal while testifying for sexual assault consent bill,” Salt 
Lake City, www.good4utah.com, accessed March 1, 2015.  
437 Senate Third Reading of S.B. 208. 
438 Supporters of S.B. 208 included The California Alliance Against Domestic Violence; the California 
Attorney General; the California District Attorneys Office; Haven Women’s Center of Stanislaus; North 
County Counseling Associates; the California Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians; 
the Lost Angeles County District Attorney’s Office; the National Clearinghouse on Marital and Date Rape; 
the Commission on the Status of Women; the San Luis Obispo County Rape Crisis Center; Health Services 
Agency of Modesto; Educational Consulting Services, San Clemente; the Center Against Sexual Assault in 
Hemet; the Government Relations Oversight Committee; the North County Counseling Associates in 
Sunnyvale; the Bridge Counseling Center in Morgan Hill; and Women Escaping a Violent Environment. 
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misdemeanor option, seeing it as a fall back charge when the case was too weak for the 
prosecution to prove the felony offense. Others argued that this provision made it more 
likely that a vindictive spouse could use a rape charge for harassment purposes. 
Additionally, the law provided that men convicted under the spousal rape statute would 
not have to register as sex offenders, although they could be referred for mentally 
disordered sex offender proceedings to determine if they were deemed sexually violent 
predators who should be committed to a mental facility for the protection of the public 
safety.  
Events that occurred just two months after the law went into effect demonstrate 
the flexibility of the spousal rape law. In March 1980, Shasta County law enforcement 
officers in the northern California town of Redding arrested Hughlen “Cliff” Watkins on 
suspicion of “spousal rape, penetration with a foreign object, and sodomy” after receiving 
a call from his wife.439 Catherine Watkins, who had called the police from a women’s 
shelter, reported, “her husband had choked her and forced her to have sex.” He then 
taunted her, challenging her to “call the cops if you want,” before “dropping off to 
sleep.”440 Calling his bluff, Catherine sought the safety of the Shasta County Women’s 
Refuge, reported the rape to police, and filed for divorce from her husband.  
After initially claiming his innocence, Watkins changed his plea to guilty, 
claiming that he did not want his children exposed to the controversy a public trail would 
cause. Even then, however, he was not convinced that what he had done was rape. After 
consideration, he decided that his actions “could be called ‘rape,’ if it’s possible to rape 
                                                 
439 Russell, Rape in Marriage, 367-68. 
440 Ibid. at 268; “Man gets sentence for raping his wife,” The Daily Iowan, September 3, 1980. The Daily 
Iowan, the daily newspaper of Iowa City, Iowa, was only one of many newspapers across the nation that 
printed the UPI story. 
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your own wife.” The Court sentenced Watkins to 240 days in county jail, which was 
slightly less than two-thirds the maximum sentence for misdemeanor spousal rape. He 
also received three years’ probation.441 Had Watkins been charged with felony spousal 
rape rather than the misdemeanor charge, he could have faced up to eight years in prison. 
While the prosecutor acted within the discretion granted by P.C. § 262 when charging 
Watkins with the lesser crime of misdemeanor spousal rape, such decisions would later 
be called into question as activists challenged the legality of the wobbler provision.  
Circumstances like the one highlighted above were a primary reason that then-
Assemblywoman Hilda Solis worked to amend California Penal Code §262 in 1993. That 
year, Solis introduced Assembly Bill 187, the stated purpose of which was to amend the 
definition of spousal rape in order for it to match more closely the definition of rape.442 
Both public policy and constitutional considerations favored the passage of A.B. 187.443 
Within the California legislature, A.B. 187 was one of only two bills that the California 
Women’s Caucus officially endorsed in 1993, an occurrence requiring support from at 
least two-thirds of both Democratic and Republican members of the Caucus. The co-
authorship of the bill by thirty legislators further illustrated this bipartisan support.444 
Public support of the bill was abundant.445  
                                                 
441 “Man gets sentence for raping his wife,” The Daily Iowan, September 3, 1980. Emphasis added by 
author. 
442 Senate Rules Committee, Third Reading of A.B. 187. 
443 As will be discussed later in this chapter, spousal rape laws would be faced with constitutional 
challenges beginning in the 1980s, with particular attention to equal protection rights under Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
444 Letter from Assemblywoman Solis to Governor Pete Wilson, dated September 3, 1993; Letter sent to John 
Burton, Member of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, from Alice Jordon, Associate Director of Marin 
Abused Women’s Services, dated February 19, 1993; City Council of West Hollywood resolution in support 
of A.B. 187, passed on March 1, 1993.  
445 Support for A.B. 187 came from myriad sources. Those not mentioned directly in the text include the 
California Alliance Against Domestic Violence; California Police Chiefs Association; California Police 
Officers Association; the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, District IX; the State of 
California Commission on the Status of Women; the Hispanic American Police Command Officers 
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One objective of A.B. 187 was to eliminate the wobbler provision, thereby 
making all rape cases, including spousal rape, a felony, punishable by three, six, or eight 
years in state prison.446 The League of Women Prosecutors promoted A.B. 187 as manner 
by which to “eliminate the disparity married women raped by their husbands experience 
under existing California law” since a “misdemeanor prosecution does not provide 
adequate sanctions for this crime.”447 The Peace Officers Research Association of 
California supported the passage of A.B. 187, noting “The crime of rape should be the 
same whether the victim is, or isn’t, the spouse of the perpetrator,” promoting the 
elimination of the wobbler provision for spousal rape.448  
The Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office also supported the elimination of the 
wobbler provision. The City Attorney’s Office sent a letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, 
Chair of the Public Safety Committee, advocating the passage of A.B. 187. In that letter, 
Alana Bowman explained that when her office had prosecuted spousal rape cases before 
a jury, “the crime is incomprehensible as a rape when tried at the misdemeanor level. 
                                                 
Association; Laura X, individually and as a representative of the National Clearinghouse on Marital and 
Date Rape; the World Institute of Disability; California Women’s Law Center; the Coalition for Family 
Equity; Los Angeles Women’s Leadership Network; the Junior League of California; Mountain View 
School District; Vera Valdiviez, Vice Mayor of the City of El Monte; Wayne Clayton, Chief of Police for 
the City of El Monte; the City of Azusa; Men Evolving Nonviolently; San Diego Domestic Violence 
Council; the Northern California Coalition for Battered Women and their Children; Marin Abused 
Women’s Services; Los Angeles Commission on Assaults Against Women; and Sandra Blair, Family Law 
Specialist. 
446 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of A.B. 187 as used in the Committee hearing on June 29, 
1993.  
447 Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Judith Levin, Co-Chair 
Legislative Committee, dated March 11, 1993. The League of Women Prosecutors represented female 
prosecutors from the offices of City Attorneys, District Attorneys, and the Attorney General. The previous 
year, the League of Women Prosecutors had sent a letter to Assemblywoman Roybal-Allard advocating a 
different tactic, one in which they proposed the complete elimination of P. C. § 262 and the amending of P. 
C. § 261 to include the married persons. Letter sent by Alana Bowman on February 25, 1992. 
448 Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Skip Murphy, President 
of the Peace Officers Research Association of California, dated February 16, 1993. A verbatim copy of this 
letter was sent to Hilda Solis on 16 February; a similar letter was sent to Robert Presley, Chair of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, dated July 20, and to Senator Bill Lockyer on June 22. 
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Juries simply do not take the case seriously, believing that, if the rape had actually 
occurred, it would surely have been tried as a felony.”449 She furthered her argument by 
questioning the logic of the wobbler provision. “Many California citizens choose to live 
together in domestic partnerships. If a rape occurs within this relationship, even though 
the parties have cohabitated for years, the crime must be filed as a felony. However, if a 
married couple separates but fail to obtain a divorce, a rape in that relationship could be 
filed as a misdemeanor.”450 Bowman’s explanation highlighted the arbitrary nature of the 
wobbler provision, suggesting that it could result in very different outcomes for similar 
crimes because of nothing more than marital status, regardless of the living arrangements 
of rape victims and their abusers. 
Three months later, Bowman sent a letter to Senator Bill Lockyer, Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, again as a representative of the Los Angeles City Attorney’s 
Office. In that letter, she described disparity of treatment for the victims of spousal rape 
when the state prosecutes the case as a misdemeanor, arguing that misdemeanor cases do 
not receive the time, effort, or resources that are available for felony prosecutions. 
“Misdemeanor prosecutors do not benefit from the resources enjoyed by felony 
prosecutors, especially the assistance of [District Attorney] staff investigators, to permit a 
thorough preparation for trial in these challenging cases.”451 Bowman also argued that 
felony sentencing could reduce the number of future instances of rape and the need for 
prosecution. Notably, she did not promote the idea of rehabilitation for the rapist while in 
                                                 
449 Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Alana Bowman Deputy 
Los Angeles City Attorney, for James K. Hahn, City Attorney, dated March 11, 1993. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Letter to Senator Bill Lockyer, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, from Alana Bowman, Deputy 
Los Angeles City Attorney, for James Hahn, City Attorney, dated June 10, 1993.  
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prison. Rather, she contended that incarceration itself prevented future crime and reduced 
the need for prosecution: “Prison terms prevent recidivism by this rapist just as 
appropriate prison terms prevent other categories of rapists from repeating their crimes; 
both spousal rapists and stranger rapists are among the highest recidivists.”452 Bowman 
ended by arguing that passage of A.B. 187 “would simply extend to married persons the 
rights over their own bodies that non-marital persons possess under the existing rape 
statute.”  
While the elimination of the wobbler provision sought to close the gap between 
general rape and spousal rape, A.B. 187 simultaneously created yet another distinction. 
The bill allowed for felony probation in spousal rape cases, a sentence not possible in the 
case of rape generally. Penal Code § 261 specified that rape is an offense for which 
felony probation may not be imposed. This provision within § 262 was the result of a 
compromise reached between lawmakers and the California District Attorneys 
Association (CDAA).453  
Some supporters of A.B. 187 saw the elimination of the wobbler provision as tied 
to public education on rape. The Humboldt Women for Shelter (HWS) in Eureka, 
California, believed that A.B. 187 would “send a clear message that violence against any 
woman, regardless of marital status, will not be tolerated. It also supports a woman’s 
right to say ‘no’ and to have that ‘no’ acknowledged, regardless of marital status.” The 
HWS tied spousal rape to the broader issue of domestic violence, suggesting that the bill 
“would be a strong affirmation that safety begins in the home, pointing to the accelerating 
                                                 
452 Ibid. 
453 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of A.B. 187 as used in the Committee hearing on June 29, 
1993; Letter from Assemblywoman Solis to Governor Pete Wilson, dated September 3, 1993, encouraging 
him to sign the bill into law.  
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progress made by the California State Legislature regarding domestic violence and 
related issues.”454 In defense of the bill, Tri-Valley Haven for Women maintained that 
A.B. 187 would send “a strong and clear message to the public that spousal rape is a 
serious crime that will not be tolerated or minimized,” by bringing “the definition of and 
penalties for spousal rape in line with those for other kinds of rape.”455 The North County 
Rape Crisis and Child Protection Center promoted the use of A.B. 187 to dispel the long-
held myth that husbands “have a ‘sexual right’ to their wives at any time. . . . [By] 
eliminating the distinction between rape and spousal rape, [A.B. 187] would not only 
help survivors of spousal rape in reporting the crime since they would know it will be 
considered a serious crime, but [would] also . . . help the general public to realize that 
rape is rape no matter who the offender is.”456 Such sentiments echoed the message of 
other domestic violence and sexual assault advocates within California and across the 
country. However, each of these advocates acknowledged an important fact – simply 
passing a law making rape in marriage a crime does not mean that all potential victims 
(or perpetrators) will be cognizant of the legislation. 
The personal story of Rana Lee illustrates the importance of educating the public 
about all forms of domestic violence, including spousal rape. Rana Lee grew up in an 
upper middle-class family in Boston. She met her first husband while a sophomore in 
college. The two were together for eighteen years, during which time Lee described her 
husband as emotionally but not physically abusive. Even so, she described incidents 
                                                 
454 Letter sent to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee from Sheri Johnson of 
Humboldt Women for Shelter, dated February 16, 1993. 
455 Undated letter sent to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Vicki Gordon 
of Tri-Valley Haven for Women. 
456 Letter to Assemblywoman Hilda Solis from Rebecca O’Donnell Hauge, Hotline Coordinator, dated March 
9, 1993. Hauge sent a similar letter to Bill Lockyer on July 15, 1993. 
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where he hit walls, broke doors, and threw things at Lee and their three children. Her 
parents encouraged her to find a way to make the marriage work. It was only after a move 
to Los Angeles and her husband’s imprisonment for selling fraudulent futures that Lee 
found the courage to file for divorce. The year she divorced her first husband, Lee met 
the man who would become her second. At first, he appeared charming, saying that he 
would help her raise her children. Unfortunately, despite such promises, there would be 
no happily ever after. Instead, he introduced Lee to cocaine and excessive drinking.457 
Physical violence and sexual abuse accompanied the drinking and drug use, which 
involved not only cocaine, but also marijuana and the prescription drug valium. Lee does 
not remember how many times her husband raped her, but she will never forget the first 
time:  
On my wedding night, he threw me against the bathroom sink, pushed me onto 
my knees and forced me to perform humiliating, outrageous sex for hours, pulling 
my hair to the roots and slamming my head into the sink when I fought him. I 
begged him to stop, but he refused, dragging me to the bed and lying on me for 
what seemed ages. I fought, and I cried, and he laughed. He told me he was the 
boss and I now belonged to him, and he would hurt me and my children if I did 
not behave.458  
 
For the next three and a half years, Lee suffered beatings and rape at the hands of her 
husband. Unaware at the time, Lee later learned that her husband also had raped her 
fourteen-year-old daughter. Finally, with the help of friends, Lee left her husband and 
relocated to the San Francisco Bay Area. Although P.C. § 262 had been in effect for two 
                                                 
457 “Women, Violence, and the Law,” Hearing held before the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and 
Families, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, first session, Washington, D.C., September 
16, 1987. 
458 Ibid.; Donovan, “When A Husband Rapes His Wife,” supra, note 2. 
 161 
 
years, Lee did not report the crime to law enforcement. She did not know that she 
could.459  
Despite the volatile relationships she endured, Lee considers herself a survivor. 
With the support of close friends and years of therapy, she was able to rebuild her life. 
She became a community education specialist, presenting programs on family violence to 
teenagers and hosting a radio talk show about domestic violence. In 1987, she testified 
before a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on the topic of “Women, Violence, 
and the Law.”460 One message that she shared before the House subcommittee and in 
speaking engagements was the need for education. She testified that “most California 
women don’t know that marital rape is against the law there. . . . Women must be 
educated about their rights and the judicial system must ‘support the woman who presses 
charges – not discourage her.’”461 Some variation of this message is what Lee shared in 
her prevention work with teenagers across the Bay Area, and with a national audience as 
she appeared on television news programs.462 Each time she spoke before a new 
audience, she demonstrated that surviving domestic violence is possible with knowledge, 
support, and determination.  
Assembly Bill 187 also addressed the issue of sentencing fairness related to 
disparities in mandated sex offender registration. When Assemblywoman Solis 
introduced A.B. 187, state law did not mandate that a convicted spousal rapist register 
with local law enforcement. However, the law required those convicted for other types of 
                                                 
459 Ibid. 
460 Jill Lawrence, “Battered wives charge double standard,” The Telegraph, Nashua, New Hampshire, 
September 18, 1987; “Women, Violence, and the Law,” House subcommittee hearing.  
461 Lawrence, “Battered wives charge double standard.” 
462 Lee appeared on a variety of broadcast news shows – the Today Show, Hour Magazine, and NBC 
Nightly News – to discuss her prevention work with teens. “Women, Violence, and the Law,” House 
subcommittee hearing. 
 162 
 
sex offenses, including non-spousal rape, to register as sex offenders. A.B. 187 “would 
require persons convicted of spousal rape to register as a sex offender where the offense 
was accomplished by means of force or violence.”463 The limitations imposed on the 
registration provision of A.B. 187 reflected an additional compromise between 
lawmakers and the CDAA. Once again, like the early wobbler statutes, the implication 
was that not all spousal rapists would face the same sanctions. Those sentenced only to 
felony probation, and no prison time, would be exempt from the sex offender registration 
requirement.464  
Amid all of the support for A.B. 187’s attempt to unify punishments between non-
spousal and spousal rape, four organizations raised similar objections to the bill. These 
groups wanted to empower prosecutors and judges with greater discretion to charge, try, 
and sentence spousal rapists rather than eliminating the wobbler provision. The California 
Public Defenders Association (CPDA) preferred that judges retain more independence in 
sentencing spousal rapists. As the CPDA saw it: “judges should be allowed discretion to 
view each case as unique, responding to the facts of that case and not what might be 
imagined in the Halls of the State Capitol.”465 Members of the California Attorneys for 
Criminal Justice (CACJ) preferred prosecutors have the discretion to charge suspects 
with misdemeanors in some spousal rape cases, differentiating them from stranger rape. 
                                                 
463 Letter from Assemblywoman Solis to Governor Pete Wilson, dated September 3, 1993; Letter sent to 
Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from Nancy K. D. Lemon, Co-Chair of the 
Family Law Committee of CAADV, dated March 4, 1993. 
464 Letter from Assemblywoman Solis to Governor Pete Wilson, dated September 3, 1993. Notably, the 
California District Attorneys Association had opposed A.B. 2220 (Roybal-Allard) the previous year until 
that bill was amended to reflect similar compromise to the portions involving the wobbler provision and 
sex offender registration. Letter to Assemblywoman Lucille Roybal-Allard by Michael Sweet, 
representative of the CDAA, on June 22, 1992. 
465 Letter sent to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from David Nagler of 
Nossman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, attorneys for the CPDA, dated March 12, 1993. Nagler sent copies of the 
letter to Assemblywoman Solis and the other members of the Public Safety Committee. 
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For example, a prosecutor might make such a choice when the victim is uncooperative “if 
it means her husband could be sent to state prison” and the case would otherwise have to 
be dismissed.466 The CACJ indicated that it would support the remaining portions of A.B. 
187 if amended to retain the wobbler provision of the spousal rape law. Such an 
amendment, however, would be counterproductive to the intent of the bill. The 
amendment would maintain the distinction between spousal rape and non-spousal rape, 
allowing the prosecutor the discretion to consider an act to be a misdemeanor that would 
be a felony if the victim were not the spouse of the perpetrator. Furthermore, it would fail 
to acknowledge that such discretion was not available for crimes charged under P.C. § 
261, even though victims may be unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution of those 
crimes.  
The Committee on Moral Concerns and the Traditional Values Coalition both 
opposed A.B. 187 because they found the bill to be overly broad as applied to married 
couples. Both groups relied on the traditional notions of consent as forwarded by Sir 
Matthew Hale: marriage requires consent of both parties, and that consent freely given 
includes a general presumption of mutual consent to sexual intercourse.467 The 
Traditional Values Coalition contended: “Though a general presumption of consensual 
sex exists by the act of marriage, it is reasonable to assume that non-consensual sex could 
occur during a substance-altered state. While lack of good judgment is not a protected 
line of defense, neither spouse should be penalized for a normal act which may have or 
                                                 
466 Letter sent to Assemblywoman Solis from Melissa K. Nappan, Legislative Advocate for the California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, dated March 9, 1993. 
467 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of A.B. 187 as used in the Committee hearing on June 29, 
1993; Letter to Bill Lockyer from Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, Chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, 
dated June 28, 1993. For more about Sir Matthew Hale’s position on irrevocable consent in marriage, 
please see the introduction and chapter 1. 
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would have occurred under more controlled marital circumstances.”468 On a related note, 
the Committee on Moral Concerns argued: A.B. 187 “would make a husband (or wife) 
guilty of a felony if intercourse took place while one was ‘unconscious of the nature of 
the act.’ Such a mental state would most often occur from serious intoxication, and is not 
the best of circumstances, but within marriage it should not be a felony.” Notably, neither 
of these objections denied that rape might happen in marriage. Rather, they proposed to 
classify such actions as something other than felony rape because of the relationship 
between the parties.  
Additionally, the Traditional Values Coalition expressed concern that the 
definition of spousal rape proposed by A.B. 187 presented the potential for manipulation 
or false reporting by spouses. As they explained: “There is nothing preventing one 
spouse, short of verifiable fraud, from deliberately staging or falsifying an incident of 
spousal rape. As many divorces are bitter with both sides holding a personal, emotional 
and financial stake in the outcome, one spouse could utilize the provision of AB 187 for 
retribution of real or perceived marital injustice or for financial leverage.”469 While 
acknowledging that such manipulation was not the norm, the Traditional Values 
Coalition stressed that the potential did exist. They added that they fully supported 
individuals whose bodies had been violated, even “spouses who have been subjected to 
legitimate spousal rape.”470 In the latter case, however, the Coalition believed that current 
laws would suffice. 
                                                 
468 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of A.B. 187 as used in the Committee hearing on June 29, 
1993. 
469 Letter to Bill Lockyer from Rev. Louis P. Sheldon. 
470 Notably, the Traditional Values Coalition did not clarify what they meant by “legitimate spousal rape” 
or how a prosecutor or judge should distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims. Such terminology was 
not limited to the Coalition, to California, or to 1993. In 2012, Todd Akin, a member of the House of 
Representative from Missouri, made a comment about “legitimate rape” in a discussion about pregnancy 
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Despite opposition, the amendment to eliminate the wobbler provision provided 
by A.B. 187 became law following a 27 to 7 vote in the Senate and a vote of 68 to 3 in 
the Assembly. Governor Wilson signed the bill into law on September 29, 1993. 
Thereafter, spousal rape would be a felony.471 
Reporting Requirements 
The third provision of the spousal rape law subject to several amendments 
addressed reporting requirements. When the spousal rape law was passed in 1979, the 
language of P.C. § 262 provided: “no arrest or prosecution for spousal rape may be made 
unless the act is reported to a peace officer or district attorney within 30 days after the act 
occurred.”472 The implementation of such a reporting requirement created a virtual thirty-
day statute of limitations because crimes reported after that time would not be 
prosecutable, putting victims of this crime at a serious disadvantage. In contrast, the 
statute of limitations for non-spousal rape was six years. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, spousal rape was the only sexually-based offense that had a reporting 
requirement. The 1997 spousal rape case of Antonio Trujillo Garcia illustrates the 
importance of eliminating the reporting requirement.  
                                                 
and abortion. The comment proved so controversial and inflammatory that Akin withdrew from the 
senatorial race. See, John Eligon and Michael Schwirtz, “Senate Candidate Provokes Ire with ‘Legitimate 
Rape’ Comment,” New York Times August 19, 2012; Charlotte Atler, “Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s 
Wrong with Saying ‘Legitimate Rape,’” Time July 17, 2014. 
471 Despite the elimination of the wobbler provision in the spousal rape statute, other crimes involving 
intimate partner violence remain classified as wobblers in California. For instance, California Penal code § 
273.5 makes it illegal to injure a spouse, cohabitant or fellow parent in an act of domestic violence. While 
the opening language of the statute indicates that this action constitutes a felony, a prosecutor has the 
discretion to determine whether to charge the defendant with a misdemeanor or felony, weighing such 
factors as the defendant’s criminal history, the severity of the offense, and the circumstances or details of 
the case. Furthermore, the statute gives judges the discretion to waive the mandatory prison sentence for a 
felony conviction. California Penal Code § 273.5(3). 
472 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of S.B. 635.  
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Garcia had been married to E.G., who in 1995 separated from her husband after 
fourteen years of marriage. At that time, the court had issued a domestic violence 
temporary restraining order (TRO) that required Garcia to stay at least fifty yards away 
from E.G. and to provide at least twenty-four hours’ notice to arrange visitation with their 
two children. Garcia violated the order twice the day he received the TRO by going to 
E.G.’s house. Once law enforcement officers located him, Garcia agreed to comply with 
the order. However, he did not. He threatened E.G., saying that she would “pay” if she 
did not take him back. Thereafter, Garcia frequently violated the TRO.473  
On at least three occasions, E.G. called the police to report instances in which 
Garcia had violated the restraining order. The first occurred when he approached her at 
church, but that attempt was thwarted when an eleven-year-old female witness called the 
police. In the second instance, Garcia chased E.G. through a wooded area as she was 
returning home from work, but she escaped. The third time, Garcia went to E.G.’s house, 
banged on the window to get in, and again warned her that she would be sorry if she did 
not take him back. In this instance, the police came to the residence, found Garcia hiding 
in a crawl space, and arrested him.474 
Thirty-eight days after his arrest, Garcia intensified his efforts to harass E.G. and 
to make true his promise to make her pay. As E.G. walked home from work, passing the 
same wooded area in which Garcia had chased her, she was struck from behind:  
Someone placed a hand over her mouth and then gagged her with a handkerchief. 
Her hands were bound behind her back and she was knocked to the ground. E.G. 
then saw defendant and another man, whom she did not recognize, standing over 
her. The two men pulled her pants down and pulled her blouse up. Defendant then 
fondled her breasts and raped her. He turned to the other man and said, ‘Now 
fucker this is your turn.... I don't like this woman.’ The other man then raped her. 
                                                 
473 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1325 (2001). 
474 Ibid.  
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The men laughed and threatened to have a gang of ‘[C]holos’ rape her if she 
reported the assault to the police. The men fled; she freed herself and walked 
home.475 
 
Scared, E.G. returned home. After showering and feeding her children, she attended an 
evening class at a nearby school. Garcia showed up outside the classroom and verbally 
harassed E.G. She called the police; when they arrived, she noted the TRO and asked that 
the officers arrest Garcia. She did not report the rape.476 E.G. filed for divorce the 
following month, but this did not end Garcia’s harassment. He was arrested twice more 
for violating the TRO, once for striking her in the face when in the company of another 
man, J.O.  
A year later, she married J.O. She then confided in him about the rape. Thereafter, 
she reported the rape to the police, fifteen months after the rape had occurred. When 
Garcia was interviewed by the police, he first denied having sexual contact with E.G. 
after their separation, but later revised his statement to say that they had had consensual 
sex one time – a time that coincided with the date E.G. said she was raped. At trial, 
Garcia admitted: 
[T]hat he did not want the separation and that he had violated the restraining order 
several times. He also admitted pleading guilty to three counts of violating the 
restraining order and one count of assault against her. Defendant denied raping 
E.G. or threatening her in any way. He said they had engaged in one act of 
consensual sex soon after they had separated . . . He also explained other 
violations of the restraining order as inadvertent, as when he saw E.G. . . . at the 
school because he was watching his son play soccer. He insisted the girl who 
testified to the incident at the church was lying, as was E.G. He also denied 
striking her in the face even though he had admitted pleading guilty to the 
assault.477 
 
                                                 
475 Ibid., 1326. 
476 At trial, E.G. testified that her omission was the result of fear and embarrassment.  
477 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1327. 
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The jury found Garcia guilty. Garcia later appealed his conviction based upon the 
reporting requirement in place at the time of his trial.  
 When deliberating the 1979 spousal rape law, the California legislature relied on 
historical justifications to support the thirty-day reporting requirement, noting precedent 
from at least three sources. Interestingly, the sources relied upon were from thirteenth, 
fifteenth, and eighteenth-century England. The first piece of evidence came from the 
reign of King Henry II (r. 1216-1272), during which time the law required “that the 
woman should immediately after [the rape] go to the next town, and there make 
discovery to some credible persons of the injury she has suffered; and afterwards should 
acquaint the high constable of the hundred, the coroners, and the sheriff with the 
outrage.”478 According to Sir William Blackstone, eighteenth-century English jurist, the 
purpose of this requirement was to prevent malicious accusations.479  
 The second form of evidence dated from the rule of Edward IV (r. 1461-1470). 
During that period “a statute was adopted by Parliament requiring the rape to be reported 
within 40 days, and if the victim failed to report it within that period, the crime would be 
treated as a simple trespass,” reflecting the historical “woman as man’s property” 
viewpoint.480 The third precedent came from the time of Blackstone. In 1769, there was 
no codified reporting limitation; however, Blackstone noted: “the jury will rarely give 
credit to a stale complaint,” suggesting that to be taken seriously, a victim’s report should 
be made sooner rather than later.481 What is interesting about each of these examples is 
                                                 
478 Ibid.  
479 Blackstone is notable for his Commentaries on the Laws of England, published between 1765 and 1769. 
The content of those commentaries were highly influential to future laws in England and her territories, 
including the area that would become the United States.  
480 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of S.B. 635. 
481 Ibid. 
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that during the five centuries they represent, rape in marriage was not a legal possibility. 
Thus, the references must have applied to instances of non-spousal rape. As such, when 
the California legislators chose to rely on the English examples, they made the conscious 
decision to apply them to a crime that did not exist when the precedent was established. 
In time, California legislators would acknowledge that each of these justifications was as 
outdated as those for irrevocable consent or the spousal rape exemption remaining in 
common law.  
When California passed P.C. § 262 in 1979, American jurisdictions had started to 
question the reasonableness of the theory of irrevocable consent in marriage. In an 
attempt to bolster the confidence of jury members in spousal rape cases, California 
legislators conceived a modern justification for a reporting requirement for that crime. As 
approved by the legislature, the spousal rape law “added the 30-day reporting 
requirement to increase the probability that the reported act of spousal abuse actually 
occurred, and that the report was not merely an attempt by one spouse to injure another 
during a marital or post-marital conflict.”482 On the surface, the requirement might appear 
to address a legitimate state concern – that is, the prevention of alleged victims filing 
fraudulent reports. However, upon closer review, the requirement effectively singled out 
as untrustworthy married women, promoting the image of vengeful, mercenary wives in 
search of better divorce settlements.483 A statement made by an Oregon District Attorney 
                                                 
482 Senate Committee on Judiciary Report. 
483 In a letter from Jodie Berger, Coordinator of the Women’s History Research Center, to Senator 
McCorquodale dated April 23, 1983, Berger suggests that another fear that led to the reporting requirement 
was that women would claim rape by their husbands to support their request that Medicaid pay for 
abortions. Here she was referring to abortions that would have been illegal under the Hyde Amendment 
passed in 1976, a law passed by pro-life legislators in an attempt to limit the authority of Roe v. Wade 
(1973). The Hyde Amendment severely limited situations under which federal money could be used to fund 
abortions. The version of the law in force from 1981 through 1993 prohibited the use of federal funds for 
abortions except where carrying a fetus to term would endanger the life of the mother. In 1993, the “life of 
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asked about California’s reporting requirement supported this proposition. Peter 
Sandrock concluded: “California added the 30-day reporting requirements less out of a 
concern for the problems of prosecution than out of the fear that unless some restrictions 
were enacted, vindictive women would use the charge as a weapon against their 
husbands.”484 At the time, legislators did not acknowledge the flaw in such reasoning. 
Any criminalization of an act might lead to false reporting; however, this of course is not 
a reason not to criminalize wrongdoing. 
 Activists saw the reporting requirement as an unrealistic barrier to the legitimate 
prosecution of spousal rape. They cited examples of cases where law enforcement could 
verify allegations of spousal rape; however, prosecutors could not pursue charges against 
perpetrators because the reporting time had passed.485 In 1983, California State Senator 
Daniel McCorquodale addressed this concern when he introduced S.B. 635, the stated 
purpose of which was to “repeal the 30-day reporting requirement, and make an act of 
spousal rape (as with other sex crimes) prosecutable any time within six years after its 
commission . . . and to increase the number of prosecutions of spousal rape.”486 Support 
for the bill was plentiful and proponents championed their cause with three general 
arguments, while limited opposition relied on a single claim.  
                                                 
the mother” exception was amended to also cover abortions where the pregnancy was the result of rape or 
incest. See, Pub. L. No. 94-439, §. 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 
1460 (1977); Pub. L. No.101-166, § 204, 103 STAT. 1177 (1989); Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 STAT. 
113 (1993). 
484 Letter to Kathy Wilcox of Senator McCorquodale’s office from Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney 
for Benton County, Oregon, dated May 9, 1983. 
485 Assembly Committee on Criminal Law and Public Safety overview of S.B. 635.  
486 Senate Committee on Judiciary Report. While the original intent of the bill was to eliminate the 
reporting requirement, that would not be the effect of the bill that was passed by the legislature and signed 
into law by then Governor George Deukmejian.  
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 Supporters argued that the thirty-day reporting requirement stymied the original 
intent of the spousal rape law. The California Attorney General’s Office (AGO) justified 
the elimination of the reporting requirement. That office explained that in passing P.C. § 
262, the state legislature acknowledged that spousal rape can and does occur, and the 
legislative body had criminalized that conduct. Speaking directly to the reporting 
requirement, the AGO maintained that:  
Having formally acknowledged and defined the crime of spousal rape, there is no 
justification for setting up different standards for arrest and prosecution; the 30-
day requirement makes the crime seem needlessly suspect. SB 635 will put 
spousal rape on a footing with all forms of sexual assault.487 
 
The judges of the Santa Clara County Municipal Court supported this sentiment. 
Presiding Judge Nancy Hoffman explained that to impose a short reporting time for 
spousal rape is unreasonable when it did not exist for any other penal code violation. She 
went on to say the thirty-day reporting requirement “unfairly bars prosecutors from 
introducing evidence of attacks that fall outside the reporting period.”488 Nine judges 
from that court contended that the “present 30-day reporting requirement is impractical 
and frustrates the effective implementation if [sic] the spousal rape law.”489 In support of 
their assertion, the judges provided an example of an offender who had rendered his 
victim unconscious for a period greater than a month following an instance of spousal 
rape. Such a perpetrator would not be subject to prosecution under P.C. § 262.  
                                                 
487 Letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from Allen Sumner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, dated 
April 26, 1983. See also, “1983 Legislative Wrap-Up” in the National Action Against Rape Newsletter, 
which noted: “Passage of a law eliminating the marital rape reporting requirement is necessary to make the 
spousal rape law . . . effective.” 
488 Letter to Assemblyman John Vasconcellos, chair of the Assembly Ways & Means Committee, from 
Nancy Hoffman, presiding judge of the Santa Clara Municipal Court, dated August 15, 1983. 
489 Letter to Senator McCorquodale from the judges of the Municipal Court in Santa Clara Country, dated 
May 27, 1983. 
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 The Women’s History Research Center also argued for the elimination of the 
reporting limit. The Center provided two examples where the thirty-day reporting 
requirement effectively barred prosecution for cases of spousal rape. The first example 
involved a victim who had suffered physical harm beyond rape by her husband. She “was 
in a coma for 1 month and was aphasiac afterwards, [and] also suffered permanent brain 
damage as a result of the sexual assault by her husband.”490 The second example involved 
a victim held hostage at gunpoint in her own home by her husband. The rapes she 
endured occurred continually over a long period. Her husband had previous convictions 
for child abuse and assault and sexually and physically assaulted his previous two wives. 
The court did convict the man; however, the charges against him involved at least ten 
fewer counts of spousal rape because the earlier instances occurred more than thirty days 
before the wife was able to inform law enforcement.491 Such a result could not have been 
the intention of the California legislature when it passed the spousal rape bill in 1979.  
Other supporters used an equal protection argument by placing spousal rape 
within the context of other sexual offenses. Senator McCorquodale began the discussion 
for this claim. In a statement given on April 26, 1983, McCorquodale explained the 
discrepancy between the prosecution of spousal rape and other legally recognized forms 
of sexual assault. He noted that it was not uncommon for a woman to endure several 
instances of spousal rape before she finally reported the crime, primarily because she 
feared reprisal that was more brutal from her abuser. When she did report the crime, she 
                                                 
490 Letter from Jodie Berger, Coordinator of the National Clearinghouse on Marital and Date Rape, to 
Senator McCorquodale dated April 21, 1983. The NCMD forwarded the letter to eight other California 
senators. The National Clearinghouse on Marital and Date Rape was a project developed and maintained by 
the Women’s History Research Center. While the story presented by the Women’s History Research Center 
is very similar to the Dianna Green case that opened this chapter, the Center did not identify the victim by 
name. Thus, this author cannot confirm that the individual mentioned by the Center was Dianna Green. 
491 Ibid. 
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found that earlier instances might not be prosecutable despite their legitimacy because of 
the reporting provision. In contrast, McCorquodale asserted: “No distinctions based upon 
marital relationships are made in any sexual assault other than rape. Therefore if the 
assaults include object rape, sodomy or oral copulation, prosecutions could be initiated 
upon the underlying incidents.”492 In fact, the criminal laws related to those alternate 
actions “punish any non-consensual act, whether or not committed by the spouse of the 
victim, and contain no special reporting requirements for spouses.”493 A press release 
issued by Senator McCorquodale’s office asserted: “This inconsistency in the law results 
in a dangerous lack of equal protection for victims of spousal rape.”494 Once again, then, 
here was official recognition that California’s spousal rape statute treated victims married 
to their rapists differently than women who were sexually assaulted by a non-spouse.  
As Lisa Di Silva, the coordinator of South County Rape Crisis Services, noted, 
American society has perpetuated several myths about sexual assault, including the 
widespread notion that a husband cannot rape his wife. Di Silva recognized California as 
one of the small minority of states who had by 1983 recognized rape in marriage as a 
crime. Nevertheless, she criticized the state for maintaining special conditions for the 
crime that did not exist for other sexual assaults. Di Silva argued: “By mandating a 30 
day reporting requirement, the law is making exceptions in the case of spousal rape,” 
                                                 
492 McCorquodale statement on S.B. 635 given April 26, 1983.  
493 Senate Committee on Judiciary overview of S.B. 635. Notably, prior to 1975, California law prohibited 
all sodomy and oral copulation, regardless of the connection between the participants. When amended in 
1975, the law legalized these acts between consenting adults, whether married or not. Thus, unlike rape, the 
laws regarding sodomy and oral copulation never made distinctions based on the marital status of those 
involved.  
494 Kathy Wilcox of Senator McCorquodale’s office issued press release regarding the bill April 27, 1983 
that included this statement.  
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where there should be none. “Spousal rape, like other sexual assaults, is a violent crime, 
and needs to be recognized as such,” she concluded.495 
The California Alliance Against Domestic Violence (CAADV), a statewide 
organization that represented over eighty domestic violence programs across California, 
offered support for the bill by highlighting the reasons that victims of spousal rape do not 
immediately report such violations. Speaking for CAADV, Janet Carter explained that 
the majority of women who seek assistance from domestic violence programs “do not 
seek legal protection from the physical abuse the first time it happens. It is only when 
they feel they have no other option available in order to protect themselves from further 
violence that they turn to the legal system.”496 Carter went on to support the elimination 
of the reporting requirement, explaining that it would allow prosecutors in spousal rape 
trials to admit as evidence a history of repeated sexual violence. In doing so, Carter 
concluded that S.B. 635 “would be another step towards ensuring that our legal system 
protects everyone from violent crime, whether it occurs out on the street, or within the 
home.”497 
California Women Lawyers provided additional support for the elimination of the 
reporting requirement, explaining that many victims do not report spousal rape promptly 
because they fear for themselves and/or their families. While the members of California 
Women Lawyers recognized that the “chances of a successful prosecution diminishes 
where there is a delay in reporting of the offense,” they acknowledged that the absence of 
the reporting requirement would not make prosecuting spousal rape unreasonably 
                                                 
495 Letter to the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee from Lisa Di Silva, Coordinator of Rape Crisis 
Services, dated April 20, 1983. 
496 Letter sent to Governor Deukmjian from Janet Carter, dated September 12, 1983. 
497 Ibid. 
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difficult. As with any other offense being investigated, prosecutors would have the 
opportunity to evaluate a case of spousal rape to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to move the case forward for trial.498 
Opposition to S.B. 635 came from the Office of the State Public Defender and 
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. Both groups argued that the reporting 
requirement provided “vital protection against groundless and vindictive charges . . . 
[brought in] retaliation for a marital dispute or to gain some leverage in a divorce or child 
custody case.”499 Robert Scarlett, Deputy State Public Defender, maintained that the 
“area of spousal rape is one fraught with the possibility of false accusations and difficult 
credibility determinations,” making a reporting requirement necessary to protect the 
rights of the accused from such abuses.500 The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
stated opposition to S.B. 635 followed similar reasoning.501 What neither group seemed 
to acknowledge was that regardless of a reporting requirement, prosecutors still had the 
discretion to determine when there was sufficient evidence to bring a case to trial and 
when not to pursue a charge for lack of evidence.  
Supporters of S.B. 635 were quick to rebut any opposition to the bill. The Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office explained that the original reason for 
including a reporting requirement as part of the spousal rape law – the prevention of 
abuse of the criminal justice system by vindictive spouses – had “been discredited and the 
                                                 
498 Undated letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from Adriana Burger, legislative committee of California 
Women Lawyers; Letter sent to Governor Deukmejian from Adriana Burger, dated September 16, 1983. 
499 Assembly Committee on Criminal Law and Public Safety memo in preparation for a June 7, 1983 
hearing.  
500 Letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from Robert Scarlett, Deputy State Public Defender, dated April 
22, 1983. 
501 Letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from Michael Pinkerton, Legislative Advocate for California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, dated April 22, 1983; Second letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from 
Michael Pinkerton, dated June 16, 1983. 
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continuation of the what effectively constitutes a thirty-day statute of limitations flies in 
the face of reality.”502 The statistics available in 1983 supported the position that wives 
were not exploiting P.C. § 262 to falsely accuse their husbands of rape. Of the fifty-two 
statewide arrests for spousal rape since the spousal rape law went into effect in January 
1980, very few ended without going to trial. The conviction rate for those cases that went 
to trial was 75.5%, “a figure significantly higher than that of non-marital rape cases, 
believed to be 2% nationwide.”503 Such numbers stand in stark contrast to those who 
feared that the passage of a spousal rape law would open the floodgates to false charges 
leveled by unhappy, bitter wives who sought revenge on their unwitting husbands.  
The version of S.B. 635 that ultimately came before the Senate and Assembly for 
a vote was different than the one originally introduced by Senator McCorquodale. The 
first draft of the bill called for the complete elimination of the thirty-day reporting 
requirement. At one point in the process, a one-year reporting requirement was proposed; 
however, by July an amendment to the bill reduced the timing to ninety days.504 
                                                 
502 Letter sent to Senator McCorquodale from Robert Philibosian, Los Angeles County District Attorney, 
dated April 20, 1983. 
503 Letter to Senator McCorquodale from the judges of the Municipal Court in Santa Clara Country, dated 
May 27, 1983; Letter from Jodie Berger to Senator McCorquodale dated April 21, 1983. While the 2% 
conviction rate may appear questionably low, it does track with data found on the websites for Rape Abuse 
& Incest National Network (RAINN) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). While the two sites do not 
provide a perfect parallel, the data present relevant information that sheds light on rape statistics. RAINN 
describes why only two of every one hundred rapists will serve time in prison. According to their website, 
RAINN notes that for every one hundred rapes committed, victims only report thirty-two to the police. Of 
those, only seven result in an arrest. The police refer three of those cases to prosecutors, who are successful 
with felony convictions in two cases that result in prison time. The other ninety-eight face no consequences 
for their actions. https://rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates. BJS offers a comparison of 
conviction rates for Part I, or Index offenses, in the United States and Great Britain between 1981 and 
1996. Part I offenses include criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle 
theft, larceny-theft, and arson. All of these crimes were included in the BJS comparison except for larceny-
theft and arson. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/cjusew96/cpp.cfm.  
504 Legislative Analysis of Senate Bill No. 635, August 18, 1983. 
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California legislators approved this version of the bill and Governor George Deukmejian 
signed it into law on September 28, 1983.  
It would be ten years before the legislature further amended the reporting 
requirement of the spousal rape law. As noted earlier in the chapter, Assemblywoman 
Hilda Solis introduced Assembly Bill 187 in 1993 with the goal of abolishing the 
distinction between spousal rape and rape to the greatest extent possible. In relation to the 
reporting requirement, the proposed amendment, in its final form, would replace the 
ninety-day reporting requirement with an obligation to report within one year of the 
violation. However, the one-year requirement would not apply if evidence other than the 
victim’s allegations would be admissible at trial. The statute of limitations for 
prosecution in such cases would remain at three years. Additionally, A.B. 187 would 
allow a victim to report the incident of spousal rape to a much wider pool of individuals 
than police officers and district attorneys.505  
The primary debate surrounding the proposed change revived concern about 
groundless and vindictive charges levied by bitter and spiteful women against 
constitutional claims that the reporting requirement denied equal protection to victims of 
spousal rape. When considering the need for a reporting requirement, proponents argued 
that the six-year statute of limitations for non-spousal rape provides time for the 
identification of an unknown assailant. However, in spousal rape, the victim knows the 
perpetrator. Applying the longer statute of limitations to spousal rape could allow one 
spouse – all examples pointed to a wife – to use a threat of a rape charge sometime after 
                                                 
505 Senate Committee on Judiciary Report; Enrolled Bill Report, Department of Corrections, September 13, 
1993.  
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the marriage has soured as advantage in a divorce settlement or a child custody case. In 
response to this argument, Los Angeles County District Attorney, Gil Garcetti, countered:  
Of particular importance [with A.B. 187] is the elimination of the 90-day 
reporting requirement. Any such reporting requirement is offensive, serves only to 
single out spousal rape victims as less trustworthy than all other persons, and 
denies them equal protection of the laws. Moreover, because of the dynamics 
involved in domestic violence relationships, it is less likely that a rape victim will 
immediately report a spouse than a stranger to the police or the district attorney’s 
office. Notwithstanding the fact that many spousal rape victims may seek medical 
treatment and/or therapy, or confide in friends rather than the police, a reporting 
requirement would bar subsequent charges without regard to the strengths or 
weaknesses of a case. . . . A reporting requirement simply codifies existing 
prejudices against victims of domestic abuse.506  
 
While there was nothing particularly new in Garcetti’s argument, as the district attorney 
for the most highly populated county and largest metropolitan region in California, his 
public endorsement of A.B. 187 carried a great amount of weight. Garcetti ended his 
statement by explaining that the language of A.B. 187 used the same language as the 
penal code provisions for other forms of sexual offenses. As such, the change to the 
spousal rape law would provide the protection due to all individuals, whether married or 
not, and would bring an end to prejudice against rape victims who are married to their 
rapists.507 
Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard provided her support for A.B. 187.508 As 
viewed by Roybal-Allard, a serious question remained as to whether the spousal rape law 
                                                 
506 Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee from Gil Garcetti, dated 
March 24, 1993. 
507 Ibid. 
508 In many ways, A.B. 187 paralleled a bill introduced by Assemblywoman Lucille Roybal-Allard in 
1992. The governor signed the bill, A.B. 2220, but it never became operative because it was tied to a 
Senate bill the governor vetoed. There were two basic differences between these bills. First, A.B. 2220 
“would have included the spousal rape of a person incapable of giving legal consent, because of a mental 
disorder or developmental or physical disability, as specified under circumstances of spousal rape.” A.B. 
187 did not have such a provision because legislators agreed that the general rape law already addressed 
this form of sexual assault, regardless of the relationship between victim and abuser. The second difference 
had to do with the timeframe in which a victim was able to report a crime. A.B. 2220 “would have made 
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could withstand constitutional scrutiny given that it continued to provide unequal 
protection for spousal rape victims. While the penalties were equivalent for spousal rape 
and non-spousal rape, Roybal-Allard noted the continuing significant difference in the 
statute of limitations for the two crimes:  
The question raised in this connection is whether criminal statutes that deny 
victims of spousal rape important protections in the prosecution of a violent crime 
solely on the basis of gender and marital status would be constructed to be a 
denial of Equal Protection under the United States and California Constitutions. I 
respectfully submit that there is no rational basis or compelling state interest that 
would support that disparate treatment.509 
  
Roybal-Allard also addressed the argument of frivolous lawsuits filed by mercenary 
women out to get their husbands. She argued that such claims were completely 
unfounded, suggesting: “that 93% of the spousal rape charges filed between 1980 and 
1985 resulted in convictions,” a percentage that refutes the claim of unfounded law suits 
being filed under P.C. § 262. She concluded by positing: “To maintain 
requirements/distinctions that are unsupported with facts is to send a message that in 
California, spousal rape is seen as a lesser offense than non-spousal rape.”510 Such a 
                                                 
the statute of limitations for reporting spousal rape the same as non-spousal rape – six years.” In contrast, 
A.B. 187 provided a one-year reporting requirement that dated from the time of the alleged violation. Bill 
Analysis for A.B. 187 issued by the Office of Criminal Justice Planning. 
509 Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chairman of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, from 
Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, dated April 9, 1993. In her letter, Roybal-Allard refers to studies 
that documented a finding that spousal rape was often a manifest of the larger societal problem of domestic 
violence. See, Finklehor and Yllo, License to Rape; Diana Russell, Rape in Marriage; and Lenore E. 
Walker, The Battered Woman.  
510 Ibid. The Coalition for Family Equity, which represented twenty-eight different organizations across 
California, supported Roybal-Allard’s constitutional argument, noting: “the elimination of the 90-day 
reporting requirement is vital to this legislation, since limiting the reporting time denies them equal 
protection under the law.” Letter to Assemblyman Bob Epple, Chair of the Public Safety Committee, from 
Marilyn Kizziah, Chair of Coalition for Family Equity, dated March 30, 1993. 
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message, she asserted, would be bad for California’s reputation in that twenty states had 
already eliminated the distinction between spousal rape and non-spousal rape.511  
Assemblywoman Solis looked to Oregon for confirmation that elimination of the 
reporting requirement would not result in a flood of unsubstantiated cases. In 1977, 
Oregon’s legislature eliminated the language of the state’s rape statute that defined a rape 
victim as a “female person not married to the actor,” resulting in a rape law that was 
“silent about the woman’s relationship to the defendant” accused of raping her.”512 
According to Peter Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney for Benton County, Oregon, Oregon 
learned three lessons following the 1977 amendment. First, spousal rape victims rarely 
report their husbands to authorities. “Benton County (pop. 70,000) has had fewer than six 
cases since 1977, an experience mirrored by other jurisdictions.”513 Second, those cases 
of spousal rape that women reported to authorities usually were extremely violent in 
nature, far more violent than most non-spousal rapes. Third, there was no evidence to 
suggest that women had abused the law. As Sandrock explained, it was “the seriousness 
of the reported cases, not the number, that justifies Oregon’s Law.”514  
Evidence like that provided by Sandrock alleviated some unease held by members 
of the legislature, but did not eliminate it entirely. Passage of A.B. 187 resulted in three 
changes to the reporting requirement of P.C. § 262. The new law extended the reporting 
                                                 
511 Roybal-Allard sent Assemblywoman Hilda Solis a copy of the letter that she sent to Assemblyman Bob 
Epple. Notably, Solis would use much of the language of that letter when she addressed then Governor Pete 
Wilson, encouraging him to sign A.B. 187 into law.  
512 Letter to Assemblyman Richard Rainey, member of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, from 
Benton County, Oregon District Attorney Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., dated February 22, 1993. In the letter, 
Sandrock explained to Rainey that Assemblywoman Hilda Solis had asked him to comment on Oregon’s 
experience with spousal rape prosecution. Sandrock sent copies of the letter to Assemblywoman Solis and 
the other members of the Assembly Public Safety Committee.  
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. 
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restriction to one year after the date of the violation instead of ninety days; however, the 
one-year requirement would not apply if evidence other than the victim’s allegations 
would be admissible at trial. The statute of limitation for prosecution in such cases would 
remain at 3 years. Additionally, the statute drastically expanded the pool of whom a 
victim could contact to report the violation. No longer was reporting limited to a police 
officer or district attorney.515 
In 2001, the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District addressed a 
challenge to the provision of P.C. § 262 regarding corroborating evidence. In that appeal, 
the aforementioned Antonio Trujillo Garcia appealed his conviction for spousal rape, 
claiming that the trial court unfairly allowed corroborating evidence used to waive the 
reporting requirement in the case against him. The Court of Appeals disagreed and 
upheld his conviction. Garcia’s case influenced the final amendment to P.C. § 262 in 
2006.516 
Garcia’s appeal raised several challenges to the validity of his conviction for 
spousal rape; however, his challenges boiled down to the argument that E.G.’s allegation 
of the rape was not corroborated by independent evidence as required under P.C. § 262; 
and therefore, the State should not have pursued a prosecution due to the late reporting of 
the rape. Specifically, Garcia asserted that the trial court should have granted his motion 
to dismiss the charge against him due to insufficient corroborating evidence; the judge 
should have instructed the jury “to determine whether sufficient corroborating evidence 
                                                 
515 Under the amended law, the victim could report the incident to any of the following: medical personnel, 
a clergy member, an attorney, a shelter representative, a counselor, a judicial officer, a rape crisis agency, a 
prosecuting attorney, a law enforcement officer, a firefighter. 
516 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1327 (2001). In an attempt to protect the identity of Garcia’s 
wife/victim, the Court referred to her as E.G. For the same reason, the Court also referred to the man she 
married after her divorce from Garcia by his initials. 
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brought the prosecution within the statute of limitations”; and the evidence of his 
violations of the TRO were irrelevant and prejudicial, and therefore should not have been 
admissible at trial.517 
On appeal, the Court reviewed the procedural actions of the trial court, 
specifically the decision to allow the introduction of evidence that would corroborate 
E.G.’s accusations. During pretrial motions, Garcia (through his attorney) moved to 
dismiss the charge of spousal rape on the grounds that E.G. had not reported the offense 
within a year of its occurrence. The prosecutor stipulated that the one-year reporting 
requirement had not been observed, but maintained that the reporting requirement did not 
apply since corroborating evidence was available to support the victim’s assertions.518 In 
support of this assertion, the prosecutor noted Garcia’s repeated violations of the TRO 
and the statements he gave to police officers. The presiding judge found the evidence 
highly relevant and admissible, thereby denying the motion to dismiss. At the conclusion 
of the trial, Garcia renewed his motion to dismiss, but once again, the court denied his 
motion.  
Garcia’s primary argument on appeal was that “the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss the charge of spousal rape based on the lack of corroborating evidence. 
He insists the evidence put forth by the prosecutor did not meet appropriate standards for 
corroborating evidence,” and therefore warranted a dismissal of the charge. Both parties 
to the appeal acknowledged that no case law existed that spoke directly to the issue of 
corroborating evidence in a spousal rape case; hence, the Court of Appeals had to 
                                                 
517 Ibid., 1327-28. 
518 A stipulation is a voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning a relevant point. In this 
case, the prosecutor was agreeing with the defense attorney that the victim did not report the rape until after 
the one-year statute of limitations had expired.  
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evaluate the situation in light of arguments that were indirectly or tangentially related to 
corroborating evidence in spousal rape cases. The Court of Appeals began its discussion 
with a review of People v. Williams, a 1997 case that involved corroborating testimony 
provided by an accomplice.519 In that case, the California Supreme Court noted that 
evidence given by an accomplice need not corroborate every fact, but is: 
‘sufficient if it does not require interpretation . . . [and] tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it must tend to implicate the 
defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the 
crime but it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself 
to establish every element of the offense charged.’. . . Moreover, evidence of 
corroboration is sufficient if it connects defendant with the crime, although such 
evidence ‘is slight and entitled, when standing by itself, to but little 
consideration.’520  
 
The Court continued, stating: “[U]nless a reviewing court determines that the 
corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or that it could not reasonably tend 
to connect a defendant with the commission of a crime,” the decision by the court or jury 
regarding the admission of corroborating evidence will not be overturned on appeal.521 
The Court next addressed the type of evidence that a prosecutor could introduce as 
corroborating evidence. Garcia argued that only “physical evidence, witness statements, 
or the defendant’s statements made near the time of the crime” were appropriate to 
corroborate, and that such evidence was not present in his case.522 The Court dismissed 
this argument because the cases Garcia relied upon did not address spousal rape – nor in 
fact, did they concern evidence in cases of domestic violence. Additionally, the Court 
                                                 
519 People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 635 (1997). 
520 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1329. 
521 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1329-30, citing People v. Szeto, 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 (1981). 
522 To support this position, Garcia relied upon People v. Navarro, 126 Cal.App.3d 785 (1981); People v. 
Adams, 186 Cal.App.3d 75 (1986); People v. Hollis, 235 Cal.App.3d 1521 (1991); and People v. Pena, 7 
Cal.App.4th 1294 (1992). 
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explained that the cases forwarded by Garcia involved situations where corroborating 
evidence was necessary to uphold a conviction, rather than “corroboration required for a 
prosecution to proceed,” which was the basis of Garcia’s appeal.523 
 The People’s arguments, with which the Court agreed, reasoned that the evidence 
introduced at trial was appropriate to corroborate E.G.’s claim of spousal rape, supporting 
the trial court’s decision not to grant Garcia’s motion to dismiss.524 The People argued 
that cases brought under P.C. § 262 allowed evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct 
to be introduced as independent corroborating evidence.525 Acknowledging that spousal 
rape was a form of domestic violence, the People further argued that prosecutors could 
introduce evidence of a defendant’s earlier instances of domestic violence to prove a 
disposition to commit such acts.526 The People presented Garcia’s violations of the TRO 
as evidence of this disposition. The Court concurred that recent case law supported the 
People’s argument. In People v. Yovanov, the Court held: “when a defendant is charged 
with a sexual offense, evidence of his or her uncharged sexual misconduct is no longer 
subject to the general prohibition against character evidence.” Rather, when the 
Legislature enacted section 1108 of the Evidence Code, it “declared that the willingness 
to commit a sexual offense is not common to most individuals; thus, evidence of any 
prior sexual offenses is particularly probative and necessary for determining the 
                                                 
523 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1330. 
524 In its decision, the Court of Appeals refers to the State of California, the respondent on appeal, as the 
People. As such, the author will maintain this usage in further discussion of the case. 
525 Here, the People relied upon People v. Yovanov, 69 Cal.App.4th 392 (1999).  
526 The People argued that this position was supported with California Rules of Evidence § 803(g)(2)(B) 
and § 1109. 
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credibility of the witness.”527 The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Evidence Code § 1108 in People v. Falsetta, in which it explained:  
By their very nature, sex crimes are usually committed in seclusion without third 
party witnesses or substantial corroborating evidence. The ensuing trial often 
presents conflicting versions of the event and requires the trier of fact to make 
difficult credibility determinations. Section 1108 provides the trier of fact in a sex 
offense case the opportunity to learn of the defendant’s possible disposition to 
commit sex crimes.528  
 
The Court further reasoned that Garcia’s record of repeated violations of the TRO and 
admitted assault was admissible under Evidence Code § 1109, which “permits the 
introduction of evidence of the commission of prior acts of domestic violence in a 
criminal action charging the defendant with an offense involving domestic 
violence.”529 Based upon the reasoning established in Yovanov, Falsetta, and Brown, the 
Court concluded that the trial court acted appropriately in using Garcia’s prior acts of 
domestic violence to corroborate E.G.’s allegations. Finding no error in the trial court’s 
actions, the Court affirmed Garcia’s conviction.  
 The Court’s decision in Garcia would stand as the State’s view on the reporting 
requirement until 2006 when Senator Sheila Kuehl introduced S.B. 1402, which sought to 
eliminate the reporting requirement of the spousal rape statute.530 Kuehl presented the bill 
as a way to “ensure that all victims of rape are afforded equal protection under the law by 
eliminating an additional reporting requirement that only applies to marital rape.”531 In 
                                                 
527 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1331, citing People v. Yavanov, which referred to People v. Soto, 64 
Cal.App.4th 966 (1998). 
528 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1332, citing People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (1999). Such a legal 
position would have likely brought a very different result to the South Carolina case against Dale Crawford 
discussed at length in chapter 4.  
529 People v. Garcia, 89 Cal.App.4th at 1332, citing People v. Brown, 70 Cal.App.4th 1129 (2000).  
530 Senate Committee on Public Safety Overview of S.B. 1402 for the hearing scheduled for April 4, 2006. 
531 Letter to the members of the Senate Public Safety Committee from Barry Broad, representative of the 
California Public Defenders Association, dated March 23, 2006. 
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addressing this issue, the legislature had to evaluate a few key questions, among which 
was whether there was objective policy rationale for retaining a reporting requirement in 
the spousal rape statute which is not required for non-spousal rape. A second question 
was whether the reporting requirement imposed a practical obstacle to marital rape 
prosecutions, and if it did not, was it nevertheless a vestige of a legislative compromise 
nearly thirty years old which no longer is relevant or necessary.532 Proponents of S.B. 
1402 answered these questions: No, there was no objective policy reason to maintain the 
reporting requirement solely for spousal rape; yes, the reporting requirement served as a 
hindrance to spousal rape prosecutions; and yes, the reporting requirement embodied a 
compromise nearly three decades old that was archaic and no longer relevant.533 
 Support for S.B. 1402 was plentiful and strategically coordinated among interest 
groups across California. Letters poured in to Senator Kuehl, other members of the 
Senate and Assembly, and Governor Schwarzenegger; however, the verbiage of that 
correspondence often conformed to prescribed language.534 The arguments presented fell 
into two broad categories: refutation of the spurned-wife-will-file-a-false-claim fear and a 
constitutional argument, neither a novel line of debate. 
Proponents of S.B. 1402 reiterated arguments raised in support of A.B. 187 in 
1993. Nancy Lemon, a lecturer at Boalt Hall School of Law and a lobbyist for marital 
rape reform explained that the “one-year reporting period effectively shortens the 
                                                 
532 Senate Committee on Public Safety Overview of S.B. 1402 for the hearing scheduled for April 4, 2006. 
533 Letter to Senator Kuehl from Mary Wiberg and Beth McGovern, executive council members of the State 
of California Commission on the Status of Women, dated March 24, 2006. A similar letter was sent as a 
Senate Floor Alert to all members of the California Senate on May 17, 2006. 
534 In some cases, the same form letter was sent to legislative officials or the governor on letterhead from 
fifteen or sixteen different organizations.  
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limitation period for bringing spousal rape prosecutions.”535 She went on to say that while 
great efforts had been made to remove most distinctions between P.C. § 261 and § 262, 
the reporting requirement remained a glaring distinction. While both statutes operate with 
a six-year statute of limitations, “the reporting requirement under section 262 effectively 
diminishes that parameter to one year for spousal rape.” As she explained: “Besides 
misconceiving the nature of marital rape, the reporting provision of section 262, in 
Lemon’s view, serves as a legislative reflection of the myth that ‘vengeful wives will lie’ 
and that husbands, therefore, need protection.”536 Lemon found both the disparity and the 
implication troubling, as did many others who supported S.B. 1402, and by extension the 
rights of spousal rape victims. 
 Proponents relied on constitutional arguments found in the language of People v. 
Garcia, where the court in dicta pronounced that the reporting provision in Section 262 
ought to be repealed: “The Attorney General points out that California is one of the few 
states to impose such a reporting requirement and that several states recently have 
repealed similar statutory reporting requirements. The Attorney General also notes that 
other states have found any distinction between marital and nonmarital rape to be 
unconstitutional.”537 The Court’s statement recommended that the time had come for 
California to eliminate the reporting requirement. The California Partnership to End 
Domestic Violence advanced this argument, explaining: “California is one of the few 
remaining states to impose a reporting requirement for spousal rape. The states of 
                                                 
535 Kuehl, Senate Committee on Public Safety Report for use in a hearing scheduled for March 29, 2006, in 
which she quotes from Lisa R. Eskow, “The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and 
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution,” Stanford Law Review 48, no. 3 (1996), 677-709.  
536 Ibid. 
537 Senate Committee on Public Safety Overview of S.B. 1402. Dictum is a statement of opinion considered 
authoritative, although not legally binding, because of the authority and dignity of the person who 
pronounced it. In this case, the authority belonged to the California Court of Appeals.  
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Pennsylvania and South Dakota recently repealed similar statutes. Courts in other states 
have found any distinction between marital and nonmarital rape to be 
unconstitutional.”538 The constitutional arguments used by those states argued that any 
statute that treated victims of spousal rape differently than those of non-spousal rape 
denied spousal rape victims equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.539  
Opposition for S.B. 1402 came from three primary sources: the California Public 
Defenders Association, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Alliance 
for Families and Children. While each addressed their opposition in distinct ways, they 
all focused on the continuing fear that innocent, unwitting men would find themselves 
charged falsely by unstable, greedy, vindictive wives. The California Public Defenders 
Association (CPDA) suggested a connection between increased divorce rates and women 
filing false claims of spousal rape:  
Given the increase in the divorce rate and the resulting decrease in the standard of 
living for most women and their children, the specter of a woman threatening or 
falsely accusing her former spouse of rape is an unfortunate reality. The current 
law carefully and thoughtfully provides a system of checks and balances that 
protects both parties.540  
 
                                                 
538 Letter to Senator Carole Migden, Chair of the Senate Public Safety Committee, from Marivic Mabanag, 
Executive Director of California Partnership to End Domestic Violence, dated March 30, 2006. 
539 See footnote 362, supra, for articles addressing the arguments that used equal protection claims. 
According to the Senate Rules Committee, Third Reading of S.B. 1402, additional support for the bill came 
from California Coalition Against Sexual Assault; American Association of University Women; California 
District Attorney’s Office; California National Organization for Women; California Partnership to End 
Domestic Violence; Coalition to End Family Violence; Community Overcoming Relationship Abuse; 
Community Solutions; DOVES (Domestic Violence Education and Services; Family Services of Tulare 
County; Junior Leagues of California; Lambda Letters Project; Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 
Office; Marin Abused Women’s Services; Marajee Mason Center; North County Women’s Resource 
Center and Shelter; Office of the Attorney General; Santa Clara County Domestic Violence Advocacy 
Consortium; South Bay Community Services; South Lake Tahoe Women’s Center; STAND! Against 
Domestic Violence; Support Network for Battered Women; the Riley Center of St. Vincent de Paul 
Society; WEAVE, Inc., and YWCA of Glendale. 
540Letter to the members of the Senate Public Safety Committee from Barry Broad, representative of the 
California Public Defenders Association, dated March 23, 2006. 
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Conspicuously absent from the CPDA assertion was any evidence of the validity of the 
statement. A lack of statistics or results of academic research on divorce rates and 
fraudulent spousal rape claims severely weakened the argument. The claim of increased 
divorce rates stands in stark contrast to the figures compiled by the United States 
National Center for Health Statistics, which indicated that in 2006, national divorce rates 
had reached a low point not evidenced since 1970. While divorce rates peaked in the 
decade between 1975 and 1985, after that time they began a slow, but constant decline.541 
Furthermore, while the CPDA did not offer evidence of false claims, proponents of S.B. 
1402 relied on the evidence forwarded by prominent scholars in the field of domestic 
violence and rape in marriage. 
 On the surface, opposition raised by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
(CACJ) appeared to raise a reasonable constitutional claim, noting the need to balance 
victims’ rights with the due process rights of the accused. At the same time, CACJ 
opposed any changes to the reporting requirement, for fear of unsupported claims being 
leveled by wives and prosecuted by the State: 
The current requirements of witnesses or evidence provided by Penal Code 
section 262 still allow charges to be filed well past one year. The requirements 
carefully . . . ensure that only meritorious allegations are prosecuted. They also 
consistently encourage any victims to come forward to seek protection, 
counseling and/or criminal justice. Removal of these requirements will permit 
prosecution in cases with little or no supporting evidence, years after the alleged 
acts, and are very difficult accusations to defend. The existing balance in the 
statute carefully protects due process and the fair trials California is known to 
provide.542  
 
                                                 
541 United States Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), Table 77. 
542 Letter to Senator Sheila Kuehl from Ignacio Hernandez, Legislative Advocate for California Attorneys 
for Criminal Justice, dated March 22, 2006. In a similar letter dated June 12, 2006, Hernandez countered 
the bill with a suggestion to expand the pre-trial corroboration requirements from P.C. § 262 to other sexual 
assault offenses as a way to protect against wrongful convictions. 
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There are several flaws in the position taken by CACJ. While physical protection, 
counseling, and justice represent ideal assistance for spousal rape victims, what CACJ 
fails to take into account is the myriad reasons why victims of spousal abuse, whether 
physical or sexual, fail to seek protection or counseling. Victims fail to report abuse out 
of fear: fear that others will not believe their claims; fear that reporting will be futile; fear 
of losing their children; fear of financial instability; and fear of future abuse. A second 
weakness in the argument raised by CACJ is the failure to acknowledge that absent a 
reporting requirement, prosecutors still have the discretion to evaluate the validity of 
victim claims. Regardless of how promptly a victim reports a crime, a prosecutor will not 
move forward if there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim. 
 The California Alliance for Families and Children (CAFC) opposed the bill for 
three reasons: 
First, there is no evidence of a significant problem with the existing procedures – 
if it’s not broke, don’t fix it. Second, numerous independent researchers in the 
field have documented an already high rate of false allegations of rape, including 
spousal rape. . . . Third, eliminating the protections under (current law) will only 
contribute to the excessive conflict now in our family law courts where false 
allegations already occur in high conflict cases over custody and financial 
issues.543  
 
In a March 23, 2006 letter to the Senate Committee on Public Safety, CAFC Executive 
Director Michael Robinson cited two prosecutors, Linda Fairstein from New York and 
Craig Silverman from Colorado, who maintained that about fifty percent of all rape 
allegations are false. He also referenced studies conducted in Indiana and Washington, 
D.C., which concluded that rape allegations are false twenty-four to forty percent of the 
time. Robinson also alluded to Phyllis Schlafly, long-time opponent of the feminist 
                                                 
543 Letter to the Senate Committee on Public Safety from Michael Robinson, Executive Director of 
California Alliance for Families and Children, dated March 23, 2006. 
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movement, who spoke out against spousal rape laws.544 Committed as Robinson was to 
the validity of his sources, he did not address apparent weaknesses in their findings. 
There was no indication whether the reporting statistics he quoted even considered 
spousal rape victims. Additionally, he failed to account for the significantly lower rates of 
false reporting indicated by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), published by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation that called into question the results of his experts.545 Even more 
troubling was Robinson’s reference to the one-year reporting limit, which he dubbed a 
“modest requirement,” the upholding of which resulted “in no harm to legitimate 
victims.”546  
Two weeks later as the bill moved forward with no apparent revisions, Robinson 
showed disappointment with the California legislature’s apparent dismissal of CAFC’s 
opposition to S.B. 1402. In an email to Cory Salzillo, Consultant to the Senate Committee 
on Public Safety, Robinson commented:  
We are saddened to see that it appears that there was no real debate on Sheila’s 
SB 1402 spousal rape. I also notices [sic] that the bill analysis quoted part of our 
position letter but left out the quotes by nationally known prosecutors on the 
suggest [sic]. . . . We are about to open Pandora’s box even wider in family law 
destruction if this bill passes and is signed into law. Unfortunately, I am spread 
way to [sic] thin and was not able to make the hearing. We don’t have the money 
that womens [sic] groups have because of feminist pork they get from 
government.547 
                                                 
544 Ibid. 
545 What Robinson could not foresee was the about-face Fairstein seemed to take just a year later. 
Recognizing Fairstein as an expert on rape prosecution, ABC News interviewed Fairstein about the 2006 
Duke Lacrosse rape investigation. During the interview, she indicated: “you have to acknowledge that false 
accusations do happen — though they are less than 10 percent of reported rapes,” a number far closer to the 
UCR numbers than what Robinson presented. Lara Setrakian, “Duke Lacrosse Case: America’s Top Sex 
Crimes Expert Cites Serious Problems,” ABC News, March 21, 2007. 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=2971265&page=1.  
546 Robinson letter to Senate Committee on Public Safety, March 23, 2006. 
547 Email to Cory Salzillo sent by Michael Robinson on April 7, 2006. In 2006, Salzillo served as a 
Consultant to the Senate Committee on Public Safety. The following year, he became the Director of 
Legislation for the California District Attorneys Association. Currently, Salzillo is a lobbyist and Managing 
Director of Warner & Pank, LLC in Sacramento. Individuals, most notably Phyllis Schlafly, have used the 
term “feminist pork” pejoratively to reference federal funding under the Violence Against Women Act. 
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While such remarks reflected opponents’ disenchantment with the progress of S.B. 1402 
through the legislature, the comments suggested frustration with the women’s movement 
in general and Senator Kuehl specifically, if Robinson’s reference to Kuehl by first name 
only is any indication.548 Overall, Robinson presented an unconvincing connection 
between protection for victims of spousal rape and the destruction of the family, all the 
while failing to acknowledge that evidence of sexual assault in a marriage in itself signals 
the breakdown of the family unit. 
Despite the strong opposition posed by the California Public Defenders 
Association, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Alliance for 
Families and Children, S.B. 1402 passed unanimously in both houses of the California 
legislature. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger received the bill on June 16, 2006. After 
consideration of position papers from both the Assembly and Senate and letters of 
support from no fewer than sixteen interest groups from around California, 
Schwarzenegger signed S.B. 1402 into law twelve days later, thereby eliminating the 
reporting and/or corroboration requirement for spousal rape prosecutions.549 
                                                 
Their opposition to such funding stems from the belief that domestic violence statistics are incorrect and 
improperly skewed in favor of women, thereby discriminating against men. They further argue that the 
government, and by extension the programs it funds, should stay out of marital/family affairs. John Leo, 
“This Rape Legislation Would Dole Out Feminist Pork,” Orlando Sentinel, July 13, 1993, 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1993-07-13/news/9307130484_1_feminist-theory-gender-feminist-
analysis; The Phyllis Schlafly Report 30, no. 5, December 1996, 
https://www.ewtn.com/library/ISSUES/PS1296.TXT; Phyllis Schlafly, “Time to Dispose of Radical 
Feminist Pork,” Human Events, July 19, 2005, http://humanevents.com/2005/07/19/time-to-dispose-of-
radical-feminist-pork/. 
548 Michael Robinson has been involved in California politics since 1972, as an advocate for family law 
reform. He has built a reputation for his efforts to shore up laws that protect men from paternity fraud and 
those that assist divorced men in child-custody disputes.  
549 The May 18, 2006 vote in the Senate was 33:0; the Assembly vote on June 15, 2006 was 70:0. 
Department of Finance Enrolled Bill Report, dated June 21, 2006.  
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The changes brought by S.B. 1402 symbolized the end of a struggle by women’s 
rights advocates that had been ongoing for nearly thirty years. Beginning with the 
adoption of a spousal rape law in 1979, eight amendments were required to bring spousal 
rape legislation in line with non-spousal rape. Those amendments were possible only 
because of the dedication of legislators, both female and male, and dozens of interest 
groups across California that represented the interests of thousands of individuals who 
believed the time had come to treat all victims of rape with the same level of protection. 
Unlike Dianna Green, Mrs. S., Rena Martinez, Catherine Watkins, Rana Lee, and E.G., 
spousal rape victims now have recourse under California law that parallels that of non-
spousal rape victims.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SEX, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPE: GETTING AWAY WITH RAPE IN MARRIAGE 
IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 While earlier chapters have chronicled the progress of legislation aimed at 
protecting women from sexual assault within marriage, this chapter presents a step 
backward in that progress. A case of marital rape that should have ended in a conviction 
instead saw a rapist set free to continue his violent behavior. Integral to this account is a 
discussion of rape shield statutes, which emerged parallel to state marital rape laws.  
On June 2, 1992, NBC’s Dateline, known for its true crime and human-interest 
stories, aired a segment titled “Husbands, Wives, and Rape.” The focus of the episode 
was a marital rape case in South Carolina – a case prosecutors thought they could not 
lose.  
Dale and Trish Crawford had been married just over a year in December 1991. 
While both had been married before and had children from their previous unions, Dale 
and Trish had known each other since they were in their early teens. Trish had described 
Dale to friends as “a gentle, kind, caring person,” but on the evening of December 7, 
1991, that view changed. That night, according to Trish, the police report, and the 
prosecution that would follow, Dale “tied [his wife’s] hands, waist, and legs to [a] bed, 
taped her eyes and mouth shut, raped her and sexually assaulted her with foreign objects 
while threatening her with a knife.”550 By capturing the event on videotape, Dale 
unintentionally provided a visual testimony of what happened. After viewing the 
videotape, James Metts, a twenty-year veteran of the Lexington County Sheriff’s 
Department, said it was clear that Dale forced Trish to have sex against her will. 
                                                 
550 Dateline transcript, June 2, 1992, 2, prepared by BurrellesLuce DVDs and Transcripts, acquired 
September 28, 2011 (hereafter, Dateline).  
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According to Metts, “It’s obvious . . . that she [was] not a willing participant . . . that she 
[was] really in a lot of pain.”551  
In his own defense, Dale acknowledged tying up his wife and having sex with her 
that night, but he claimed that it was not against her will. Nevertheless, he became the 
first husband tried under South Carolina’s 1991 law that made rape between a husband 
and wife a crime. Months later, he maintained the position that he did not rape his wife. 
“Dale Crawford [said] that his wife said ‘no’ to sex, but that he knew she meant ‘yes.’”552 
During the trial, Dale testified that his wife had enjoyed sex games and that they had 
videotaped earlier lovemaking. Despite arguments by the prosecutor that the tape of the 
December 7 event showed rape, not a consensual sex game, it took the jury of eight 
women and four men less than an hour to find Dale not guilty – that regardless of Trish 
saying no, she was a willing participant in the events of that horrific night.553 
 At the time the Crawford case went to trial, forty-eight states had some kind of 
law that addressed marital rape. By 1992, only Oklahoma and North Carolina maintained 
the common law exemption that insulated a man from such a charge. One need not look 
too closely at the laws of some of those forty-eight states, including that of South 
Carolina, however, to question whether those laws were stringent enough. In over half of 
the states, “a woman [had] less legal protection from [sexual] assault if the attacker [was] 
her husband than if [he was] a stranger.”554 In a minority of states, wife-victims were 
required to report the incident within thirty days or prosecution would forever be barred. 
                                                 
551 Ibid., 3; Twila Decker, “Prosecutor: Man Taped Wife’s Rape Video is Evidence in Lexington Trial,” 
The State (Columbia, SC), April 16, 1992. 
552 Dateline, 3. 
553 Twila, Decker, “Jury: Man Didn’t Rape Wife; Graphic Videotape Depicted Sex Game, Jurors Agree,” 
The State (Columbia, SC), April 17, 1992; Dateline, 3-4. 
554 Dateline, 1, 6.  
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The laws of several states provided for spousal prosecution only when the victim and 
assailant were living apart under a written separation at the time of the alleged crime. A 
few states required evidence of force or use or threat of violence and that the victim 
believed that the perpetrator would carry out the threat against the victim or another 
person (generally, a child or other loved one).555  
 South Carolina’s approach to spousal rape serves as a valuable case study. Not 
only was South Carolina one of the final states to pass a marital rape law, but when that 
law was passed, it provided marital rape victims less legal protection than non-spousal 
rape victims. In 1986, the National Organization for Women (NOW) released a study that 
ranked states based on how well or poorly their laws improved the status of women, 
considering the areas of employment, education, home and family, and community.556 
According to that report, South Carolina ranked dead last.557 Concerned with how the 
NOW report would influence national public perception, making it difficult to “attract 
quality people and businesses” to their state, the South Carolina Commission on Women 
(SCCW) issued a response to the NOW report in 1990 (hereafter McSwain report). It was 
the hope of the SCCW that “the Governor will be able to use [the] report to identify those 
                                                 
555 Today, many states maintain the distinction between spousal rape and non-spousal rape, imposing 
different reporting requirements or requiring the prosecution to prove different elements of the crime if the 
victim is married to the defendant. See, for instance, the current laws in South Carolina and Oklahoma. 
South Carolina Code § 16-6-615 requires the “offending spouse’s conduct . . . be reported to appropriate 
law enforcement authorities within thirty days in order for that spouse to be prosecuted for” spousal sexual 
battery. When Oklahoma passed its marital rape law, it required a showing of force or threat of violence to 
meet the statutory elements of the crime: Oklahoma’s Statute, 21 O.S. § 1111(B), provides that “rape is an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force 
or violence is used or threatened, accompanied by apparent power of execution to the victim or another.”  
556 NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and Renee Cherow-O’Leary, The State-by-State Guide to 
Women’s Legal Rights (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987). 
557 South Carolina Commission on Women Annual Report, 1989-1990, 6. 
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areas in which the legal status and economic opportunities for all South Carolina citizens 
may be improved, particularly for South Carolina women.”558  
Four statements made in the McSwain report regarding marital rape in South 
Carolina are particularly telling. First, “Marital rape is the only form of family violence 
that is currently legal in South Carolina.” Second, a study by the Medical University of 
South Carolina cited in the report noted that “victims were physically injured in 46 
percent of rapes committed by spouses, and 42 percent of the victims feared for their 
lives.” The third acknowledges that the “South Carolina marital rape statute [as it existed 
at the time] permits a man to sexually batter a woman if that woman [was] married to him 
and if she [had] not obtained a court order formally recognizing their living separately 
from each other.” The fourth statement indicated that South Carolina rape crisis centers 
estimated that only one in ten rapes are ever reported to the police.559 Such admissions 
leave no room for interpretation. The culture of South Carolina perpetuated an 
environment in which there were very few resources available to marital rape victims.  
The SCCW recommended that the current South Carolina law be amended, 
allowing a woman, without condition, to accuse her husband with rape (or as the 
language of the statute reads, criminal sexual conduct). The following year, in 1991, the 
South Carolina General Assembly passed the state’s first marital rape law. It is within 
this context that Crawford serves as a pivotal case for South Carolina. Not only was it the 
first case to be tried under South Carolina’s marital rape statute, but the outcome of that 
                                                 
558 Gayla S. L. McSwain, The Legal Status of Women: An Analysis of the NOW Report and Comparison of 
Laws in South Carolina to Laws in Other States (Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina Commission 
on Women, 1990): 3-34. Available from Women & Social Movements in the United States, 1600-2000, 
Kathryn Kish Sklar and Thomas Dublin, eds. 
559 Ibid., 9, 13, 14. 
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trial led to a 1994 amendment which addressed South Carolina’s rape shield law in the 
context of marital rape.  
However, in 1991 when State Representative Lucille Whipper introduced the bill 
that would make marital rape a crime; she knew that she was fighting an uphill battle. 
She explained that the bill was very important – a necessity if the state was ever going to 
change the idea that men are in charge of women and women’s bodies. She 
acknowledged that marital rape bills in South Carolina faced opposition from legislators 
of both political parties who saw such legislation as a threat to male privilege.560 More 
precisely, the proposed legislation faced opposition from the predominantly male state 
legislators who held 88.8 percent of the seats in the South Carolina legislature in 1991.561 
Whipper’s 1991 legislative proposal was actually the sixth marital rape bill introduced in 
the state legislature.562 In each of the previous years, the Senate had passed a similar bill, 
but those bills had died in the House. In 1991, however, when the vote came in the 
Senate, the House had already passed its own bill.563  
Three main obstacles stood in the way of passing the marital rape bills introduced 
between 1986 and 1991: fear of false reporting, disbelief in the possibility of marital rape, 
and a misunderstanding of existing laws. First, opponents believed the passage of a 
marital rape bill would open the floodgates to such claims. Senator Ryan Shealy strongly 
opposed the bill, explaining, “sex is something that’s expected, anticipated and presumed 
                                                 
560 Author’s telephone interview with Lucille Whipper, September 19, 2011 (hereafter, Whipper interview). 
561 In 1991, women held 2 of 46 seats in the South Carolina State Senate and 17 of 124 seats in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives. Thus, they held only 11.2 percent of the seats in the state legislature 
that year. “Women in State Legislatures 1991” Center for the American Woman and Politics, National 
Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University (1991).  
562 “Marital Rape Bill Advances,” Herald-Journal, Spartanburg, SC, January 23, 1991. 
563 Cindi Ross Scoppe, “Marital-Rape Bill Races Past Protests, Heads for Senate,” The State (Columbia, SC), 
March 20, 1991. 
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when you get married.” He believed that a marital rape bill would “encourage women to 
file false reports after marital squabbles or when they seek divorces, custody of children 
or property settlements.”564 Representative Phil Bradley also voiced concerns about false 
charges, noting that “once someone is charged with [marital rape], his life is totally 
ruined.”565 Such fears were unfounded, however, as recent studies have shown that there 
are no more false reports of marital rape than for any other type of crime.566 Nevertheless, 
the “issue of false reporting may be one of the most important barriers to successfully 
investigating and prosecuting sexual assault, especially with cases involving non-
strangers.”567  
                                                 
564 “Spousal Rape Senate Bill Would Make It a Crime,” The State (Columbia, SC), February 9, 1988. 
Notably, this attitude was alive and well in 2011. A state prosecutor interviewed about marital rape in 
South Carolina noted only two cases in recent memory that involved the charge of marital rape. The first 
would fit a skeptic’s definitions of “real rape,” in that it resulted in serious and permanent physical injury 
for the victim. The other, however, he described as a false charge in which the wife seduced her estranged 
husband, causing him to believe they were reconciling. In fact, according to the prosecutor, following their 
sexual encounter, she threatened to claim rape if he did not grant her the muscle car in their divorce 
settlement. Author interview with W. Allen Myrick, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, September 28, 
2011. 
565 David Reed, “House Kills Bill to Make Marital Rape a Crime,” The State (Columbia, SC), June 1, 1988. 
566 Gilda Cobb-Hunter and Jo Anne St. Clair, “Marital Rape: The Only Form of Family Violence Legal in 
S.C.,” The State (Columbia, SC), 7 November 1990; South Carolina Commission on Women Report, 14.   
Reports from the late 1960s and early 1970s that relied upon police records and medical examiner data 
indicated that unfounded rape allegations occurred in two to twenty-five percent of cases. However, the 
Uniform Crime Report, published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicated: “the unfounded rate 
for forcible rape remained about 8% from 1991 to 1997, while the average rate for other index crimes (i.e., 
property crimes, arson, robbery, and aggravated assault) was considerably lower, at about 2%.” This might 
lead some to believe that putative rape victims are less trustworthy than victims of other crimes. However, 
such a conclusion might be too simplistic. What was not discussed in the earlier reports is the fact that 
unfounded rates typically “include not only false complaints, but also cases dismissed for lack of physical 
evidence, uncooperative victims/witnesses, or because no suspect could be located.” Therefore, it should be 
acknowledged that the “unfounded rate for rape might be higher not necessarily because complainants are 
more apt to lie in rape than in other types of crime, but rather because evidentiary issues that impede 
prosecution are more common in rape compared to other crimes.” Heather D. Flowe, Ebbe B. Ebbesen and 
Anila Putcha-Bhagavatula, “Rape Shield Laws and Sexual Behavior Evidence: Effects of Consent Level 
and Women's Sexual History on Rape Allegations,” Law and Human Behavior 31, no. 2 (2007), 161. 
Notably, recent studies that involve more rigorous research suggests that an accurate percentage of false 
rape reports is estimated to be between two and eight percent. See, for instance, Dr. Kimberly A. Lonsway, 
Sgt. Joanne Archambault, and Dr. David Lisak, “False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to Successfully 
Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault,” The Voice 3, no. 1 (2009) (Published by the 
National District Attorneys Association’s National Center for the Prosecution of Violence Against 
Women).  
567 Lonsway, “False Reports,” 1. 
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Several misconceptions about rape and the behavior of rape victims reinforced the 
fear of false reporting. Most sexual assault cases involve victims who do not meet 
societal expectations of the characteristics of a typical sexual assault victim. One widely 
held belief is that most sexual assaults involve strangers wielding weapons who 
unwittingly leave a great amount of evidence behind, while the reality is that the majority 
of attacks are made by those known to the victim without the use of a weapon and 
without overt signs of physical injury. Another stereotype is that a rape victim will 
always cooperate fully with investigators and prosecutors, providing specific details that 
do not change. In reality, very few victims report an attack immediately, but rather wait 
hours, days, or weeks, if they report at all. Even then, details may change in subsequent 
retellings or a victim may recant her testimony all together. Inconsistent or incomplete 
testimony may be the result of trauma or confusion based on memory impairment, a 
victim believing that no one will believe her account, an attempt to protect the perpetrator 
if it is someone known to the victim, feelings of guilt or shame.568 Unfortunately, many in 
society, including crime investigators and prosecutors, hold these stereotypes of rape 
victims. As long as those involved in the criminal justice process believe that most 
reports of sexual assault are false, “efforts to improve the criminal justice response to 
sexual assault will have only limited impact. Only those cases that look like our societal 
stereotype of ‘real rape’ will be successfully investigated and prosecuted.”569  
The second obstacle to passing a marital rape law derived from a general disbelief 
in the possibility of rape in marriage. Senator J. M. “Bud” Long, the only member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to vote against the bill in 1991, stated: “Why in God’s name 
                                                 
568 Ibid., 4-6. 
569 Ibid., 10. 
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we’re going to punish a man for having sex with his wife when she says, ‘No, not 
tonight,’ I don’t know.”570 Long was not alone in his belief, nor were such ideas limited 
to South Carolina. In 1979, then California State Senator Bob Wilson questioned: “But if 
you can’t rape your wife, who can you rape?”571 Also that year, Charles Burt, defense 
attorney in Oregon’s Rideout case, held the position that marital rape cases were 
frivolous and unnecessary: “It points out the absurdity of bringing the crime of rape as a 
law into marriage.”572 In 1981, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton argued that rape in marriage was less serious than 
rape by a stranger. He noted: “Damn it, when you get married, you kind of expect you're 
going to get a little sex.”573 Such arguments demonstrated that when it came to weighing 
women’s safety against male privilege, many men across the nation stood behind the 
right of free access to women’s bodies.  
 The third obstacle to the law’s passage was the belief that laws were already in 
existence that prosecutors could use in cases of marital rape. As noted by South Carolina 
Representative Charles Sharpe, there are “laws already on the books to govern that kind 
of thing . . . I just feel like this [new law] is not needed, and we need to stay out of a 
man’s bedroom.”574 The common understanding of “laws already in existence” was 
assault and battery, a charge not specific to rape.575 Such an attitude diminished the 
                                                 
570 Scoppe, “Panel Approves Marital Rape Bill.” 
571 Michael D. A. Freeman, “But If You Can’t Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape:” The Marital 
Rape Exemption Re-examined,” Family Law Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1981), 1. 
572 For a review of the Rideout case, please see the Introduction. Susan Barry, “Spousal Rape: The 
Uncommon Law,” American Bar Association Journal 66, no. 9 (1980), 1091. 
573 Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 137. 
574 It is noteworthy that Sharpe saw it as a man’s bedroom. His purposeful choice of words removes the 
possibility that the bedroom also belonged to the woman. Cindy Ross Scoppe, “Clock Running Out for 
House Action on Marital Rape Bill,” The State (Columbia, SC), May 31, 1990. 
575 Scoppe, “Panel Approves Marital Rape Bill.” 
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severity of marital rape by implying violent force was needed to meet the metric of “real 
rape.” This approach was not unique to South Carolina; in fact, it was a common 
argument used across the nation to oppose the elimination of the marital exemption. 
Advocates of the new law were quick to criticize the use of assault and battery to cover 
marital rape. Activists repeatedly explained rape was rape, no matter who committed it, 
and that is how the law should address marital rape. One aspect of their argument 
highlighted the penalty differential in sentencing: In South Carolina, the crime of 
criminal sexual conduct (rape) in the first degree carried a maximum thirty-year sentence, 
while assault and battery in the first degree carried only a ten-year maximum sentence.576 
The practical implication: a man who sexually assaults his wife and is charged with and 
convicted of criminal sexual conduct faces up to thirty years in prison. In contrast, if 
prosecutors charge the same individual with assault and battery for the sexual assault of 
his wife, a conviction will result in no more than ten years’ imprisonment. Thus, by 
categorizing marital rape as assault and battery, prosecutors could effectively limit 
sentencing of husband-rapists to one-third that of non-husband-rapists, undermining the 
seriousness of the act. 
Nevertheless, according to Whipper, the social and political climate had changed 
enough by 1991 for the marital rape bill to pass, particularly because of lobbying efforts 
by women’s organizations. When asked why South Carolina took so long to pass the law 
and eliminate the absolute protection of married men, Whipper suggested that South 
Carolina “holds on to things for a long time, even when they are not good things.”577 
                                                 
576 S.C. Code § 16-3-652, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; S.C. Code §16-3-600(C)(1), assault 
and battery in the first degree. 
577 Whipper interview.  
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Gilda Cobb-Hunter, an expert on the issue of combating domestic violence, reinforced 
this explanation. Cobb-Hunter hoped to see marital rape treated the same as other rape, 
but agreed that advocates of that position needed to remain realistic about what they 
could convince the General Assembly to pass. “We realize that we are in South 
Carolina,” she said several months before Governor Carroll Campbell signed the bill into 
law.578 Thus, Cobb-Hunter and others had to settle for less than they hoped. The result 
was two separate statutes that applied to rape in marriage, depending on whether the 
couple was living together or not at the time of the offense. If the couple was still 
married, but legally separated, the criminal sexual conduct law applied, and a husband 
found guilty would face up to thirty years in prison. In contrast, if the couple shared a 
residence, the applicable crime was the new offense of spousal sexual battery, which 
required physical evidence of violence and only carried a sentence of up to ten years.579 
This then was the status of the law when prosecutors charged Dale Crawford with 
“four counts of marital rape and one count of kidnapping.”580 The verdict in that trial was 
instrumental to the 1994 changes to South Carolina’s rape shield law as it applied to 
marital rape. As noted in the chapter’s opening vignette, Crawford was a case that 
prosecutors thought they could not lose. Deputy Solicitor Knox McMahon, prosecutor for 
the case, referred to Crawford’s “videotape as a ‘lesson on How to Rape Your Wife.’” 
Visibly shaken by the verdict, McMahon went on to say, “If this isn’t marital rape . . . it 
                                                 
578 Scoppe, “Panel Approves Marital Rape Bill.” At the time of her statement, Gilda Cobb-Hunter ran a 
domestic violence organization in Orangeburg, South Carolina. In 1992, voters elected her to the South 
Carolina House of Representatives, a position she still holds in 2015.  
579 S.C. Code § 16-3-615, spousal sexual battery; “Marital Rape Bill Advances,” Herald-Journal 
(Spartanburg, SC), January 23, 1991; Cindi Ross Scoppe, “Marital Rape Bill Signed Spousal Sexual Abuse 
Requires Physical Proof,” The State (Columbia, SC), June 13, 1991. 
580 Twila Decker, “Prosecutor: Man Taped Wife’s Rape Video is Evidence in Lexington Trial,” The State 
(Columbia, SC), April 16, 1992. 
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doesn’t exist.”581 When interviewed by Dateline, Sheriff James Metts admitted that he 
was shocked that the jury acquitted Crawford, explaining that the jury was unduly 
influenced by testimony regarding Trish’s sexual past. According to Metts: “What they 
[the Crawfords] had done previously, or what they may do in the future, [was] not 
relevant to” the present case.582  
How, then, could the jury reach a not-guilty verdict?583 What had the jury heard 
that led them to such a surprising conclusion? Under South Carolina law at the time, the 
defense attorney could not introduce evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual behavior if 
her attacker was someone other than her spouse. However, when the charge was marital 
rape, “witnesses [could] testify about the victim’s sexual history.” 584 Ironically, in most 
cases, the prosecutor could not introduce evidence of the defendant’s sexual history. 
What this meant in Crawford was that the jury heard Dale testify that “his wife enjoyed 
sex games and that they had made [a] videotape of their lovemaking in the past.” They 
also heard Trish’s ex-husband testify that she enjoyed “unconventional sex,” and that she 
had allowed him to tie her up many times during sex. What the jury did not learn was that 
her ex-husband had a motive to paint a bad picture of her – they were in a battle for 
custody of their four-year-old child. Additionally, the judge would not let the prosecution 
                                                 
581 Decker, “Jury: Man Didn’t Rape Wife”; Dateline, 4. 
582 Dateline, 4. 
583 In an interesting coincidence, the composition of the jury in Crawford and Rideout (Oregon, 1978) each 
included eight women and four men. In 1993, marital rape advocate Laura X rationalized the verdicts in 
each case, explained that John Rideout and Dale Crawford “were acquitted because the majority female 
juries in those cases had been conditioned to be judgmental of other women and to distance themselves 
from a rape victim out of fear of it happening to them.” Laura X, “Accomplishing the Impossible: An 
Advocate’s Notes From the Successful Campaign to Make Marital and Date Rape a crime in All 50 U.S. 
States and Other Countries,” Violence Against Women 5, no. 9 (1999), 1072. 
584 Twila Decker, “A Show of Support Keep Faith, Accuser in Rape Trial Says,” The State (Columbia, SC), 
April 22, 1992; Editorial, “Marital Rape Statute Should Be Amended,” The State (Columbia, SC), April 23, 
1992.  
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introduce testimony from Dale Crawford’s ex-wife. Had she been able to testify, the jury 
would have heard that she, too, had been a victim, and that Dale had tied her up with a 
rope and raped her. Had Dale’s sexual history been fair game like Trish’s, the jury also 
would have learned of police reports alleging that Dale had assaulted Trish and his ex-
wife many times.585 
We will never know if this additional evidence would have swayed opinions of 
the jury members. What is clear, however, is that the not guilty verdict reverberated 
across South Carolina and the nation, causing many to question whether marital rape laws 
in that state – in fact, across the country – were adequate to protect a wife from sexual 
assault by her husband. Activists sounded a call to reform the marital rape law almost 
immediately. Those involved wanted to see revisions that would outlaw testimony on the 
victim’s past sexual history; in other words, the promulgation and implementation of a 
rape shield law that protected victims of marital rape.586  
In part due to public disbelief in the justice of Dale Crawford’s acquittal, in 1994 
South Carolina amended its rape shield law to include protection for victims of marital 
                                                 
585 Dateline, 4-5; Decker, “A Show of Support Keep Faith.” It should be noted, however, that at the time 
Dale Crawford bound and raped his first wife, marital rape was not a prosecutable offense in South 
Carolina. This may have been one of the reasons that the judge did not allow the jury to hear testimony 
from Crawford’s first wife. Other possible reasons relate to the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 
404(a)(1) disallows the admission of evidence of a person’s character to prove conduct, except when “a 
pertinent trait of the character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.” If, however, 
Crawford did not offer character evidence in his defense, the prosecutor could not have used his former 
wife’s testimony to discredit his innocence and veracity. Rule 404(b) would also have prevented the 
prosecutor from using the first wife’s testimony as “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove” 
Crawford’s character “in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Finally, according to Rule 403, a 
“court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” At Dale Crawford’s trial, potential testimony by his 
first wife illustrating a history of bondage and rape certainly would have been relevant to the charge he was 
facing. However, any defense attorney would argue that the nature of that testimony would severely 
prejudice the jury against the defendant. 
586 Dateline, 6. 
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rape. The amendment to South Carolina’s rape shield provision was among the last in the 
nation and drew upon substantial legislative, judicial, and social history.  
Historically, testimony about the sexual history of a rape victim during a trial 
emerged from the traditional view of rape as a crime that spoiled “the chastity and value 
of a woman by a man who had no legal claim to sex with her.”587 Rape laws, then, were 
“designed to protect men from the destruction of their interests in women’s bodies by 
other men, somewhat like the theft of household objects in a robbery.”588 The echo of this 
perspective – the chastity and corresponding value of a woman – prevailed well into the 
twentieth century. We can see this in the case of rapes in which “only a victim who was 
‘respectable’ and could show that she did not have a reputation for loose morals or casual 
sex stood a reasonable chance of seeing the conviction of her attacker.”589  
The traditional use of a victim’s sexual history as evidence was to show consent 
and to show a propensity for dishonesty. The practice of connecting consent with sexual 
experience followed the reasoning: “a sexually experienced woman supposedly casually 
selects sexual partners and was thus more likely to have consented to the act in 
question.”590 In People v. Abbot, an 1838 New York case, the judge distinguished 
between a woman “who has already submitted herself to the lewd embraces of another, 
and the coy and modest female severely chaste and instinctively shuddering at the 
thought of impurity,” implying a natural consent from the first and refusal by the latter.591 
                                                 
587 Cuklanz, Rape on Prime Time, 30.  
588 Ibid.; Sakthi Murthy, “Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim’s 
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Seventy-seven years later, a Tennessee judge embraced the same reasoning, concluding: 
“No impartial mind can resist the conclusion that a female who had been in the recent 
habit of illicit intercourse with others will not be so likely to resist as one who is spotless 
and pure.”592 The belief that a sexually experienced woman was more likely to consent 
was still pervasive in the American legal system when the anti-rape movement arose in 
the 1970s.  
Also prevalent was the belief that a woman who had sexual experience outside of 
marriage was inherently untruthful. As Vivian Berger, Columbia University law 
professor, explained in 1977: “A few courts believe that evidence of unchastity [sic] 
bears not only on the substantive issue of consent but also on the woman’s credibility; 
promiscuity imports dishonesty.”593 While chastity – or lack thereof – reflected a 
female’s self-worth and honesty, sexual experience had no effect whatsoever on men’s 
veracity.594 The questioned reliability of a woman’s testimony in a rape case traces back 
to a statement by Matthew Hale: “rape . . . is an accusation easily to be made and hard to 
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused.”595 Hale’s statement, 
emphasizing the unreliability of rape victim testimony, led to the legal assumption “that 
rape victims were more likely to be liars than other witnesses or victims.”596 Legal 
writing on the credibility of rape victims in the twentieth century continued to challenge 
the character of women. In his widely respected legal treatise, Evidence in Trial at 
Common Law, legal scholar Henry Wigmore contended: “no judge should ever let a sex 
                                                 
592 Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655 (1915). 
593 Vivian Berger, “Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,” Columbia Law 
Review 77, no. 1 (1977), 16. 
594 Ibid. In the notes accompanying page 16, Berger provides citations to cases in which the courts equated 
promiscuity with dishonesty.  
595 Matthew Hale, History of Pleas to the Crown (Philadelphia, PA: Robert H. Small, 1847), 635.  
596 Cuklanz, Rape on Trial, 19. 
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offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s social history and mental 
makeup have been examined . . . by a qualified physician.” Lisa M. Cuklanz, professor of 
Communication Studies at Boston College and notable scholar of gendered violence, 
explained that Wigmore’s statement deepened the warning of Hale’s pronouncement: 
“Hale’s meaning was clearly echoed, but with intensified meaning. Now it was not 
simply the social circumstances that promoted false accusations of rape but also the 
actual psychological makeup of female victims.”597 Challenging the female character in 
this manner furthered legal protection for men accused of rape.  
Prior to rape shield laws, rape victims were fair game for defense attorney 
attempts to undermine their credibility, attempts that used the victim’s intimate 
experiences as a form of character assassination. Sexual history evidence generally falls 
into three categories: testimony that describes specific instances of the victim’s conduct, 
generally fact-based details of particular occurrences; opinions of the victim’s sexual 
practices, where witnesses provide statements of their own beliefs about the victim’s 
prior sexual activity; and evidence of the victim’s reputation, or the community view of 
the victim’s character and sexual experience.598 
In the late 1970s, pressure for evidentiary reform came from an uneasy coalition 
between law enforcement officials and feminist organizations. Among the issues this 
unlikely alliance argued was that “sexual morality had changed since the adoption of the 
common-law doctrine which allowed evidence about the victim’s unchaste character.”599 
                                                 
597 Ibid., 20-21.  
598 Murthy, “Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations,” 549-50. 
599 Jason M. Price, “Constitutional Law – Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of 
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By the time advocates proposed rape shield laws, many young women engaged in 
consensual sexual relations outside of marriage. Thus, both popular culture and action by 
the federal government supported efforts to reform the rules of evidence that governed 
trials.600  
Significantly, the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the birth control 
pill as a form of contraception in 1960 fueled the emerging sexual revolution.601 As a 
result, a growing number of unmarried women exercised the right to engage in 
recreational sex quite separate from procreation and marriage.  
Beginning in 1974, the resulting “rape shield laws were designed to protect rape 
victims from embarrassing questions about their private sexual lives,” generally 
forbidding testimony about the victim’s prior sexual history and ensuring “that the rape 
defendant, not the rape victim, was on trial.”602 Advocates suggested that the character 
assassination rape victims faced in open court weakened victim credibility and often 
                                                 
600 Two publications challenged the marriage-oriented ethic related to sex. In 1953, Hugh Hefner released 
the inaugural issue of Playboy, a magazine that promoted a “philosophy that rejected any limits on sexual 
expression and reserved for marriage the harshest of criticism. . . . and encouraged its readers to ‘enjoy the 
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Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America, Second Edition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 302-03. On the early history of Playboy, see Carrie Pitzulo, Bachelors and Bunnies: 
The Sexual Politics of Playboy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Hefner’s message found an 
ally in Helen Gurley Brown, whose 1962 nationally best-selling book Sex and the Single Girl, “encouraged 
single women to enjoy sex before marriage,” and introduced the American public to the swinging singles 
culture. Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women’s Movement Changed America (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 51, 319. In fact, Brown seemed to have as little use for marriage as Hefner 
did. Instead, she “advised women to enjoy the propositions that would come their way and to use sex as the 
‘powerful weapon’ it was.” D’Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 303-04. 
601 As a result of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the birth control pill, a growing number 
of unmarried women exercised the right to engage in recreational sex quite separate from procreation and 
marriage. Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America (New York: Free Press, 1997), 
265-66; Rosen, The World Split Open, 55. Women’s sexual freedom was expanded when the United States 
Supreme Court formalized the right of women (and men) to use contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (as applied to married couples) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing a woman’s right to abortion. 
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resulted in a high-level of acquittal rates in those cases that went to trial.603 Opponents 
suggested that those same provisions prevented a defendant from presenting a full 
defense, specifically by restricting the right granted under the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause. As jurist Gerald E. Rosen explained, “To deprive the defendant of 
the right to present material evidence contradicting the victim is not only to deprive the 
defendant of his constitutional rights to cross-examine his accuser and to mount an 
effective defense, it is also to potentially undermine the jury’s fact-finding 
responsibilities.”604 Despite such concern and any potential legal detriment to defendants, 
state legislatures began to pass rape shield laws in 1974. 
  Between 1974 and 1980, forty-five states and the federal government “made 
efforts to protect rape victims from the humiliation of public disclosure of the details of 
their prior sexual activities” in the form of rape shield laws. In all but one of these 
jurisdictions, legislators passed rape shield statutes; in the remaining state, an appellate 
court ruling instigated change.605 According to the National Center for Victims of Crime, 
rape shield laws “limit the introduction of evidence about a victim’s sexual history, 
reputation or past conduct,” as a response to “the practice of discrediting victims by 
introducing irrelevant information about their chastity.”606 Such laws were enacted to 
                                                 
603 Daniel Lowery, “The Sixth Amendment, The Preclusionary Sanction, and Rape Shield Laws: Michigan 
v. Lucas 11 S. Ct. 1743 (1991),” University of Cincinnati Law Review 61 (1992), 311 and accompanying 
notes. 
604 John Gibeaut, “Shield a Prosecution Sword: Rape Law Can Protect Accuser Who Has Reason to Lie,” 
ABA Journal 83, no. 12 (1997), 37, citing Judge Gerald E. Rosen’s opinion in Boggs c. Brigano, 82 F.3d 
417 (1996). See also, Price, “Constitutional Law – Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes, 541-542. 
605 J. Alexander Tanford and Anthony J. Bocchino, “Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 128 (1980), 544-602. According to Tanford and Bocchino, the 
five states that did not have statutes addressing rape shield by 1980 were Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, 
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606 The National Center for Victims of Crime, 
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serve five basic purposes: to protect the privacy of rape victims; to encourage victims to 
come forward; to enhance the accuracy of outcomes in rape trials by excluding irrelevant 
or prejudicial evidence; to serve as a deterrent to would-be rapists; and, to protect the 
autonomy of women.607  
Before the enactment of rape shield statutes, victims often faced humiliating and 
intrusive questioning about the smallest details of their private lives. Facing such 
questions at trial would often exacerbate the trauma of the sexual assault, implying that 
the victim was somehow to blame for the rape. To avoid being “assaulted” a second time 
by criminal justice officials, many women were reluctant to report the crime and subject 
themselves to a barrage of personal questions in open court. Rape shield statutes 
attempted to insulate victims from this type of secondary violation. They also reflected 
the growing consensus that a woman’s sexual past has a low probative value in a rape 
trial.608 Advocates for rape shield laws argued that the provisions keep jurors’ attention 
on the behavior of the defendant and away from the victim’s reputation, making it clear 
that the defendant, not the victim, is on trial.609 As such, the statutes promoted the 
empowerment of women, giving them the freedom to embrace their choice of sexual 
lifestyle without the fear of diminishing the legal protection against unwanted sexual 
advances. 
 While most rape cases are governed by state law and heard in state courts, rape 
shield laws are embedded in the Federal Rules of Evidence as well. In late October 1978, 
                                                 
607 Murthy, “Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations,” 551-52. 
608 The term probative indicates a tendency to prove or disprove a disputed issue. See note 36 for a review 
of the mandate of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that requires courts to weigh the probative value of 
relevant evidence against unfair prejudice such evidence may cause if introduced to a jury.  
609 Gibeaut, “Shield a Prosecution Sword,” 36; Murthy, “Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations,” 
552.  
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then President Jimmy Carter signed into law H.R. 4727, which created Rule 412, the 
federal rape shield statute. In doing so, Carter issued a presidential statement regarding 
the purpose and value of Rule 412 as addressing the myriad concerns listed above and 
serving as a model for state and local criminal practices. In part, Carter noted: 
This bill provides a model for state and local revision of criminal and case 
law. It is designed to end the public degradation of rape victims and, by 
protecting victims from humiliation, to encourage the reporting of rape. . . 
. Too often rape trials have been as humiliating as the sexual assault itself. 
By restricting testimony on the victim’s prior sexual behavior to that 
genuinely relevant to the defense, the rape victims act will prevent a 
defendant from making the victim’s private life an issue at trial.610 
 
That is not to say, however, that H.R. 4727 passed without controversy. In fact, Rule 412, 
like many state rape shield statutes, was the result of lengthy conflict and debate between 
respected groups on both sides of the issue. The resulting legislation was more 
conservative in nature than some feminist activists would have liked, but it did reflect the 
mixed coalition that supported the bill – traditionally conservative law-and-order types 
and liberal feminists. As adopted, Rule 412 prevented the introduction of opinion and 
reputation evidence of the rape victim’s sexual history, thereby quashing the notion that 
once a woman consents to sexual activity, she has given up the right to withhold consent 
in the future. 
Like many state rape shield laws, including South Carolina’s amended 1994 
statute, the exclusions provided by Rule 412 are not absolute, but rather include 
exceptions to the protective nature of the law. As related to criminal proceedings, Rule 
412(b) provides that a court may allow into evidence testimony: 
of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove that 
someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or 
                                                 
610 President’s Statement on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1902 (Nov. 6, 
1978). 
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other physical evidence . . . [or] evidence of specific instances of a 
victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual 
misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by 
the prosecutor.611 
 
Such exclusions demonstrate the delicate, but necessary balance between protecting a 
victim’s privacy and maintaining the legal rights of a rape defendant.  
Even if evidence falls into one of these two categories, for a party to utilize these 
exceptions, he or she must abide by the terms of Rule 412(c), which sets forth a notice-
and-hearing requirement. If a party intends to offer such evidence, a motion detailing the 
evidence and the purpose for which it will be used must be filed at least fourteen days 
prior to trial. A copy of the motion must be delivered to all parties; the victim must also 
receive notice. Before any evidence of this type may be admitted, the court must then 
hold an in camera hearing, providing both the victim and interested parties the 
opportunity to present information regarding the motion.612 The court must then 
determine whether the proffered evidence is both relevant and more probative than 
prejudicial.613 In instances where defense attorneys did not follow these procedural 
requirements, federal courts ruled against parties attempting to introduce evidence of a 
victim’s sexual conduct.614 
                                                 
611 Rule 412 provides a separate provision for civil cases, which allows the admission of evidence offered 
to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition if its probative value exceeds the danger of harm to 
the victim. Additionally, evidence of a victim’s reputation may be introduced by the defense if the victim 
has placed her reputation in controversy. Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2). 
612 In camera is the Latin term for “in chambers.” Thus, in camera hearings take place in the judge’s 
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613 See note 58 for a description of Fed. R. Evid. 403, which sets forth the balance between probative and 
prejudicial evidence at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 412(c). While the default time requirement is 14 days prior to 
trial, the statute provides the court the discretion to adjust the timing in the interest of justice. See Murthy, 
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614 See, B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091 (2002); Alexander v. Virgin Islands, 2014 WL 323063 
(V.I., 2014).  
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 In 1974, Michigan became the first state to enact a rape shield statute as part of an 
effort to improve the treatment of rape victims. Additional reform efforts “included 
establishing a scale of degrees of criminal sexual conduct, doing away with the 
requirement that the prosecution show resistance by the victim, and eradicating 
interspousal immunity to charges of criminal sexual conduct.”615 The Michigan law 
prohibits the use of character evidence in rape trials, including a victim’s sexual history, 
except for “[e]vidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct” with the defendant or 
evidence “of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy, or disease.” For a defendant to enter such evidence at trial, he must first file a 
written motion and offer proof of its veracity, after which time the judge may hold an in 
camera hearing to determine if the “proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the 
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative 
value.”616 
Twenty years later, when South Carolina amended its rape shield law, legislators 
adopted this language nearly verbatim.617 In fact, a large majority of states followed 
                                                 
615 Lowery, “The Sixth Amendment, The Preclusionary Sanction, and Rape Shield Laws,” note 84. As 
Lowery explains, related state reform efforts “dispensed with the requirement that the complainant’s 
testimony be corroborated and with the mandatory jury instruction that her testimony be scrutinized with 
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mandatory emergency treatment for post-rape victims, reimbursement schemes for victim’s medical 
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616 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.520j. Additionally, Michigan Rules of Evidence 404 (2011) addresses 
character evidence, stating that it is not admissible to prove conduct. However, like the aforementioned 
statute, there are some exceptions. Rule 404(a)(3) provides exceptions for character of the accused, victims 
of alleged homicide, witnesses, and alleged victims of sexual conduct crimes. It states that “In a 
prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with the 
defendant and evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the origin of semen, pregnancy, or 
disease.” While Rule 404 does not address in camera hearings or inflammatory or prejudicial evidence, 
Rule 403 does provide for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of prejudice.  
617 S.C. Code § 16-3-659.1(1). Notably, this statute does not require that it show that the victim had been 
raped by another person, simply that she had sexual relations with someone other than the defendant (the 
presence of semen not belonging to the defendant) and that such an interaction may have resulted in a 
pregnancy or the transfer of a sexually transmitted disease. 
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Michigan’s lead, but some carved out specific uses for the admission of character 
evidence. Delaware, for instance, prohibits the use of “opinion evidence, reputation 
evidence and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness’ sexual conduct” 
for the purpose of proving consent by the alleged victim of rape.618 At the same time, the 
Delaware statute provides that similar evidence may be introduced to attack the 
credibility of the complaining witness.619 Nevada law allows the admission of “evidence 
of any previous sexual conduct of the victim [of sexual assault] to prove the victim’s 
consent.”620 However, evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct to prove her 
credibility as witness is inadmissible unless “the prosecutor has presented evidence or the 
victim has testified concerning such conduct, or the absence of such conduct, in which 
case the scope of the accused’s cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal must be 
limited to the evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim.”621 New York law prohibits 
the admission of a victim’s sexual conduct in a sexual offense case, except in four 
situations where the court determines that the evidence is “relevant and admissible in the 
interest of justice.” The exception that sets New York apart from other states is where the 
proffered evidence would prove or tend to prove that that victim had been convicted of 
prostitution, falsely suggesting that one who engages in prostitution will not or cannot 
withhold consent.622 
                                                 
618 Del. Code Ann. Title 11, § 3509(a)(2010). The original 1979 statute provided the same prohibition.  
619 Del. Code Ann. Title 11, §§ 3508 and 3509(d)(2010), provided that the relevance is not outweighed by 
prejudice. Again, the 1979 statute included similar provisions.  
620 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.069 (2010). Earlier versions of this statute provided similar allowance of evidence.  
621 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 50.090 (2010). Earlier versions of this statute provided similar limitations on the 
admission of evidence to challenge the victim’s credibility.  
622 N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.42 (2010). The 2010 statute and its earlier 1987 version specifies that a 
conviction for prostitution must have occurred in the three years prior to the incident which is the subject of 
the prosecution for the exception to be applicable. 
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While there was (and remains) wide variation to state rape shield laws, nearly 
every state’s rape shield law contains an exception in one form or another that relates to 
the prior sexual behavior between the victim and the defendant. The implication of such 
an exception is that “evidence of prior sexual behavior between a rape defendant and a 
complainant was relevant and admissible when he claimed the defense of consent.”623 
Whether intended or not, the implementation of the exception had the effect of 
resuscitating Matthew Hale’s assumption that a woman, having once “given her body” to 
a man, thereafter continues to consent to sexual intercourse. Thus, a man charged with 
raping a woman with whom he had a previous intimate relationship may not enjoy 
immunity from prosecution, but “he does have the benefit of presenting evidence of their 
sexual history to prove his defense of consent.”624 The extent of this benefit can be great, 
in that it often deters women from reporting rape when their attacker is a current or 
former intimate partner.  
When South Carolina amended its rape shield law to cover marital rape in 1994, it 
too had exceptions. According to the relevant statute, “Evidence of specific instances of 
the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and 
reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct is not admissible.”625 However, it 
allowed for plenty of exceptions that a defense attorney could rely on to make sure the 
jury heard about the victim’s sexual history. The judge’s determination of admissibility 
of such evidence would arise following an in camera hearing.626 The in camera hearing 
                                                 
623 Anderson, “Marital Immunity,” 1524, indicating that by 2003, 48 states and the District of Columbia 
had passed some sort of rape shield law either by statute or judicial decree; See also, Michelle J. Anderson, 
“From Chastity Requirement to Sexual License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law,” George 
Washington Law Review 70 (2002), particularly pages 81-6. 
624 Anderson, “Marital Immunity,” 1522-23. 
625 S.C. Code § 16-3-659.1. 
626 S.C. Code § 16-3-659.1(2). 
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and the judge’s discretion would appear to protect the victim from unnecessary intrusions 
into her personal life that would constitute inflammatory or prejudicial testimony that 
could erroneously sway the opinions of the jury. Still, there was one type of evidence for 
which the statute did not protect the witness: “Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
activity which would constitute adultery and would be admissible under rules of evidence 
to impeach the credibility of the [victim] witness may not be excluded.”627 This provision 
alludes back to the proposition derived from eighteenth-century legal treatises that 
promiscuity imports dishonesty, suggesting that a woman who cheats on her husband is 
fundamentally dishonest and is thus more likely to lie about rape.628 
Notably, the exclusionary nature of rape shield laws is controversial because of 
the competing interests involved. The court must balance the privacy interests of the rape 
victim with the due process rights of the defendant. As noted above, legislators designed 
rape shield statutes to insulate the sexual assault victim from invasive and humiliating 
questioning about her sexual history. Advocates believe that excluding such testimony 
would reduce gender bias in the courtroom, especially as related to determinations of 
consent where the sexual assault victim acted passively rather than resisting (putting up a 
fight).629 This would encourage more victims to report sexual assault. Opponents suggest 
that those same provisions prevented a defendant from presenting a full defense, 
specifically by restricting the right granted under the Sixth Amendment.630 One result of 
                                                 
627 S.C. Code § 16-3-659.1(1). 
628 Julia Simon-Kerr, “Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in 
Impeachment,” The Yale Law Journal 117, no. 8 (2008), 1856-1860. The provision in the statute would 
also seem to reflect the “medieval misogynistic view that once women had sex they desired it always, and 
this insatiability exculpated their rapists.” Barbara A. Hanawalt, ‘Of Good and Ill Repute’: Gender and 
Social Control in Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University Press,, 1998), 127. 
629 Price, “Constitutional Law – Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes,” 550. 
630 The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused the right to present witness in his own behalf and to 
cross-examine witnesses called to testify against his interest. In federal cases, defendants may rely upon the 
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balancing the interests of the victim and the defendant is that the jury may still hear about 
the sexual history of the victim despite rape shield provisions if the defense can 
successfully persuade the judge that the proposed evidence is relevant to establishing his 
innocence.  
Since the late 1970s, the Federal Courts have addressed the balancing act required 
when rape shield laws conflict with the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. One 
early case was United States v. Kasto, issued prior to Rule 412 going into effect.631 The 
underlining events of the case occurred in the spring of 1977 when Beth Renee Jennings, 
an Iowa State University student, participated in an exchange program on the Cheyenne 
River Indian Reservation in South Dakota. Late one evening, Abraham Kasto awakened 
Jennings.632 After talking for about forty-five minutes, Kasto asked Jennings to take a 
ride with him. A few minutes into their ride, Kasto stopped the truck. At that time, 
Jennings asked Kasto to take her home. Instead, Kasto pulled Jennings out of the vehicle 
and raped her. He then took Jennings to his home where he raped her two more times. 
Thereafter, she fled the house; a neighbor took her to the hospital to seek treatment for 
injuries and to report the sexual assault.633 The police subsequently arrested Kasto on 
charges of rape.  
Prior to trial, the government filed a motion asking for the court to prohibit the 
defense from introducing testimony – or making any reference at all – to any sexual 
activities that Jennings may have had with men other than Kasto and from making any 
                                                 
Sixth Amendment to enforce this right; in state cases, protection arises under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, through which the Supreme Court has incorporated the Sixth Amendment protections. 
631 United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1978). It is notable that the rapes in question took 
place on American Indian reservation lands. As a result, the trial occurred in a federal district court. 
632 The reservation’s YMCA had co-sponsored the exchange program. When Jennings first met Kasto, she 
learned that he was a representative of the YMCA.  
633 Kasto, 584 F.2d at 270. 
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reference to the form of birth control Jennings used. Notably, the “District Court granted 
the motion on the basis that a rape victim’s reputation for unchastity and evidence of their 
specific acts of sexual intercourse with men other than the defendant are irrelevant to 
either her general credibility as a witness or to the issue of her consent to intercourse with 
the defendant on the date charged.”634 At the end of the trial, Kasto appealed his 
conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the 
District Court’s order that prevented the aforementioned evidence. Kasto argued that by 
denying him the opportunity to introduce evidence of unchaste behavior on the part of 
Jennings, he was unable to mount a complete defense under the terms of the Sixth 
Amendment and the application of Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402.635 In its opinion, the 
Eighth Circuit stated: 
[A]bsent circumstances which enhance its probative value, evidence of a 
rape victim’s unchastity, whether in the form of testimony concerning her 
general reputation or direct or cross-examination testimony concerning 
specific acts with persons other than the defendant, is ordinarily 
insufficiently probative either of her general credibility as a witness or of 
her consent to intercourse with the defendant on the particular occasion 
charged to outweigh its highly prejudicial effect.636 
 
 “[C]ircumstances which enhance probative value” might include such evidence as the 
presence of semen, pregnancy, or the victim’s physical condition indicating intercourse, 
or where the evidence tends to establish bias, prejudice, or an ulterior motive surrounding 
the charge of rape. The Court went on to conclude:  
Our examination of the record in the instant case satisfies us that the ruling 
by the District Court prohibiting any reference to any sexual activity 
                                                 
634 Ibid.  
635 According to Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is admissible at 
trial, unless otherwise prevented by a federal law or rule. Relevant evidence is that which has a tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.  
636 Kasto, 271-72. 
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which Jennings may have had with men other than Kasto, and to the fact 
that she was wearing an intrauterine contraceptive device at the time of the 
incident, was not an abuse of discretion. Any relevance which this 
evidence may have had to the issue of her consent to sexual relations with 
Kasto was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.637 
 
The Court thereafter affirmed the judgment of the District Court, thereby upholding 
Kasto’s conviction. 
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court heard a case based on notice-and-
hearing requirements of Michigan’s rape shield statute. Michigan v. Lucas involved a 
defendant/appellant who had been convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct 
for using a knife to force his ex-girlfriend into his apartment, where he beat her and 
forced her to engage in several nonconsensual sex acts.638 At the time of the violation, 
Michigan had an operating rape shield law that provided, in part, that if a defendant 
proposes to introduce evidence of a prior sexual relationship between himself and the 
victim, he must file a written motion to offer proof of that relationship within ten days of 
his arraignment. Within its discretion, the court would then hold an in camera hearing to 
determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible.639 At trial, Lucas’ lawyer asked 
to be able to introduce evidence of a prior relationship between his client and the victim, 
despite a failure to file a written motion to do so. The trial court denied the motion and 
proceeded with a bench trial. The court did not find Lucas’ defense of consent persuasive. 
Thereafter, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to a prison term of forty-four to 
one hundred and eighty months.  
                                                 
637 Ibid., 272. 
638 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
639 Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.520j. 
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When Lucas appealed, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s 
decision, holding that the notice-and-hearing requirements of Michigan’s rape shield 
statute was “unconstitutional in all cases where it was used to preclude evidence of past 
sexual conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant.”640 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ 
decision was consistent with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court began 
its analysis with a review of prior cases in which it had upheld notice requirements in 
similar situations. Anecdotally, the court explained that notice requirements by 
themselves did not violate a defendant’s decision to call witnesses, but rather simply 
accelerated the timing of that disclosure. Acceleration of this type was not a 
constitutional violation, the Court stated, because a criminal trial is not “a poker game in 
which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.”641 In a 
later decision, the Court explained that notice requirements enhanced the fairness of the 
adversarial system by increasing the evidence available to both parties.642 In light of this 
string of cases, the Court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in adopting 
their per se rule that the notice-and-hearing requirement violated the Sixth Amendment as 
related to the rape shield law.643 In doing so, the Court acknowledged a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights “to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right 
‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal 
trial process.’” Those restrictions, however, “may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to 
                                                 
640 Michigan v. Lucas at 148. 
641 Michigan v. Lucas at 150. 
642 Michigan v. Lucas at 150 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) and Wardius v. Oregon, 412 
U.S. 470 (1973)). See also, U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), 
in which the Court held that probative evidence could be prohibited in some circumstances when a criminal 
defendant failed to observe a valid discovery rule. 
643 Michigan v. Lucas at 152. 
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the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a [court] must 
evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the 
defendant’s constitutional right to testify.”644 
The following year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Alaska’s rape 
shield law in a case that clearly balanced the interests of the victim and the defendant. In 
Wood v. Alaska, an Alaska state court had convicted the defendant/appellant of first-
degree sexual assault.645 Kenneth Wood and the victim, referred to only as M.G., offered 
contradicting accounts of their relationship at the time of the incident. Wood claimed that 
he and the victim had been in a tumultuous relationship that wavered between fighting 
and make-up sex. In contrast, M.G. claimed that their relationship had always been 
platonic. Before trial, the state moved for, and was granted, a protective order under 
Alaska’s rape shield statute to prevent Wood from introducing evidence of M.G.’s prior 
sexual conduct.646 Following his conviction, Wood appealed on the grounds that the 
exclusion of M.G.’s prior sexual conduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him and to present an adequate defense. The Alaska Court of Appeals 
upheld the conviction, concluding: “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the evidence because it had limited probative value, and whatever value it had 
was outweighed by its probable prejudicial effect.”647 Wood then appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, basing the appeal once again on alleged violations of his Sixth 
Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.  
                                                 
644 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US. 44, 55-56 (1987). See, Price at 554-55, where Price applies this reasoning to 
the use of rape shield statutes. 
645 Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544 (9th Cir. 1992). 
646 Wood v. Alaska at 1546. According to Alaska’s rape shield statute, the court was required to determine, 
in an in camera hearing, the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct. 
647 Wood v. Alaska at 1547. 
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The evidence the jury had not heard was that M.G. had previously posed for 
Penthouse, had appeared in X-rated movies and other sexual performances, and that she 
had shared her experiences with Wood, showing him the Penthouse photographs. In its 
decision, the Ninth Circuit weighed the interests of both victim and defendant, noting that 
while elements of M.G.’s past sexual conduct might be relevant to the case at hand, even: 
relevant evidence can be excluded in certain circumstances. The right to 
present relevant testimony “may, in appropriate cases, bow to 
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” . . . 
[A] state has a legitimate interest in protecting rape victims against 
unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment regarding their sexual 
conduct. Also, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . 
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, 
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”648  
 
Based on these legal grounds, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
explaining that Wood had not successfully proven a violation to his Sixth Amendment 
rights. The Court reasoned that the relevant facts were more prejudicial than probative, 
contending that if the jury members had heard the facts of M.G.’s sexual history the jury 
might: 
feel hostility for her as an immoral woman, and it could base its decision 
on that hostility rather than on the actual facts of the case. The proffered 
evidence in this case is particularly prejudicial because it indicates not 
only that M.G. had extramarital sex, but also that she posed nude and had 
sex both for money and for the purpose of making pornography. Because 
many people consider prostitution and pornography to be particularly 
offensive, there is a significant possibility that jurors would be influenced 
by their impression of M.G. as an immoral woman. They could also 
conclude, contrary to the rape law, that a woman with her sexual past 
cannot be raped, or that she somehow deserved to be raped after engaging 
in these sexual activities. In light of these considerations, we conclude that 
the risk of confusion and prejudice is substantial.649 
                                                 
648 Wood v. Alaska at 1549, where the Court drew heavily on the language of Michigan v. Lucas, discussed 
above (internal citations omitted). 
649 Ibid., 1552-53. 
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By making such a statement, the court ensured that the jury focused on the facts at hand 
and not the victim’s past, fulfilling the purpose of Alaska’s rape shield statute.  
As these three cases demonstrate, when hearing cases involving Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412, federal courts have been sensitive to the apparent conflict between the 
interests of the victim and the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. In Kasto¸ Lucas, 
and Wood, the Court used a balancing test to protect the privacy of the victim, while 
maintaining the right of the accused to launch a complete defense by introducing 
evidence to contradict the statements of the victim. The Courts concluded that when the 
evidence proposed by the defense had no probative value or would unduly prejudice the 
jury against the victim, that evidence would not be allowed. Following these examples, in 
recent years, federal courts and many state courts have acted more consistently with 
regard to rape cases, providing more protection to and justice for victims.  
In contrast, South Carolina continues to demonstrate attitudes that privilege 
accused (marital) rapists over victims. While it is true that there have been some 
amendments to laws relating to criminal domestic violence, criminal sexual conduct, and 
spousal sexual battery since 1994, the more important question is whether these laws are 
in fact protecting women and eliminating rape in marriage. Research conducted in 
Columbia, South Carolina in 2011 suggests that when it comes to protecting its female 
residents from marital rape, the Palmetto State falls short. Four common themes emerged 
from interviews with current and past legislators, state prosecutors, and those who work 
with victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. These common themes explain 
South Carolina’s hesitation in implementing protective measures for women that match 
dominant views in other states.  
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 First, according to many female legislators and social advocates, South Carolina 
remains a patriarchal environment controlled by wealthy, white, heterosexual men of 
privilege. This social structure, which has prevailed since statehood, often marginalizes 
women, children, and minorities.650 Rebecca Williams, Policy and Prevention Specialist 
for the South Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, 
explained that there is within this culture, a deeply rooted and prevailing attitude that the 
family is a closed environment; what happens within the family is private and closed to 
public observation.651 Gilda Cobb-Hunter explained this in 1994, when she said: “in an 
area like family violence, because it is so personal, and it is so private . . . you have a lot 
of folks who are just opposed to government intervening in their bedroom.”652  
 As described by Ginny Waller, Executive Director of the Sexual Trauma Services 
of the Midlands in Columbia, South Carolina, the majority of people in South Carolina do 
not consider sexual violence to be an appropriate topic for conversation. People simply 
do not like to talk about it or acknowledge that there is a problem with sexual assault at 
all. If that is the attitude about sexual assault in general, addressing marital rape will be 
far more difficult.653  
 Waller went on to stress that things would not change simply because state 
legislators passed a new law. Lasting change will require educating the population and 
changing deeply ingrained attitudes if any real change is going to happen. To this end, 
                                                 
650 Author interview with Rebecca Williams, Policy and Prevention Specialist for the South Carolina 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, 28 September 2011 (hereafter, Williams 
interview); Whipper interview. 
651 Williams interview. 
652 Lisa Greene, “Man Guilty of Raping His Wife Jury ‘Sends a Message,’ Makes History With Verdict,’ The 
State (Columbia, SC), February 3, 1994.  
653 Author interview with Ginny Waller, Executive Director of the Sexual Trauma Services of the 
Midlands, September 27, 2011 (hereafter Waller interview). 
 226 
 
Waller explained that those groups most influenced by lessons on sexual assault and 
domestic violence include students, those in the medical field, and law enforcement 
officers.654 Another avenue of education was possible because of a STOP grant funded by 
the Violence Against Women Act. The grant funds a position within the South Carolina 
Attorney General’s Office (AGO), staffed by prosecutor Kelly Wilson Hall. In an 
interview, Hall explained the multifaceted responsibilities of her job: in addition to 
prosecuting cases involving domestic violence, criminal sexual conduct, and other crimes 
against women, she is responsible for state-wide training of law enforcement officers, 
victims’ advocates, and judges on the protocol established by the AGO to deal with 
domestic violence and sexual assault.655  
 Finally, while the state legislature passed the marital rape law in 1991, the 
criminal justice system has rarely utilized the statute to protect victims. While Hall 
accepted the job with the AGO with the understanding that she would prosecute domestic 
violence cases, she indicated that after three years in that position, not a single spousal 
sexual battery case had crossed her desk.656 Hall offered a few theories. She suggested 
that law enforcement officers arresting suspects do so on other charges – i.e. criminal 
domestic violence. Second, she believed that women simply do not report incidents of 
rape in their marriages. This, she said, could reflect their dependence on their abuser. She 
also postulated that they do not see marital rape as a crime; rather, they see sex as a part 
of marriage, even when the man uses force. Those interviewed, whether from the 
criminal justice system or victim advocacy groups, all echoed Hall’s explanations. In 
                                                 
654 Waller interview. 
655 Author interview with Kelly Wilson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, September 28, 2011.   
656 Hall interview.  
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fact, only Assistant Deputy Attorney General W. Allen Myrick knew first-hand of a case 
of marital rape prosecuted as such.657 Instead, Suzanne Mays, a sex crimes prosecutor in 
Lexington, South Carolina, indicated that very few marital rape cases have come to her 
attention – perhaps one or two in fifteen years of practice. Mays suggested that criminal 
domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature is a more common charge. Marital 
rape, explained Mays, is simply more difficult to prosecute, and prosecutors choose a 
more likely conviction over risking a full acquittal.658 The decision to pursue prosecution 
for criminal domestic violence has sentencing implications that downplay the harm to 
marital rape victims. Spousal sexual battery (marital rape) carries a sentence of up to ten 
years. In contrast, a defendant convicted for a first offense of criminal domestic violence 
faces a sentence of a fine of $1,000 to $2,500 or imprisonment for up to thirty days. A 
second conviction carries a sentence of a fine of $2,500 to $5,000 and imprisonment for 
between thirty days and one year. For a third conviction, a defendant faces between one 
and five years in prison.659 This decision by law enforcement and prosecutors may be 
based on practical and efficient considerations: there is a greater likelihood of a 
conviction for criminal domestic violence, and a conviction is better than an acquittal, 
even when the conviction is for a crime carrying a lesser sentence. 
Each of the above responses points to the long-standing political culture of South 
Carolina. Daniel Elazar has described South Carolina’s political climate as one steeped in 
                                                 
657 See note 547 in this chapter for Myrick’s comparison of a “real” marital rape case to a situation 
involving a manipulative and vindictive woman falsely claiming marital rape.  
658 Author telephone interview with Suzanne Mays, September 28, 2011.  
659 Author interview with Tameika Isaac Devine, attorney and Columbia City Council Member, September 
23, 2011; See, S.C. Code § 16-25-20. Only when the crime involves a deadly weapon, results in serious 
bodily injury to the victim, or is an assault that would reasonably cause a person to fear imminent serious 
bodily injury or death, does the sentence for criminal domestic violence carry a sentence of 1-10 years. See 
S.C. Code § 16-25-65, criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature.   
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traditionalistic culture that holds tightly to a paternalistic and elitist conception of the 
state, and one which passes legislation that “places a great deal of importance upon 
privilege of the elite, and upon maintaining programs that serve the interest of this 
group.”660 This culture attempts to use government in very limited ways, seeing “the 
development of a bureaucratic structure as a threat to the value of interpersonal 
relationships.”661 The laws of South Carolina relating to domestic violence reflect the 
dominance of the traditionalistic political subculture in at least three ways. First, family 
courts, rather than higher courts, have jurisdiction over the issuing and enforcement of 
orders of protection against domestic assault, suggesting that such matters are not of 
grave legal concern. Second, these orders, or in fact the criminal domestic violence laws, 
do not protect those persons in non-cohabitating or same-sex relationships, “suggesting 
that traditionalistic views do not support such protection because this would be a threat to 
traditional social ideas and statutes.”662 Third, domestic assault (including sexual assault) 
is statutorily defined, prosecuted, and sentenced separately from regular assault – often 
less severely – which reinforces the desire of traditionalist subcultures to maintain 
traditional patterns even when doing so is contrary to legal and cultural changes 
occurring elsewhere in the nation.663  
                                                 
660 Daniel J. Elazar, The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time, and Culture on American Politics 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 235.  
661 Rebecca Williams, “STOP Formula Grant Administration and the Effects of Political Culture: A 
Comparative Case Study of Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina and Washington,” (Master’s Thesis, 
University of South Carolina, 2007), 7. 
662 Ibid., 29. This discussion intentionally addresses criminal domestic violence statutes rather than spousal 
sexual battery since criminal domestic violence charges are those pursued by the criminal justice system 
even when marital rape was part of the domestic violence instance under review. In light of the recent 
Supreme Court decision that legalized same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015), it 
remains to be seen if criminal domestic violence and spousal sexual battery laws in South Carolina – or 
similar laws in other jurisdictions – will be used to protect victims in same-sex relationships.  
663 South Carolina has a long history of acting independently from the rest of the nation, particularly in 
cases where federal law challenges state’s rights. In 1832, John C. Calhoun resigned as Vice President of 
the United States citing differences with President Andrew Jackson and filled a Senate vacancy, allowing 
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 Unfortunately, the state of South Carolina’s laws allowed Dale Crawford to go 
free and, unsurprisingly his pattern of marital rape and domestic violence continued. In 
late 2004, Dale Crawford was once again the focus of legal and media attention. While 
twelve years had passed since he had been acquitted of raping his then wife Trish, details 
of that event resurfaced as Crawford faced criminal charges, this time for kidnapping, 
murder, and rape in Virginia. On November 22, 2004, police found the body of Sarah 
Louise Crawford, Dale’s third wife, in a Charlottesville, Virginia motel room, four days 
after she had gone missing.664 Dale Crawford quickly became the prime suspect as 
evidence of the couple’s volatile relationship came to light. Two years before they 
married in 1999, a court had convicted Crawford of assault and battery against Sarah. At 
the time of her death, Sarah had a restraining order against her husband and had recently 
moved out of their marital home. Crawford had threatened Sarah when she moved her 
belongings from their house.665  
When the case moved to trial, the jury was not allowed to hear about the earlier 
charges involving Trish since Dale had been acquitted of that crime. However, they did 
hear testimony that Crawford had purchased a handgun and bullets in the weeks prior to 
Sarah’s murder. Witnesses testified that police had found Sarah’s blood on the seat 
                                                 
him to serve South Carolina in Congress to promote states’ rights against perceived encroachment by the 
federal government. South Carolina was the first state to secede from the Union, thereby triggering the 
beginning of the Civil War in 1861. Southern Democrats, including those in South Carolina, had at best a 
tepid relationship with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Programs in the 1930s and 1940s. Many in South 
Carolina took an oppositional stance against the activist Warren Court during the Civil Rights Movement. 
664 Courtney Stuart, “Capital offense: Jury sends a message,” The Hook of Charlottesville, Virginia, 
February 15, 2007. http://www.readthehook.com/85347/cover-capital-offense-jury-sends-message. 
Accessed December 18, 2014. Jack Kuenzie, “Man formerly charged with marital rape now charged with 
murder of third wife,” WISTV of Columbia, South Carolina, November 26, 2004. 
http://www.wistv.com/story/2612294/man-formerly-charged-with-marital-rape-now-charged-with-murder-
of-third-wife. Accessed December 28, 2014.  
665 Stuart, “Capital offense.” 
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covers of her car. Prosecutors suggested that Sarah had been shot in the northern Virginia 
city of Manassas and then driven to Charlottesville, over ninety minutes away. The 
medical examiner testified that given her injuries, Sarah may have lived an hour after 
being shot, but that she would have been paralyzed instantly. Finally, forensic experts 
testified that there was less than one in six billion odds that the semen found on Sarah’s 
body came from someone other than Crawford. The jury heard from investigators that 
Crawford had driven Sarah’s car to Florida shortly after she had been killed, and that he 
told family members in Gainesville that he was in the area on vacation, mentioning 
nothing about Sarah’s death. Finally, the jury heard of Crawford’s interview by the 
police, in which he contradicted himself several times about the events and timing of 
those events leading up to his wife’s death.  
After eight hours of deliberations, the jury of six men and six women found 
Crawford guilty of the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Sarah Crawford.” 
In fact, they found him guilty of six of the seven counts he faced, including “abducting, 
killing, and raping her, stealing her car, and using a firearm in the commission of an 
abduction. The one not guilty verdict – the use of a firearm in the commission of rape – 
was perhaps an even grimmer indictment of Crawford’s actions.”666 The finding of not 
guilty on this count was because the jury concluded that the rape occurred after Sarah 
was dead, making the use of the weapon unnecessary. The court sentenced Crawford to 
two consecutive life sentences plus sixty-seven years. 
For the next seven years, Crawford appealed his conviction. The result of those 
appeals closely resembled a ping-pong match in which he prevailed and then lost ground. 
                                                 
666 Ibid. 
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The appeals, which finally reached the Virginia Supreme Court, argued that Crawford’s 
Sixth Amendment right under the confrontation clause had been violated. Evidence 
introduced at his original trial included an affidavit accompanying Sarah’s petition for a 
restraining order against Crawford. In her affidavit, Sarah had told police officers that her 
husband had “told [her] that [she] must want to die. He also said that he [understood] 
why husbands kill their wives.”667 Crawford’s attorney argued that since his client was 
unable to cross-examine Sarah, the court should not have allowed her recorded testimony 
from the affidavit to be introduced at trial. Thus, the argument continued, his conviction 
hinged on inadmissible evidence, requiring that his conviction be overturned. In 2008, a 
three-judge panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed his convictions on all charges 
except the stealing of Sarah’s car. The following year, the Court of Appeals, reversed the 
three-judge opinion, upholding the original convictions and the admission of the 
affidavit. Crawford’s attorney filed a subsequent appeal with the Virginia Supreme Court, 
which agreed to hear the appeal.668 The Court released its decision in January 2011, 
upholding Crawford’s original convictions. The Court reasoned that while the admission 
of the affidavit technically violated his Sixth Amendment rights, the violation was 
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”669 The Court when on to explain that the case 
against Crawford was strong without the affidavit and would have nevertheless led to a 
conviction in the absence of the affidavit. 
                                                 
667 Brian Chidester, “State court hears Crawford appeal,” C-Ville Weekly, June 1, 2010. http://www.c-
ville.com/State_court_hears_Crawford_appeal/#.VLGksyvF98E. Accessed December 28, 2014. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Tasha Kates, “Court upholds Crawford murder conviction,” The Daily Progress, January 13, 2011. 
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/court-upholds-crawford-murder-conviction/article_0ec42b4e-dd07-
5306-981e-f0d8f4bd99af.html?mode=jqm. Accessed December 28, 2014.  
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While the opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court represented the upholding of 
justice, questions linger about the crimes committed by Dale Crawford. Had he been 
convicted of raping his second wife, Trish, would Sarah Crawford still be alive? Had that 
rape case been heard in a Virginia state court – or the court of a state other than South 
Carolina – would it have led to a conviction, thereby protecting women like Sarah from 
the violence of Dale Crawford? If Crawford faced charges of marital rape in South 
Carolina today, would the jury reach a different verdict? 
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CONCLUSION 
 HOW FAR WE HAVE COME: OR, “THE IDEA THAT COERCION MIGHT 
OCCUR BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE REQUIRES ACCEPTING THE 
IDEA THAT WIVES ARE INDEPENDENT PEOPLE WITH RIGHTS OVER 
THEIR OWN BODIES.”670 
 
Marital rape is a concept that many find difficult to comprehend. The confusion 
often takes one of two paths: disbelief that marital intimacy would rise to the level of rape 
or an inability to comprehend how the law could have insulated a husband from 
prosecution for compelling his wife to have sex against her will. Then there are 
individuals who maintain the belief that rape in marriage is not possible because of the 
concept of irrevocable consent. This belief forms the basis for the “legitimacy” of the 
marital rape exemption. This project has evaluated the argument from both sides of the 
debate, as it analyzes the criminalization of marital rape in the United States in the years 
between 1975 and 1993. The evidence demonstrates that the decision to remove the 
common law protection for husbands was the result of coordinated effort by legislators, 
jurists, activists, and community participants.  
Despite jurisdictional variation, by the end of the twentieth century, all fifty states 
had eliminated the marital rape exemption. However, even a cursory review of those laws 
suggests that victims of marital rape are not provided the same protections, nor are their 
abusers subject to the same level of punishment, from one state to the next. Furthermore, 
in a number of states, the criminal justice system continues to address spousal rape 
differently than non-spousal rape. The primary differences are evident in reporting 
requirements, the statutorily-defined elements of the crime, and sentencing requirements.  
                                                 
670 This sentiment comes from Finkelhor and Yllo, License to Rape, 90. 
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Notwithstanding the number of men arrested and convicted for raping their wives, 
support for a marital rape exemption remains. In the past year, over twenty years since 
the last state eliminated the marital rape exemption, several events have called into 
controversy universal acceptance of the suppositions found in the above title: sexual 
coercion might occur in marriage and that a woman’s right over her own body includes 
the right to say no to marital sex. Those events, separately and collectively, revive the 
theory of irrevocable consent. They also provide evidence that there is a need for further 
development in social and legal attitudes toward rape in marriage. 
 Michael Cohen, attorney and top aide for businessman turned presidential-
hopeful, Donald Trump, raised controversy on July 27, 2015, when he responded to rape 
allegations brought against Trump regarding an incident in 1989. Trump’s ex-wife, Ivana, 
described the episode as rape in a deposition given during the couple’s divorce case in the 
early 1990s. She later clarified her statement and rescinded the assertion that rape had 
occurred. Journalists breathed new life into the episode after Trump announced his run 
for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination. Cohen defended his boss: “You’re 
talking about the frontrunner for the GOP, presidential candidate, as well as a private 
individual who never raped anybody. And, of course, understand that by the very 
definition, you can’t rape your spouse.”671 Thinking that he was adding credibility to his 
argument, Cohen argued: “there’s very clear case law,” to support this position. What 
Cohen didn’t consider was that New York, the state in which Trump resided in 1989 and 
in which his divorce was filed, struck down their marital rape exemption in the 1984 case 
                                                 
671 Tanya Basu, “Donald Trump Lawyer Sorry for Saying ‘You Can’t Rape Your Spouse,’” Time, July 28, 
2015, http://time.com/3974560/donald-trump-rape-ivana-michael-cohen/. 
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People v. Liberta, thirty-one years prior to Cohen’s statement.672 Cohen has since 
apologized for his comments and the difficulties he might have caused for Trump’s 
campaign. 
Unlike Cohen, the Christian blogger who posts under the pseudonym Larry 
Solomon remains unapologetic for posts that have spurred significant controversy. The 
stated purpose of Solomon’s blog, BiblicalGenderRoles.com, is to advise couples on how 
to follow biblical gender-role standards. In an October 2015 post, Solomon contended 
that men “should not tolerate refusal” when their wives say no to sex. Throughout his 
blog, Solomon presents his unique version of women-blaming for sexual difficulties 
within marriage. He claimed in a post titled “How a Husband Can Enjoy Sex That is 
Grudgingly Given by His Wife,” that sex within marriage is a wife’s duty, and to refuse 
that duty or to fulfill grudgingly that duty is sinful. 673 Solomon had argued in an earlier 
post titled “Christian Husbands – You Don’t Pay For the Milk When You Own the 
Cow!” that, from a biblical perspective, there is no such thing as marital rape. A wife’s 
body belongs to her husband, he insists, and a wife should present any request for 
deferment – not refusal – of sex in a humble and gentle way.674  
Addressing men’s motivation for marital intimacy, Solomon explained that men 
want to connect both physically and emotionally with their wives during sex. Yet, a 
woman who seems uninterested in her husband’s sexual demands makes that emotional 
                                                 
672 People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984). 
673 Larry Solomon, “How a Husband Can Enjoy Sex That is Grudgingly Given by His Wife,” October 18, 
2015, 
 http://biblicalgenderroles.com/2015/10/18/how-a-husband-can-enjoy-sex-that-is-grudgingly-given-by-his-
wife/. 
674 Larry Solomon, “Christian Husbands – You Don’t Pay For the Milk When You Own the Cow!” April 
28, 2015, http://biblicalgenderroles.com/2015/04/28/christian-husbands-you-dont-pay-for-the-milk-when-
you-own-the-cow/. 
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connection impossible. Instead of cautioning his male readers to postpone marital 
intimacy until their wives are interested participants, Solomon suggested that they 
“ignore [their wives’] lack of desire and have sex . . . anyway.”675 To avoid potential 
emotional conflict of their own in such situations, Solomon suggested that husbands 
concentrate wholly on the physical connection. The way to do this, Solomon suggested, 
was to “Focus your eyes on her body, not her face. Focus on the visual pleasure you 
receive from looking at her body and physical pleasure you receive from being inside 
your wife.”676  
While Solomon claimed that his comments do not endorse marital rape, his critics 
are not convinced. Some critics have demonstrated their disbelief by responding to his 
blogs with links to domestic violence and sexual assault laws. Others have attempted to 
reach a wider audience through alternate blogs and online news magazines.677 Solomon 
responded by posting another article on his blog, “The Frustrated Feminist Wife,” in an 
attempt to match wits with those critics he referred to as “Rape Accusers.”678 With 
neither side backing down, the debate continues. 
                                                 
675 Emily James, “Christian Website Sparks Fury for Advising Husbands to Avoid Wives' Faces During 
Sex If Their Spouses Don't Want Intercourse - After Saying There's No Such Thing As Marital 
Rape,” October 27, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-3291687/Christian-website-claims-no-
thing-marital-rape-advises-husbands-avoid-wives-faces-sex-spouses-sinfully-not-mood-intercourse.html 
676 Ibid. In his remarks, Solomon compared a wife who is an unenthusiastic participant to the mythological, 
monstrous Medusa: “So like the men who could not look at Medusa’s face otherwise they would be killed, 
realize that if you look on your wife’s face when she is displaying a sinful attitude toward sex it will kill 
your sexual pleasure.” Solomon, “How a Husband Can Enjoy Sex.” 
677 David Edwards, “Christian Website: Don’t Look at Your Wife’s Face During Sex to Enjoy It Even 
When She Resists,” Rawstory, October 26, 2015, http://www.rawstory.com/2015/10/christian-website-
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“Christian Website Advises Avoiding Wife’s Face if She’s Not Into Sex,” Jezebel, October 26, 2015, 
http://jezebel.com/christian-website-advises-avoiding-wifes-face-if-shes-n-1738825759; James, “Christian 
website sparks fury”; Hilary Hanson, “If Your Wife Hates Sex, Just Don't Look At Her Face, Says 
Christian Blogger,” Huffinton Post, October 27, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/if-your-wife-
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678 Larry Solomon, “The Frustrated Feminist Wife,” May 31, 2015, 
http://biblicalgenderroles.com/2015/05/31/the-frustrated-feminist-wife/. 
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Given the swiftness and quantity of opposing responses, Cohen and Solomon 
represent the minority within American society. As such, it is improbable their views on 
the possibility of rape in marriage will have an impact on statutory provisions that have 
criminalized spousal rape. Certainly, controversies will arise that challenge our current 
notion about rape and which actions the law will define as rape, even between individuals 
who are married. In fact, as the following example illustrates, future amendments to 
spousal rape laws will likely involve nuanced interpretations of the laws and their 
application to specific situations not previously considered. 
In August 2014, Henry Rayhons, 78, was charged with third-degree sexual assault 
of his wife Donna, who suffered from dementia/Alzheimer’s disease. Following 
instructions from daughters of a previous marriage, Donna was living in a residential care 
facility when the alleged sexual assault occurred. A care plan developed by facility 
employees, Donna’s daughters, and her treating physician, recommended cessation of 
activities that might result in undue stress or physical harm to Donna. In mid-May 2014, 
care facility personnel reviewed the care plan with Rayhons and informed him that his 
wife was no longer able to consent to sexual activity. Events leading to Rayhons’ arrest 
began when Donna’s daughters shared their concerns with health care providers, alleging 
inappropriate sexual contact between Henry and Donna. After care facility staff informed 
the police about the daughters’ suspicions, a formal investigation ensued. At issue in the 
case was whether Donna had the mental wherewithal to consent to sexual activity.679 
While the majority of recent debates about consent and sexual assault have revolved 
                                                 
679 Relevant to the Rayhons’ case, the Iowa sexual assault statute provides: “a person commits sexual abuse 
in the third degree when the person performs a sex act . . . [when] the act is between persons who are not at 
the time cohabiting as husband and wife . . . [and] the act is performed while the other person is mentally 
incapacitated, physically incapacitated, or physically helpless.” Iowa Code § 709.4. 
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around the influence of drugs, alcohol, and the culture on college campuses, 
Rayhons’s trial presented a unique examination of the aspect of consent: “When is a 
previously consenting spouse suffering from dementia no longer able to say yes to 
sex?”680 The jury found Rayhons not guilty, yet it is uncertain why they reached that 
verdict. They may have concluded that Donna did give consent, despite her severe 
cognitive impairment, or that the prosecutor had not proven the charges against Rayhons. 
In the alternative, ambiguity within the state statute may have influenced the jury’s 
decision. Iowa law defines sex with a person suffering from a “mental defect or 
incapacity” as sexual assault but provides no guidance about what is meant by the term 
“mental defect.”681 
Experts suggest that the “conclusion of the trial is unlikely to end the national 
conversation the case launched about sex and dementia.”682 As the life expectancy for 
Americans continues to increase and rates of dementia rise, medical, ethical, and legal 
issue of consent will become even more significant. The complexity of dementia make 
legal assessment of consent difficult. Symptoms fluctuate unpredictably. A patient might 
be lucid in the morning, yet impaired that same afternoon. What is appropriate one day 
might be inappropriate the next, depending on the patient’s condition. A lack of 
consensus within the medical field further complicates this uncertainty. Even among 
Alzheimer’s experts, there is no agreement on whether the disease really does preclude 
                                                 
680 Sarah Kaplan, “In an Iowa Courtroom, an Astonishing Case of Sex and Alzheimer’s,” Washington Post, 
April 7, 2015, accessed October 10, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/04/07/in-an-iowa-courtroom-an-astonishing-case-of-sex-and-alzheimers/.  
681 Sarah Kaplan, “Former Iowa Legislator Henry Rayhons, 78, Found Not Guilty of Sexually Abusing 
Wife with Alzheimer’s,” Washington Post, April 23, 2015, accessed October 10, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/23/former-iowa-legislator-henry-rayhons-
78-found-not-guilty-of-sexually-abusing-wife-with-alzheimers/. 
682 Ibid. 
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people from being able to give consent. It is possible for a physician to conclude that a 
patient is too cognitively impaired to consent to any sexual activity, while at the same 
time acknowledging that physical intimacy can benefit dementia patients by calming 
agitation and easing loneliness.683 
The current controversy surrounding consent and dementia patients will not be the 
only concern that causes society to reinterpret the legal definition of (spousal) rape. The 
people of this nation – whether legislators, activists, or simply interested citizens – will 
certainly be called upon to address future nuanced conditions that arise and demand 
subtle clarifications. 
As with any project, there are additional avenues of inquiry about social attitudes 
and legal analysis regarding spousal rape that remain to be considered in further research. 
The influence, if any, which race and ethnicity had on the promulgation of spousal rape 
laws is one area fruitful for investigation. For instance, Laura X argued that African 
American legislators in California, Ohio, and South Carolina “suffered paternalism by 
unsupportive white male liberals who said that marital rape was only a problem in the 
African American community . . . [that] would be cured by ending poverty for African 
Americans.”684 While such evaluation may not have made it into the legislative history of 
other jurisdictions, the possibility is ripe for further investigation. Further examination of 
domestic violence and sexual assault activism in relation to that of LGBT activism would 
also provide an opportunity for critical analysis, especially in light of Supreme Court 
                                                 
683 Kaplan, “In an Iowa Courtroom”; Pam Belluck, “Sex, Dementia and a Husband on Trial at Age 78,” 
New York Times, April 13, 2015, accessed October 10, 2015, 
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684 Laura X, “Accomplishing the Impossible: An Advocate’s Notes From the Successful Campaign to Make 
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decisions that have held anti-sodomy law unconstitutional and invalidated state laws that 
banned same sex marriage.685 Popular culture both influences and reflects changes in 
societal norms and expectations. Therefore, a close reading of novels, movies, and music 
that reference sexual assault and physical violence within marriage would provide yet 
another lens by which to evaluate changing social and legal views on spousal rape.   
While there are clearly still questions to be asked and critical analyses to be made, 
this study demonstrates several of the important victories that women made in terms of 
personal autonomy that led to the criminalization of rape in marriage. Over the course of 
nearly one hundred and fifty years, those hard won victories were dependent on the 
dedication of women’s advocates, the determination of legislators, the activism of jurists, 
and the support of an involved public. Social and legal attitudes toward spousal rape – 
actually, sexual assault in general – have resulted in greater legal protection for the rights 
of married women. The elimination of the marital rape exemption, better trained law 
enforcement, increased services provided by advocates, and a more informed public all 
promote the legitimacy of marital rape claims. This sense of legitimacy promotes the 
belief that victims today will receive more support and justice than did Greta Rideout, 
Diana Willis, Dianna Green, and Trish Crawford. 
 
                                                 
685 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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